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over the years.
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1 Introduction
My thesis sheds light on three empirical research questions related to the intersection
of the fields of applied labor economics and empirical public economics: What is the long-
run effect of more generous unemployment insurance on post-unemployment outcomes?
How do unemployed job seekers search for jobs when both wage and commuting distance
matter? How do disability insurance recipients adjust labor supply in response to financial
incentives? Chapter 2 shows that more generous unemployment insurance has a negative
impact on post-unemployment earnings in the long-run; although earnings differences
become smaller over time, a gap in earnings remains. In particular, this effect seems
to be driven by older job seekers who rely on unemployment assistance for an extended
period of time. Chapter 3 shows that both wage and commute distance are relevant for
job search, namely, laid-off workers start looking for new jobs in the old workplace that
pay a relatively high wage. As time goes on, however, workers increasingly prospect areas
outside of the previous workplace and eventually accept jobs that eventually pay a lower
wage. Chapter 4 shows that the labor supply of disability insurance recipients is lower
than it could be, because recipients reduce their earnings due to financial incentives that
cut disability benefits if their earnings are too high.
All three chapters make use of two key ingredients to answer these desired research
questions: rich data and an adequate empirical strategy. All chapters are based on the
Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which covers the universe of private sector
wage earners from 1972 until today. It collects complete labor market histories along
with socio-economic characteristics and employer information. The data can be linked
to several other datasets to gain additional information. I also link the ASSD to the
unemployment register to extract further socio-economic characteristics and information
about type and amount of unemployment benefits (see Chapters 2 and 3). The link to the
tax register allows me to gain information about the place of residence for each individual
(Chapter 3) and higher quality information on labor earnings, a crucial ingredient for
Chapter 4. The empirical strategies I use vary according to the chapter. For example,
in Chapter 2, I compare job seekers before and after the reform by adopting a quasi-
experimental, Differences-in-Differences, approach. For Chapter 3, we pair a calibration
exercise with Cox-proportional hazard estimates that rely on kinks in the unemployment
benefit schedule (Card et al., 2015) and discontinuities in eligibility rules for potential
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unemployment duration. For Chapter 4 we implement a bunching estimator (Kleven and
Waseem, 2013) to estimate the counterfactual earnings densities of disability insurance
recipients. The remainder of this introduction presents extended summaries of these three
chapters.
Chapter 2: Unemployment Insurance and Post-Unemployment
Outcomes
Unemployment insurance systems are present in many countries and serve to replace in-
come in case of job loss. A widely debated issue is what the optimal level and duration
of unemployment benefits should be. Increasing the potential duration of unemployment
benefits (PBD) gives job seekers more time to find suitable jobs when they need it. There
is abundant evidence showing that more generous unemployment insurance prolongs ef-
fective unemployment and nonemployment duration because job seekers eventually lower
their search efforts in anticipation of the longer benefit duration. Prolonging job search
can lead to worse outcomes for the unemployed if employers discriminate against those
with longer unemployment, for example, by giving them worse job offers. Thus, giving
job seekers more time may not necessarily help them to find better jobs. In this essay,
I answer the question of what happens to earnings after unemployment for those unem-
ployed who are allowed to spend more time on unemployment benefits. I use a reform in
Austria that increased PBD for job seekers above age 40 with sufficiently high experience,
while it remained unchanged for less experienced or younger job seekers. The reform is
analyzed utilizing a Differences-in-Differences strategy contrasting the inflow of treated
and control groups before and after the reform.
While there is no discernible earnings difference between treated and controls before
the reform, earnings are substantially lower in the first year after unemployment entry
for job seekers eligible for the extension in PBD. Earnings are lower because treated are
nonemployed longer and also because they find worse jobs as measured with daily earnings
and employment days. Earnings remain low for a substantial amount of time, but the
difference in earnings shrinks as the treated eventually leave their current employers and
find a better match. Extending PBD has a differential impact by age group. Specifically,
young job seekers incur a relatively smaller earnings loss and virtually everyone returns to
employment. The difference in earnings declines quickly, but the treated do not overtake
controls implying a gap in earnings over the entire 10 years that I assessed. Old job
seekers incur a larger earnings loss, remain nonemployed longer, and rely more heavily
on unemployment assistance as a consequence of the reform. Overall, the reform did not
help either of the groups to find better jobs or find jobs fast enough to avoid detrimental
effects from prolonged joblessness.
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Chapter 3: Spatial Search Strategies of Job Seekers and the Role
of Unemployment Insurance
Most people do not work where they live and have substantial commute times to work.
On average in OECD countries, individuals travel 60 minutes one-way. Standard models
of job search focus on wages as main decision variable and do not account for the role
of space, which might be a useful simplification. We consider the distance-wage trade-off
by assessing the role of space empirically but also by extending the standard job search
framework.
We use the ASSD combined with the unemployment register and information on travel
times between municipalities within Austria to study the interplay of distance and wage
empirically. An unemployed individual can leave unemployment in six distinct exits:
higher/lower/same wage and higher/lower/same distance. Using the different exits as
competing risks, we pursue a Cox regression approach to estimate hazard rates for each
exit as a function of unemployment parameters such as benefit level and benefit duration.
The econometric specification uses three features of unemployment insurance in Austria.
First, we make use of the fact that the level of unemployment benefits is a kinked function
of previous earnings. Second, unemployment benefit duration is a discontinuous function
of age. Third, we explicitly model the finite nature of unemployment benefits and the
fact that individuals may enter a second tier regime, unemployment assistance. Empirical
results suggest a negative relationship between unemployment benefit level and potential
benefit duration and hazard rates. Furthermore, we document a decrease of the hazard
rate in the same city relative to the hazard rate outside the city and that over time job
seeker accept lower wages.
Then, we develop a simple continuous-time search model to rationalize the empirical
observations. In the model, we assume two types of job seekers: covered workers are
entitled to unemployment benefits and uncovered workers receive lower unemployment
assistance. All job seekers start out in the covered regime but switch to the uncovered
regime with a constant rate. Both types target their search to the previous workplace
but also outside and we assume that covered job seekers have a relatively higher efficiency
of search in the previous workplace. Job seekers make a choice about three things: a
minimum acceptable wage (reservation wage), a maximum acceptable distance (reserva-
tion distance) and within the reservation distance the optimal intensity of search effort.
The solution consists of a reservation frontier, that is, a reservation wage for any com-
mute distance. The slope of the reservation frontier is the marginal rate of substitution
between wage and distance: job seekers can buy short commutes with a lower wage or
seek to be compensated with a higher wage for long commutes. Uncovered job seekers
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value unemployment less because of the lower amount of benefits that they receive. Thus,
they ask a lower wage for any given commute distance. The fraction of job seekers who
finds a job in the previous workplace decreases over time. The main reason is that the
average search intensity in the previous workplace declines as more and more uncovered
job seekers remain in the pool of unemployed. We simulate the dynamics of the main
outcomes of the model over the turn of nonemployment and compare them to the data.
The calibrated model is quite able to replicate the empirical regularities. It predicts that
the absolute and also all six sub-hazards decline. Furthermore, it is able to replicate the
decrease of the hazard rate in the same city relative to the hazard rate outside the city.
The analysis shows that both distance and wage matter for job search and that both
dimensions can be incorporated into a job search framework.
Chapter 4: Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insur-
ance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design
Disability insurance (DI) programs are among the largest social programs by now and
amount to approximately 2.5 percent of GDP on average (OECD, 2010b). While DI
programs are designed to provide income replacement in case of permanent loss of earnings
capacity, many programs have been criticized to discourage work. One work disincentive
present in many countries is that beneficiaries lose part of their benefits if earnings exceed
a substantial gainful activity amount (SGA) amount.
For Austria, we find that the presence of this SGA cap induces many DI beneficiaries
to adjust their monthly earnings just below the SGA threshold of e439. If monthly
earnings exceed the SGA threshold by e1, DI benefits are reduced by up to 50 percent in
that month. These rules generate a discontinuous increase in the (implicit) tax liability
– a notch – at the SGA threshold and create a strong incentive to bunch below the SGA
threshold. Estimating a counterfactual earnings distribution under the scenario where no
notch is present, we find large and sharp excess bunching just below the SGA threshold.
We estimate that DI beneficiaries who earn just below the SGA threshold would increase
monthly earnings by up to e400 if the notch at the SGA threshold did not exist. This
represents a 91 percent increase relative to the SGA earnings level. The estimated earnings
response is large, but the implied earnings elasticity (i.e., the amount of earnings change
as a response to a change in the implicit tax rate) is small with only 0.206. This is because
notches create extremely large implicit tax rates, and thus, the behavioral responses are
large even when elasticities are quite small. Simulating alternative policies, we find that
replacing the notch at the SGA threshold with a e1 benefit offset for every e2 of earnings
would increase work and reduce government expenditures.
2 Unemployment Insurance and
Post-Unemployment Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies how the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) affects post-
unemployment outcomes. Understanding whether a policy change impacts post-unemploy-
ment outcomes is crucial to assess the implications of a reform beyond unemployment
itself. Evaluating the effect of changes in UI on unemployment itself is too narrow if
unemployment insurance also affects job quality. Fiscal cost of increasing UI may be out-
weighed if job seekers can explore more job opportunities to find better jobs. But fiscal
costs are even higher if increasing UI deteriorates post-unemployment outcomes. There-
fore, even a pure policy assessment requires information on how changes to UI affect
post-unemployment outcomes. Knowledge about whether and how post unemployment
outcomes are affected has implications for the formulas for the optimality of unemploy-
ment insurance (Chetty, 2008; Schmieder et al., 2012a).
Theoretical predictions are ambiguous whether and how a longer duration of benefits
affects post-unemployment outcomes. Standard job search theory predicts that longer po-
tential benefit duration (PBD) makes job seekers more selective. This mechanism leads
to a decrease in the unemployment exit rate (Mortensen, 1977; van den Berg, 1990) and
may result in better job match quality because job seekers wait for higher productiv-
ity jobs (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000). Unemployment
benefits can influence job match quality negatively if, for example human capital depreci-
ates or employers discriminate against job seekers based on unemployment duration (see
Oberholzer-Gee (2008) or Kroft et al. (2013) for experimental evidence). Both mechanisms
might be relevant at the same time. The negative influence is more likely to dominate the
higher selectivity of job seekers for longer nonemployment durations (Schmieder et al.,
2016; Nekoei and Weber, 2015).
There is a vast literature showing that more generous UI leads to longer duration of
unemployment benefit receipt (unemployment duration) and/or the time between job loss
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and re-employment (nonemployment duration).1 More recent evidence also shows how
consumption changes during unemployment. Kolsrud et al. (2015) document that con-
sumption drops from the beginning of unemployment and further decreases throughout
the spell. Changes in earnings are an important determinant for changes in consumption
during unemployment because transfers do not fully compensate for the earnings loss.
However, their study does not answer whether there are implications for consumption
after unemployment benefits have run out. Surprisingly little is known on how changes in
UI impact post-unemployment outcomes. Although the literature on post-unemployment
outcomes has grown recently, there neither is a consensus on the sign nor the size of
potential effects. Most studies that directly evaluate the effect of more generous UI on
post-unemployment outcomes focus on wages and tenure on the first job after unem-
ployment. Other frequently assessed outcomes also include whether individuals switch
industries and/or occupations.2 The set of outcomes is potentially large, yet some are
only observed on the first job per definition while others would in principle allow measur-
ing long-term effects of changes to UI. Much less is known on the consequences of more
generous UI on longer-term outcomes in general.
Schmieder et al. (2012c) study long-term effects of higher PBD in Germany. PBD dis-
continuously increases at age 42 from 12 to 18 months. Regression discontinuity estimates
indicate that increased PBD leads to higher initial nonemployment. While nonemploy-
ment remains larger up to five years after the initial unemployment spell, individuals with
longer initial spells have a lower subsequent probability to be nonemployed. Changes in
nonemployment could imply that days spent on some form of social benefits changes as
well. Assessing the long-term consequences of changes to UI for other social programs is
important and interesting to study in light of the complementarity/substitution discus-
sion (see Inderbitzin et al. (2016). Degen and Lalive (2015) study a reform in Switzerland
that reduced PBD from 24 to 18 months for older job seekers. They focus on earnings up
to four years after unemployment entry. Results indicate that a reduction in PBD leads
to permanently higher earnings (3.3 percent) and employment (3.3 percentage points).
1Studies include the seminal work by Meyer (1990) using US data, Hunt (1995) for Germany and
Winter-Ebmer (1998), Lalive and Zweimüller (2004), Lalive et al. (2006). Studies identifying a causal
effect by means of a regression discontinuity design include Lalive (2008), Card et al. (2007a), Caliendo
et al. (2013), Schmieder et al. (2012a) and Nekoei and Weber (2015).
2see Addison and Blackburn (2000a) for a review of earlier contributions. van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008) study a decrease in PBD in Slovenia finding small positive effects on re-employment wages. Mas
and Johnston (2015) study a decrease in PBD in the US and do not find that re-employment wages
change. Studies that assess an increase in PBD include: Caliendo et al. (2013) and Schmieder et al.
(2016) for Germany finding negative effects on re-employment wages, Le Barbanchon (2012b) finds no
effect on re-employment wages for France, Nekoei and Weber (2015) finding positive effects for Austria.
Guglielminetti et al. (2015) study how wages interact with commuting distance. Their evidence suggest
that job seekers tend to increase the search radius, centered on the old workplace, as time goes.
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The effect is stronger for high skilled individuals likely because skills depreciate faster for
them. While four years is a decently long period of time to measure post-unemployment
outcomes, it would be interesting to understand whether effects are persistent beyond this
period. Furthermore, decomposing the effect into employment and wages would allow to
better understand different aspects of job quality.
This paper analyzes the long-term effects of a reform to the Austrian unemployment
insurance. The reform increased (i) PBD from 30 to 39 weeks for high experienced workers
aged between 40 and 49 and (ii) PBD increased from 30 to 52 weeks for high experienced
workers aged 50 or older.3 The reform, enacted in August 1989, can be used to assess the
increase in PBD in a Differences-in-Differences design. The recent literature has a strong
focus on identifying effects of unemployment insurance using regression discontinuity de-
signs, for example induced by age thresholds. While these designs allow for a credible
identification of a marginal effect of for example extended unemployment insurance on
post-unemployment wages, they are bound to be local. Generalising the estimated treat-
ment effect to the population is problematic. Estimating a reform effect at the threshold
is attractive but too narrow if also individuals away from the threshold are affected.
Identification is more difficult in this case but the potential gains are large because the
treatment effect is estimated from a broader population. The reform I study in this paper
is ideal for this purpose. I find that an increase in PBD has a negative effect on earnings
in the 10 years after unemployment entry. The effect is strong in the beginning but the
difference in yearly earnings shrinks over time. Mainly adjustments in (non)employment
contribute to both the negative effect in the beginning and the decline of the effect over
time. In particular older job seekers rely more heavily on unemployment assistance after
unemployment benefits have expired.
This paper adds in at least three aspects to the existing literature on how PBD affects
job match quality. First, I focus on earnings instead of re-employment wages as the main
outcome. A job seeker may care for the wage earned on the job after unemployment if
the job is permanent. But she may equally care about for how many days she can earn
this wage in case of unstable jobs. Earnings are a summary measure of employment and
wages. Different than wages, earnings do not hinge upon having a job, hence are always
defined. Throughout the paper I use labor earnings and neglect other sources for earnings
such as social benefits. If not stated differently, I use the term earnings and imply labor
earnings.
The concept of earnings is formalized in equation (2.1). Specifically, earnings are
positive if a worker is employed. In this case she receives daily earnings for the number
3The reform also changed the level of benefits for low-income individuals. The effect of the full reform
on unemployment duration is analyzed in Lalive et al. (2006).
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of employment days. Daily earnings times employment days yields earnings in a given
period. Earnings are zero if a worker is not employed in which case employment days and
daily earnings are zero. I use the term conditional earnings when I only consider the part
of a period when the worker is employed. With employment status I refer to whether an
individual is employed or not in a given period.
labor earnings =
employment days× daily earnings if employed0 if not employed (2.1)
The specification makes clear that in a given period there are three major margins where
differences in earnings can occur: changes in employment status, employment days or
different daily earnings. To study long-term outcomes I focus on the 10 years after unem-
ployment entry but also analyze in detail single years to study adjustment mechanisms
over time.
Second, the long-term outcome I analyze implies that I study the labor market situ-
ation beyond the first job after unemployment. A worker might care for the earnings on
the first job. But she might also care for improvements in earnings for example through
improvements on the job or by changing jobs (Jovanovic, 1979; Burdett and Mortensen,
1998) if such possibilities exist. To gain insights about the relevance of such channels, I
will focus on the evolution of yearly earnings over the 10 years.
The third contribution of this paper concerns the decomposition of earnings in case
they are zero. Equation (2.1) makes clear that earnings are zero if a worker is not em-
ployed. I decompose nonemployment and study to what degree unsuccessful job seekers
rely on other forms of social benefits once unemployment benefits have run out.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the institutional background
and data. Section 4.3 explains the econometric framework and tests its assumptions.
Section 2.4 presents main empirical results for earnings along with robustness checks.
I continue with the decomposition of earnings and assess the labor market situation of
job seekers beyond earnings by taking into account further social benefits. Section 4.5
concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background and Data
The unemployment insurance system in Austria is characterised by two main parame-
ters: unemployment benefits replace between 40 and 60% of previous earnings for a fixed
amount of time (potential benefit duration, PBD). Once unemployment insurance bene-
fits have expired, job seekers may enter the means-tested unemployment assistance (UA)
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regime. UA is basically granted for an unlimited amount of time but individuals have to
re-apply every 26 weeks.
In 1989, the Austrian unemployment insurance system experienced major changes
while there were no changes to UA. Before August 1, 1989 the unemployment system in
Austria allowed all individuals who worked 52 weeks within the last two years to claim
unemployment benefits for a maximum of 20 weeks. All individuals who contributed to
unemployment insurance for 156 weeks or more in the last five years were eligible for 30
weeks of unemployment benefits. With August 1, 1989, the Austrian government imple-
mented a series of changes to PBD. PBD became dependent on age and new experience
thresholds. Individuals older than age 40 with contributions to the unemployment system
of at least 312 weeks within the last 10 years were eligible for 39 weeks of unemployment
benefits. PBD increased to 52 weeks for the age group 50 and older if individuals con-
tributed to the unemployment system for at least 468 weeks within the last 15 years.4
Table 2.1: Change to PBD and Treatment Assignment
Prior UI contributions (weeks)
<156 156-311 312-467 ≥468
Age
< 40 20 (-) 30 (C) 30 (C) 30 (C)
40-49 20 (-) 30 (C) 39 (T) 39 (T)
≥50 20 (-) 30 (C) 39 (T) 52 (T)
Notes: Table 2.1 shows the change to PBD in weeks and treatment assignment (C: Control; T: Treatment; -: not considered)
based on age and experience at date of unemployment entry. See text for details.
Table 2.1 illustrates how control and treatment groups are constructed. Treatment
status is a function of age and experience. Individuals are assigned to the treatment
group if they fulfil the experience criterion and fall in the respective age range at unem-
ployment entry. The policy change can be evaluated using a Differences-in-Differences
(DiD) strategy by comparing the total inflow before the reform to the total inflow after
the reform.
2.2.1 Data and Sample
For the construction of the sample I use the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD)
described in detail in Zweimüller et al. (2009). The ASSD is a matched employer-employee
dataset covering the universe of private sector employees in Austria. For each worker, the
4The policy change also increased the replacement rate from 41% to about 47% for individuals with
monthly earnings between 5000 and 10,000 ATS (363-727 Euros). Lalive et al. (2006) show how the
change in PBD and/or the replacement rate affects the duration of unemployment. To isolate the change
in PBD I exclude individuals with low previous earnings.
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dataset contains daily information on labor market status, including among others em-
ployment and unemployment. I consider inflow from August 1986 to July 1996. For each
inflow I calculate the unemployment and nonemployment (time from job loss until a new
job is found) duration. I refer to these two durations as initial unemployment and initial
nonemployment duration. By date of inflow I infer experience, age and base earnings rel-
evant for the benefit level5. These three variables determine the treatment status. From
the ASSD I calculate earnings in the ten years before and after initial unemployment.
Earnings are deflated to 2000 Euros using the consumer price index. Specifically, I calcu-
late earnings per employer and then aggregate to single years by weighting the employer
specific earnings with employer specific employment days. This procedure also yields
number of employment days. Similarly, I infer the number of days on unemployment,
other benefits (consisting of unemployment assistance, sick leave, disability, old-age) or
inactivity. For the last job before initial unemployment I infer earnings, tenure, indus-
try affiliation and geographical location related to the employer. I further include the
complete series of earnings, employment and unemployment days in the ten years before
initial unemployment as control. I complement the data with information from the unem-
ployment register covering years 1987 to 1998. It contains information in particular about
benefit type (UI/UA), daily benefit amount, education, recall status and family situation.
The ASSD allows me constructing a local unemployment rate specific to experience, age,
industry and region per month to control for group-time specific unemployment patterns.
I make several sample restrictions. To focus the analysis on a homogenous sample. I
analyze laid off job seekers; voluntary quits are identified by a 28 days waiting period.
Hence, all individuals who enter unemployment directly come from employment. I focus
the analysis on men because virtually all men work full time whereas I cannot tell apart
whether a women works part time or only part of the year.6 I keep only individuals be-
low age 55 at date of inflow. This restriction guarantees that labor market attachment is
sufficiently high for older individuals when I follow them up to 10 years after initial unem-
ployment. Essentially, I restrict transitions to early retirement and disability and therefore
increase the fraction of unemployed workers returning to employment.7 Similarly, and to
reach a more homogenous sample, I exclude individuals below age 35 shrinking the control
group somewhat. Finally, I exclude job seekers recalled by the previous employer because
5Note that base earnings are not equal to earnings on the last job before unemployment entry. The
benefit level is determined based on earnings in year t-1 (t-2) if the individual applies for unemployment
insurance in the second (first) half of the year.
6Daily earnings available in the data confounds hours worked and the wage rate. Furthermore, the
observed employment spells confounds hours and days worked. This limitation is a major problem for
women but not for men. Furthermore, the identifying assumption is unlikely to hold for women (see
Appendix Figure 2.10).
7see Inderbitzin et al. (2016) for the interaction of unemployment with other social benefits.
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they have different search incentives.8
2.3 Econometric Framework and Identification
I evaluate the policy change using a Differences-in-Differences strategy where I contrast
the change in outcomes of the treatment group over time to changes in outcomes of the
control group over time. The regression specification is:
Yit = β0 + δDiAt + β1Di + β2At +X
′
itβ + εit (2.2)
where Yit stands for post unemployment outcomes, such as earnings. i indicates an indi-
vidual inflow in period t. Di is the treatment dummy and equal to 1 if an inflow belongs
to the treatment group and 0 otherwise. At is a dummy that takes the value 1 if unem-
ployment starts after August 1, 1989 and 0 otherwise. δ is the coefficient of interest that
identifies the average treatment effect on the treatment group. X ′it is a vector of control
characteristics including past earnings, employment and unemployment, education, age,
experience, nationality, marital status and indicator variables for industry, geographic
location, calendar year and month and the local unemployment rate.
The main identifying assumption for the Differences-in-Differences estimator to iden-
tify the average treatment effect on the treatment group is parallel time trends for the
treatment and control group in absence of the treatment. This assumption could be vi-
olated for at least three reasons. First, the composition of treatment and control group
could change. Second, labor market outcomes might evolve differently across treatment
and control groups because their outcomes respond differently to economic cycles. Third,
the reform may change incentives to become unemployed leading to more treated individ-
uals who enter unemployment after the reform. I now discuss each of these three threads
to identification.
2.3.1 Composition of Treatment and Control Group
Table 2.2 contains selected descriptive statistics for treatment and control group before
(At = 0) and after (At = 1) the reform. Column (5) contains unconditional Differences-
in-Differences estimates. The top panel shows how earnings, employment and conditional
earnings before unemployment entry change between treatment and control group. Yearly
earnings increase from e19,711 to e21,018 for the control group and somewhat stronger
8Appendix figure 2.10 shows that unemployment duration is highly cyclical for recalled job seekers,
which makes the identifying assumption hard to assess and questionable. Excluding firms with a high
ex-ante probability to recall workers instead of recalled individuals would yield the same results.
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for the treatment group from e20,081 to e22,320. The differential increase is positive and
statistically significant indicating that treated individuals who enter after the reform have
on average higher earnings.9 All individuals entering unemployment come from employ-
ment. Employment days decrease by the same amount for both treatment and control
group. Conditional earnings increase somewhat stronger for the treatment group; the
difference is significant and drives the increase in earnings. Individuals in the treatment
group differ from those in the control group in some predetermined characteristics. The
most apparent change is that more immigrants populate the control group after the re-
form, which also explains the drop in experience of that group.10 The share of younger
individuals who are more likely to enter unemployment from white-collar jobs and more
likely to be divorced is larger in the treatment group after the reform. Furthermore,
treated individuals are more likely to come from the real goods sector and less likely to
become unemployed in the construction sector.
With the exception of more low experience immigrants entering the control group after
the reform, changes in the characteristics are economically small. The main difference,
the relatively large inflow of immigrants, only has a minor impact on the main result as
shown in the robustness section. From this perspective, treated individuals who enter
unemployment after the reform appear positively selected. Column (5) shows uncondi-
tional Differences-in-Differences estimates. The positive effect on earnings may be driven
by observable and unobservable characteristics. I now assess to what degree conditioning
on observables influences the effect on earnings.
The question is what the difference is in pre-unemployment earnings conditional on
covariates. To assess these differences, I estimate equation (2.2) for earnings in the 10
years before unemployment entry. Figure 2.1 depicts point estimates from these regres-
sions. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals, the x-axis measures years relative
to unemployment entry. The figure shows that pre-unemployment earnings conditional
on covariates are slightly negative in years 9 and 10 before unemployment entry. Pre-
unemployment earnings are zero in all other years. This result implies that the un-
conditional change in earnings between treatment and control group from Table 2.2 is
fully explained by observable characteristics. While observables explain differences in
pre-unemployment earnings, their influence on post-unemployment earnings is limited as
shown in the robustness section.
9Average yearly earnings are somewhat below median earnings of e22,332 for similar workers in the
year 1990. Median earnings of the full working population is e12,907 but the individuals eligible for the
increase in PBD only have earnings above e12,824.
10Austria experienced a substantial influx of immigrants after the fall of the iron curtain in 1989.
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Table 2.2: Selected Descriptive Statistics
Control group Treatment group
Before/After At = 0 At = 1 At = 0 At = 1 DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-UI earnings and policy intervention
Yearly Earnings (EUR) 19,711 21,018 20,081 22,320 932.2⋆⋆⋆
Days employed 315.0 317.2 312.4 314.6 0.05
Yearly earnings (EUR) | employed 19,814 21,178 20,232 22,569 973.1⋆⋆⋆
PBD (weeks) 28.64 27.55 29.70 43.05 14.44⋆⋆⋆
Unemployment (weeks) 24.25 23.73 27.93 34.55 7.14⋆⋆⋆
Nonemployment (weeks) 50.17 60.98 63.53 89.74 15.40⋆⋆⋆
Control Variables
Austrian 0.77 0.64 0.74 0.73 0.11⋆⋆⋆
Experience days last 5 years 1540.6 1408.1 1675.8 1704.6 161.3⋆⋆⋆
White Collar 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.35 0.06⋆⋆⋆
Age 38.31 39.45 46.50 47.27 -0.38⋆⋆⋆
Higher Education 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.01
Family status
Single 0.16 0.20 0.09 0.10 -0.03⋆⋆⋆
Married 0.68 0.66 0.76 0.74 0.00
Divorced 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.03⋆⋆⋆
Widow 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00
Industry
Agriculture 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00
Energy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Mining 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Real Goods 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.06⋆⋆⋆
Construction 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.18 -0.07⋆⋆⋆
Wholesale and Retail 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.02⋆⋆⋆
Tourism 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.01
Transportation 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01
Financial 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.00
Personal Services 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00
Arts and Sports 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Health 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01⋆⋆⋆
Education 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00
Government 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.01
Housekeeping 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of observations 17,430 45,186 30,320 63,909 156,736
Notes: Table 2.2 shows means of selected variables for the treatment and control groups who registered before or after 1
August 1989, respectively. Column (5) contains unconditional DiD point estimates. Yearly earnings, days employed and
conditional yearly earnings are measured in the year before UI inflow. Experience is measured in the 5 years before UI
inflow. Earnings are deflated to the year 2000. White collar status and industry is measured on the last job before UI
inflow. Significance is indicated as follows: ⋆ (p<0.1), ⋆⋆ (p<0.05), ⋆⋆⋆ (p<0.01).
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Figure 2.1: Treatment Effect for Pre-unemployment Earnings
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Notes: The figure shows treatment effects for pre-unemployment earnings in each of the 10 years before unemployment
entry. Dots depict point estimates, shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals. Own illustration using data from ASSD.
2.3.2 Evolution Over Time
Whether the treatment group would have evolved differently over time than the control
group in absence of the treatment cannot be tested directly. But the data allow following
treatment and control groups over time. In particular I can assess whether there are
differences between the two groups before the implementation of the reform. One test,
proposed in Autor (2003), is implemented by means of the following modification of
equation (2.2):
Yit = β0 +
t0+p∑
τ=t0−k
δτDi1(ti = τ) + β1Di + β2At + βτ1(ti = τ) +X
′
itβ + εit (2.3)
where t0 denotes the reform date, τ measures the quarter of the inflow and runs from
k = 16 quarters before the reform to p = 24 quarters after the reform. 1(ti = τ) is a
dummy variable for the quarter of inflow. δτ measures the treatment effect in quarter τ
relative to anything specific to that quarter captured in βτ , i.e. relative to the control
group. The specification essentially splits the treatment effect δ from equation (2.2) to
single quarters around the reform by allowing flexible group-specific changes over time.
If no pre-existing differential trends appear between treatment and control groups, we
can expect the coefficients interacted with the quarters before the reform to be zero and
the time profile flat. Clear differences before the reform could be problematic as they
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would indicate that treatment and control groups had already evolved differently over
time before the reform.
Figure 3.8 depicts the estimated coefficients δˆt along with 95% confidence intervals for
each of the 16 quarters before the reform. The figure displays point estimates for earnings
measured in the year after unemployment entry (top left), employment status, conditional
earnings and duration of initial unemployment (bottom right). The point estimates for
earnings fluctuate around, and are close to zero. Only for inflow in quarter 15 before the
reform is there a statistically significant positive effect. This positive effect is likely due
to employment status that is significantly positive for this quarter of inflow (top right).
Conditional earnings are not statistically significant in any of the quarters. There are no
obvious trends in the outcomes before the reform. Furthermore, estimating the treatment
effect only using inflow 8 quarters before the reform does not change the main result.
The increase in PBD also affects unemployment duration. Shifts in unemployment
duration that are not related to the reform would violate the design similarly to non-
parallel trends in earnings. The bottom right graph of the figure confirms that there is
no differential in unemployment duration between treatment and control group before
the reform. Point estimates fluctuate around zero, with one marginally negative effect
11 quarters before the reform. Eventually, increases in unemployment duration in the
quarter leading to the reform (0 on the x-axis). This increase may occur either because of
anticipation of the reform or because the reform also affects ongoing spells. A robustness
check shows that excluding inflow up to one year before the reform does not change the
results.11
11Appendix Figure 2.11 shows the evolution of these four outcomes over the entire estimation period.
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Figure 2.2: Parallel Trends Before the Reform
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Notes: The figure shows how treatment effects evolve in the 16 quarters before the reform. Dashed lines are treatment
effects interacted with indicator variables for quarter relative to treatment as in equation (2.3). Shaded areas depict 95%
confidence intervals. Own illustration using data from ASSD.
2.3.3 Endogenous Entry
The third test I implement assesses endogenous entry into unemployment. If treated in-
dividuals enter unemployment insurance more frequently after the reform because they
expect higher benefit duration, the estimated treatment effect would be biased (Lalive
et al., 2011). To assess inflow, I relate the inflow into unemployment to the total popu-
lation at risk to enter unemployment in either treatment or control group. Panel (a) of
Figure 2.3 plots the inflow rates by treatment and control group. Inflow rates of the two
groups evolve parallel. There is no discernible shift in the inflow rate of the treatment
group after the reform. There is, however, a slight increase in the inflow rate for the
control group starting from quarter 8 after the reform. As the reform increased attrac-
tiveness of unemployment for treated individuals, this result is surprising and reassuring
at the same time. Endogenous entry as response to the reform is unlikely in this context.
Panel (b) plots inflow levels by treatment status and confirms that there is no difference
in inflow levels after the reform. Again, we see that the number of registrations increases
starting from quarter 8 but the difference in registrations remains constant. A look at the
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graph indicates that endogenous entry in this context may not be a concern.
Figure 2.3: Endogenous Entry Into Unemployment
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Notes: Subfigure (a) shows the inflow into treatment and control group as fraction of all employed worker eligible for either
treatment or control. Subfigure (b) depicts the number of registrations for treatment and control group per quarter on the
left axis. The solid line depicts the inflow difference between treatment and control group on the right axis. The dashed
vertical line marks the reform date. Corresponding Differences-in-Differences estimates are in Table 2.3. Own illustration
using data from ASSD.
Estimating the changes in inflow between treatment and control group reinforces the
visual impression. Table 2.3 presents results from a regression of the inflow on the treat-
ment dummy Di, the interaction DiAt and a set of dummies for each quarter. On average,
the treatment group has a lower inflow rate (Di). As the visual inspection as suggested,
the inflow rate is lower for the treatment group compared to the control group (column
(1)). It is safe to say that there are not more treated individuals entering unemploy-
ment after the reform. The same is true when assessing the inflow levels (column (2)).
Endogenous entry in the treatment group is not a concern in this context.
Table 2.3: DiD Estimates for Endogenous Entry Into Unemployment
Inflow rate Inflow level
(1) (2)
DiAt -0.002⋆⋆ -95.14
(0.001) (84.51)
Di -0.017⋆⋆⋆ –240.0⋆⋆⋆
(0.000) (25.86)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Obs. 82 82
Adj R2 0.985 0.921
Notes: Table 2.3 shows DiD estimates for difference in the inflow. Column (1) reports estimates for the difference in
the inflow rate corresponding to Panel (a) of Figure 2.3. Column (2) reports estimates for the difference in the inflow
level corresponding to Panel (b) of Figure 2.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is indicated as
follows: ⋆ (p<0.1), ⋆⋆ (p<0.05), ⋆⋆⋆ (p<0.01).
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Thus the assumptions on parallel trends are likely to be satisfied.
2.4 Results
This section presents the results of the effects of the increase in PBD. First, I discuss the
results on earnings, employment status and earnings conditional on employment. Second,
I assess robustness of the main results and decompose the effect on earnings. Third, I
assess the earnings response over time by focusing on single years and then break down
nonemployment into various social benefits and inactivity.
2.4.1 The Effect of PBD on Earnings
Table 2.4 reports estimates for the cumulative loss over ten years in earnings. As a
consequence of the reform, treated individuals experience a loss in earnings of e6,927
over the ten years after unemployment entry. Evaluated at the sample mean, earnings
of the treatment group are 6 percent lower than those of the control group. Per week
of PBD increase, treated individuals have e481 lower earnings over 10 years, or e48.1
on average per year. Degen and Lalive (2015) study a decrease in PBD of 6 months
and report an increase in earnings of 0.156 percent per week of PBD decrease over a
four-year period. The difference in the results either is because of non-symmetric effects
of changes in PBD. Or the effect of PBD on post-unemployment outcomes is non-linear.
Contrarily, Kolsrud et al. (2015) document a drop in consumption of about 18 percent 1
year after unemployment entry, which is related to lower earnings. Their estimated effect
is larger than mine because they compare consumption (and earnings) before and during
unemployment and not between treatment and control group. The estimated difference in
earnings can be decomposed into employment status and conditional earnings. Both are
lower in this context contributing to lower earnings for the treatment group. On average,
treated individuals are 3.2 percentage points less likely to have a job over the 10 years
after unemployment entry (column (2)). The magnitude of the effect is similar to what
Degen and Lalive (2015) estimate over a four-year period (3.3 percentage points). The
absolute loss in conditional earnings because of the reform amounts to e4,884 (column
(3)), a loss that constitutes of fewer employment days and lower daily earnings.
The question arises why earnings are lower for the treatment group compared to the
control group. Given the theoretical considerations outlined in the beginning, lower earn-
ings are the consequence of lower job match quality, itself being related to increased
non-employment duration as a consequence of the policy change. The increase in nonem-
ployment duration is also likely to drive down job-match quality: the response in nonem-
ployment duration is relatively large. On average, individuals are allowed to spend 14.4
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weeks longer in UI (see Table 2.2). The implied marginal effect for nonemployment du-
ration is 0.45 or 13.5 days per month of PBD extension.12
Typical estimates for European studies range from 0.05 to 0.65 with a mean marginal
effect of 0.23 (Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016). Two studies explicitly relate nonem-
ployment duration to re-employment wages. Schmieder et al. (2016) estimate a marginal
effect for nonemployment duration of 0.16 and a negative effect on re-employment wages
of 1.2 percent. In contrast, Nekoei and Weber (2015) estimate a marginal effect for
nonemployment duration effect of 0.02 and a positive effect on re-employment wages of
0.4 percent. Thus, as the results here suggest, a higher marginal effect on nonemployment
duration leads to worse post-unemployment outcomes.
Table 2.4: DiD Estimates: Lower Earnings After Longer Initial Unemplyoment
Earnings Empl. Earnings
| empl.
nonempl.
duration
(weeks)
unempl.
duration
(weeks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DiD -6,927⋆⋆⋆ -0.032⋆⋆⋆ -4,884⋆⋆⋆ 6.427⋆⋆⋆ 4.470⋆⋆⋆
(1,121.4) (0.004) (1,117.0) (0.607) (0.284)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 115,183 0.834 138,041 35.719 27.933
Obs. 156,728 156,728 128,843 130,436 156,728
Adj R2 0.218 0.171 0.226 0.101 0.159
Rel. to sample mean (%) 6.014 3.837 3.538 17.99 16.00
Per week of PBD 481.0 0.002 339.2 0.446 0.310
Notes: Table 2.4 contains DiD estimates. Outcomes in columns (1)-(3) are measured cumulative over the 10 years after
UI inflow. The outcome Empl. is measured as being employed at least once in the 10 years. Mean Y refers to the mean
outcome in levels of the treatment group before the reform. The full set of controls is used including the local unemployment
rate, daily wage and tenure of the last job, experience in the last 5, 10 and 15 years, earnings and unemployment days
in the 10 years before unemployment inflow, indicator variables for industry, region, year, month, age, family status and
education, higher order polynomials of tenure, last daily wage and all experience measures. Standard errors are in brackets
and clustered on individual level. Significance is indicated as follows: ⋆ (p<0.1), ⋆⋆ (p<0.05), ⋆⋆⋆ (p<0.01).
2.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Before continuing the analysis, I examine the remaining concerns from the section on
identification and also assess robustness of the results. First, I implement a series of
placebo estimations to check whether trends were indeed parallel before the reform was
implemented. To do this, I simulate placebo reforms starting in August 1985 and shift the
reform date in 90-day steps up to August 1996. For each placebo reform I use ± 3 years
12Lalive et al. (2006) report an elasticity of 0.085 for the same reform. After I replicate their sample
by including again recalled job seekers and also women, the elasticity becomes 0.11. Indeed, most of the
reduction is due to recalls.
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of inflow around each placebo reform date. I use earnings in the year after the reform
because of repeated unemployment.
Figure 2.4 shows the point estimates for each single placebo reform. The x-axis mea-
sures time of the placebo reform relative to the actual reform date. Before quarter -8
there is no effect of this placebo reform on earnings because inflow is always before the
actual reform. Despite substantial variance, there only is a significant effect of the reform
in quarters larger than -6. The effect becomes stronger as more and more individuals
who are affected by the reform enter the estimation sample. The effect remains negative
some quarters beyond the reform, eventually because of worsening economic conditions
as seen in the assessment of the inflow. However, the placebo effects fade out after the
estimation window is shifted beyond the actual reform because only observations enter-
ing unemployment after the actual reform date remain in the estimation sample.13 The
reform is likely to shift earnings. Insignificant treatment effects if only inflow before the
reform is considered suggests that the evolution of treatment and control group is similar
in absence of the treatment.
Figure 2.4: Placebo Reforms for Earnings
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Notes: Figure 2.4 shows point estimates from Differences-in-Differences regressions for a series of placebo reforms. Each
placebo reform uses ± 3 years of inflow. Placebo reform dates start in August 1985 and shift every 90 days up to August
1996. The x-axis measures quarters relative to the actual reform date. Shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals. The
outcome is earnings in the year after unemployment entry. See the text for further details. Own illustration using data
from ASSD.
The next question is what the influence of heterogeneity is on the results. To inves-
tigate their robustness, I repeat the analysis for various subsamples closer to the policy
intervention thresholds in terms of age, experience and calendar time. Panel A of Table
13A similar picture results for unemployment duration, see Appendix Figure 2.12.
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2.5 contains the baseline estimates from Table 2.4 for ease of exposition. By definition of
the treatment, treated individuals are on average older and have more work experience.
Despite holding constant these characteristics in the estimation, the estimated treatment
effect could be the result of these differences because of insufficient overlap in control
variables. The following robustness checks also help to alleviate these concerns. Panel B
restricts age at inflow to 45 or younger leaving out old individuals. The treatment effect
becomes weaker but remains negative and significant; the increase in PBD still leads to
a decrease in earnings. Younger job seekers appear less responsive to the reform than
older job seekers, particularly regarding employment status. Reasons may include differ-
ent treatment intensity or different behavioral responses. I assess differences by age in
more detail below.
Panel C presents estimates with the sample restricted to inflow of high experience
individuals. This variation in the sample mainly cuts down on the control group. If
the results would change substantially, then the choice of the control group would be a
concern. The treatment effect becomes somewhat stronger but still remains close to the
baseline estimate suggesting that heterogeneity in experience does not largely influence
results.
In panel D, I narrow the time window and only use inflow ± 2 years around the reform
date instead from August 1985 to August 1996. Reducing the time window around the
reform reduces the influence of differing economic conditions over time. The effect on
earnings is about 30 percent smaller but still within range of the baseline. While the effect
on conditional earnings is similar, mainly the lower effect of employment contributes to
the different point estimate in earnings. Overall, significance is lower with this restriction
because only 40 percent of the sample is used. Changing the control group or making
both the control and the treatment group more similar in various ways does not largely
influence the result.
As mentioned earlier, the composition of the inflow changed. There is an inflow of
low-experienced immigrants to the control group after the reform. This change in the
composition may be due to the general inflow of immigrants to Austria around the time
of the reform and not because of the reform. But excluding immigrants from the analysis
sheds light on the robustness of result with respect to changes of inflow composition.
Panel E presents regression results when immigrants are excluded from the analysis.
The point estimate for earnings becomes slightly more negative in this case and similar
to the one in Panel C where the sample was restricted to high experience individuals as
probably similar individuals are excluded. Although the effect for employment differs the
main result remains the same. Contrarily, only analysing immigrants reveils that their
unemployment duration responds much stronger, while their earnings response becomes
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a bit smaller, comparable to younger job seekers (Panel B). The employment response of
immigrants is somewhat stronger while there is not effect on conditional earnings.
The assessment of parallel trends showed an increase in unemployment duration for
the treatment group for individuals entering unemployment in the quarter before the
reform. Because the reform affected ongoing spells but the treatment is defined at un-
employment entry, some individuals in the control group may be misclassified, which is
likely to lead to an underestimation of the effect. Panel F contains results if inflow in
the 12 months before the reform is excluded. This restriction ensures that no individual
who entered unemployment before the reform can be eligible for the increase in PBD.
Point estimates become somewhat more negative but the change is small compared to the
baseline. Wrongly accounted spells to the control group despite the fact that they belong
to the treatment group do only have a minor influence on the result.
The discussion so far was silent to what extent results are influenced by some form of
observed or unobserved heterogeneity. In case treated individuals who enter unemploy-
ment after the reform are positively selected, the presented estimates are lower bounds.
In case of negative selection, the presented estimates are upper bounds. Given higher
unconditional pre-unemployment earnings for the treatment group relative to the control
group, positive selection is likely in this context.
Oster (2013) presents a formal test for the influence of unobserved heterogeneity based
on the movement of R2 by inclusion/omission of control variables. The test therefore also
sheds further light on the direct influence of control variables, which might be a concern
because of insufficient overlap in control variables between treatment and control group.
The test requires an assumption on the maximum R-squared, R˜2, that can be reached
in a given context. Oster recommends using 1.3 times the R2 from the specification
with control variables. The test then asks how much more important does unobserved
relative to observed heterogeneity needs to be to yield a point estimate of zero to reach
R˜2. In principle, the test statistic can take any value from minus to plus infinity. A test
statistic greater than one implies that unobserved heterogeneity must be more important
than observed heterogeneity. A test statistic between zero and one would be of concern,
because relatively little unobserved heterogeneity would induce the point estimate to
become zero. A negative test statistic implies that unobserved heterogeneity would have
to drag the point estimate in the opposite direction from observed heterogeneity.
I executed this test for earnings, conditional earnings, and employment status. De-
tailed results are available in Panels B, C and D of Appendix Table 2.8. The test statistic
is mostly negative for earnings and conditional earnings implying that point estimates
are bounded away from zero under the assumption of the test. One exception is earnings
in year 9 after unemployment entry where the statistic is 0.380. For the outcome em-
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Table 2.5: DiD Estimates: Sensitivity Analysis
Earnings Empl. Earnings |
empl.
nonempl.
duration
(weeks)
unempl.
duration
(weeks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Baseline -6,927.1⋆⋆⋆ -0.032⋆⋆⋆ -4,883.8⋆⋆⋆ 6.427⋆⋆⋆ 4.470⋆⋆⋆
(1,121.4) (0.004) (1,117.0) (0.607) (0.284)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 115,183 0.834 138,041 35.719 27.933
Obs. 156,728 156,728 128,843 130,436 156,728
B. Only age 35-45 -4,185.7⋆⋆⋆ -0.006 -3,434.4⋆⋆ 4.677⋆⋆⋆ 2.719⋆⋆⋆
(1,459.8) (0.004) (1,405.3) (0.746) (0.345)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 141,045 0.909 155,199 36.745 25.192
Obs. 91,091 91,091 82,360 83,733 91,091
C. High Experience -7,689.2⋆⋆⋆ -0.037⋆⋆⋆ -5,836.1⋆⋆⋆ 5.323⋆⋆⋆ 4.012⋆⋆⋆
(1,247.0) (0.004) (1,221.9) (0.641) (0.300)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 115,160 0.834 138,023 35.733 27.942
Obs. 131,388 131,388 107,052 108,378 131,388
D. Restricted years of inflow -4,378.8⋆⋆ -0.014⋆⋆ -4,333.2⋆⋆ 3.334⋆⋆⋆ 3.436⋆⋆⋆
(1,948.3) (0.007) (1,952.4) (1.083) (0.519)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 115,376 0.806 143,145 36.123 27.436
Obs. 40,124 40,124 33,241 33,646 40,124
E. Only Austrians -7,608.6⋆⋆⋆ -0.029⋆⋆⋆ -5,763.3⋆⋆⋆ 4.575⋆⋆⋆ 3.849⋆⋆⋆
(1,306.4) (0.004) (1,303.4) (0.712) (0.335)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 118,334 0.843 140,342 36.472 28.511
Obs. 110,907 110,907 91,488 92,905 110,907
F. Only Immigrants -4,208.4⋆ -0.040⋆⋆⋆ -1,327.1 10.365⋆⋆⋆ 5.448⋆⋆⋆
(2,345.2) (0.009) (2,331.2) (1.261) (0.561)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 102,280 0.796 128,437 33.740 26.282
Obs. 41,374 41,374 33,829 33,994 41,374
G. No inflow 1 year before reform -7,233.0⋆⋆⋆ -0.035⋆⋆⋆ -5,127.1⋆⋆⋆ 6.418⋆⋆⋆ 4.649⋆⋆⋆
(1,202.8) (0.004) (1,193.8) (0.648) (0.309)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Y 115698 0.842 137348 35.769 28.129
Obs. 146,222 146,222 120,031 121,526 146,222
Notes: Table 2.5 contains DiD estimates for various sample restrictions for cumulative outcomes over 10 years after unem-
ployment inflow. The results for single years is available in Appendix Table 2.7. Panel A corresponds to estimates in Table
2.4. Panel B focuses on a sample where individuals are between 35 and 45 years old at inflow. Panel C focuses on a sample
of individuals with experience of at least 9 out of the last 15 years and 6 out of the last 10 years (also see Table 2.1 for the
definition of the treatment). Panel D uses only inflow from the years 1987 to 1991 instead of 1985 to 1996 as in Panel A.
Panel E uses only inflow of Austrians, Panel F uses only inflow of Immigrants. Panel G excludes inflow from the 12 months
leading to the reform. Mean Y refers to the mean outcome in levels of the treatment group before the reform. The full set
of controls is used (see notes of Table 2.4). Standard errors are in brackets and clustered on individual level. Significance
is indicated as follows: ⋆ (p<0.1), ⋆⋆ (p<0.05), ⋆⋆⋆ (p<0.01).
ployment status, the test statistic is at least 2.75. In this case, unobserved heterogeneity
would have to be at least 2.75 times as important as observed heterogeneity to induce a
point estimate of zero. Overall, the test suggests that the results are not susceptible to
unobserved heterogeneity and point estimates are bounded away from zero.
The treatment effect is robust to a variety of changes in the sample, and the point
estimates remain within reach of the baseline estimates. Unobserved heterogeneity does
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not play a key role beyond observed heterogeneity. Although the exact size of the point
estimates varies with subsamples, results suggest a robust negative effect of an increase
in PBD on post-unemployment earnings.
2.4.3 Decomposing Earnings
Earnings are a summary measure for the labor market situation of an individual in gen-
eral. Decomposing earnings into their components yields a detailed analysis of changes
in the underlying variables. The data set allows me to decompose earnings along several
dimensions. First, I want to assess the adjustments of earnings, employment status and
conditional earnings over time. The decomposition over time is instructive as it allows
studying the timing of the effect. Furthermore, I can disentangle short-term effects di-
rectly related to the increase in initial nonemployment from long-term effects. Second,
I can decompose conditional earnings into employment days and daily earnings. This
decomposition yields a more detailed picture of different measures for job quality. Third,
employment is mirrored by nonemployment within a year. Thus, decomposing nonem-
ployment into various different components is important for understanding long-term
consequences of the increase in PBD on other social benefits.
Evolution Over Time. Figure 2.5 presents graphical results for earnings, employment
status and conditional earnings for each year around unemployment entry.14 The figure
shows point estimates from OLS regressions of equation (2.2) on earnings in each of the
10 years before and after unemployment entry. The x-axis is centered on unemployment
entry. There is no discernible difference in earnings before unemployment entry as already
seen in Figure 2.1. Earnings for the treatment group drop by e1,175 (about 17 percent of
the effect over 10 years) in the year following unemployment entry because of the increase
in PBD. This loss in earnings is directly linked to the increase in initial nonemployment
due to the increase in PBD and therefore part of the behavioral response during initial
unemployment. Two years after unemployment entry, the earnings difference remains
low with e1,406. This point estimate is not a direct result of increased unemployment
but an effect beyond the initial unemployment period. The effect on earnings remains
on this low level through year 4 after unemployment entry and starts to approach zero
afterwards. In year 8 and beyond the point estimates are not statistically significant from
zero implying a zero difference in earnings between treatment and control group in these
years. While gap in yearly earnings closes it also implies that the the treatment group is
14Corresponding regression results for post-unemployment years are available in Appendix Table 2.9.
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worse off.15 This result is related to Kolsrud et al. (2015) and Degen and Lalive (2015)
insofar as there appears to be a more or less permanent effect on earnings during the first
four years. However, the analysis beyond year four reveals adjustments that do not allow
me to conclude that changes in PBD have a permanent effect on earnings.
Figure 2.5: Treatment Effect for Earnings
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Notes: The connected dots in Figure 2.5 depict the treatment effects for each year before and after unemployment entry
(x-axis). Earnings are measured in levels. The full set of control variables is used for the regressions (see notes of Table
2.4). Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals. The corresponding regression results are in Appendix Table 2.9.
Own illustration using data from ASSD.
Figure 2.6: Treatment Effect for Conditional Earnings and Employment
(a) Conditional Earnings
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(b) Employmnet
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Notes: The connected dots in Figure 2.6 depict the treatment effects for each year before and after unemployment entry (x-
axis). Employment is measured as one if an individual has positive earnings in that year, conditional earnings are measured
in logs. The full set of control variables is used for the regressions (see notes of Table 2.4). Shaded areas correspond to 95%
confidence intervals. The corresponding regression results are in Appendix Table 2.9. Own illustration using data from
ASSD.
15Indeed, major movements in the Differences-in-Differences estimates over years after unemployment
entry stem from level differences between treated individuals entering before/after the reform, where
treated individuals entering before the reform show a stronger decline in earnings over time.
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Earnings can be low either because workers are not employed or because they earn less
while employed. Panel (a) in Figure 2.6 depicts point estimates from the regressions with
log conditional earnings as outcome. Like earnings, point estimates for pre-unemployment
conditional earnings are close to zero, dropping by about 8 percent with unemployment
entry because of the reform. While point estimates gradually decline, they remain at
minus 2 percent in year 10 after unemployment entry but are not sufficiently precisely
estimated to be significantly different from zero. The decrease in point estimates for
conditional earnings contributes to the decrease in point estimates for earnings. Finally,
Panel (b) shows treatment effects for employment status. The general pattern is similar
to Panel (a) no discernible difference in employment status before unemployment entry.
With unemployment entry, treated individuals experience 6 percentage point lower em-
ployment in the year following unemployment entry. The effect gradually approaches
zero afterwards. In year 6 after unemployment entry there is no difference in employ-
ment status. With year 7, the treatment group shows higher employment compared to
the control group. The positive effect after year 6 emerges because a large part of older
treated individuals are less likely to permanently leave employment (see below). Similar
to conditional earnings, the movements in employment contribute to the adjustments in
earnings. Both parts, employment status and conditional earnings contribute to the ini-
tial drop in earnings but also to the decline in the effect over time. Increasing PBD has
long-term consequences beyond the effect on the initial duration of nonemployment – and
likely beyond the first job after the unemployment spell as well.
Conditional Earnings. Using the definition from equation (2.1) I decompose condi-
tional earnings into employment days and daily earnings, thereby obtaining a clearer
picture of the influence of daily earnings or employment days on conditional earnings and
of which component drives the adjustments over time. Furthermore, the decomposition
also allows for a closer comparison of the size of the point estimates to recent studies.
Table 2.6 presents results for the decomposition of conditional earnings in each of the
ten years following unemployment entry. Panel A contains point estimates from equation
(2.2) for log conditional earnings, Panel B for log employment days, and Panel C for log
daily earnings.
For employed individuals in the year following unemployment entry, only a small
negative difference appears in log daily earnings and it is not statistically significant. The
difference increases in year two and remains negative throughout the following years. On
average treated individuals have lower daily earnings of between 1.4 to 3.9 percent or
between 0.097 and 0.271 percent for each week that PBD increases. The effect on daily
earnings is similar to Schmieder et al. (2016) in two distinct ways. First, the effect size is
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comparable: they estimate a decline in re-employment wages of 0.20 percent per week of
PBD increase. Second, the difference in wages can be the result of dynamic selection of
workers over the nonemployment spell.
Appendix Figure 2.13 shows that conditional on nonemployment duration, there is no
difference in post-unemployment daily earnings. Dynamic selection therefore is not an
issue here. This result implies that the reform did not shift reservation wages upward. In-
stead, the effect of the increase in PBD on daily earnings arises through increased nonem-
ployment durations.16 Permanently lower daily earnings may be the result of a higher
share of treated individuals working part time after unemployment. Data limitations do
not allow for a further decomposition in the wage rate or hours worked. Adjustments
in employment add to the relatively moderate effect on daily earnings resulting in the
relatively large effect on earnings.
Panel C reports treatment effects for employment days conditional on employment.
The reduction in employment days accounts for over 90 percent of the decline in condi-
tional earnings in the first year. Treated individuals work fewer days if they are employed
compared to individuals from the control group which partly is a direct consequence of
longer initial nonemployment. But even in year two after unemployment entry, treated
individuals work on average 5.2 percent fewer days compared to controls. Over time, the
treatment effect on conditional employment days gradually approaches zero and is statis-
tically insignificant in year 6 after unemployment entry. It likely turns positive afterwards.
Negative effects in both daily earnings and conditional employment days imply on aver-
age worse jobs for treated individuals in both job match quality dimensions. The decline
in the effect on conditional employment days indicates that job quality is improving for
the treatment group. Furthermore, this improvement compensates for the permanently
lower daily earnings contributing to the decline in the effect on conditional earnings and
earnings.
Measured by both daily earnings and employment days, treated individuals get worse
jobs as a consequence of staying unemployed longer but improve their situation over time.
Another widely used measure for job quality is the duration of post-unemployment jobs.
Short post-unemployment tenure or equivalently frequent job changes would indicate that
workers try to leave their current job thus finding a better job-match, which improves
their situation (Jovanovic, 1979; Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). For all individuals who
successfully found a job after unemployment, I construct a variable indicating the start
of a new job in a given year. Thus, the variable measures the extent to which employed
individuals change employers. Figure 2.7 presents point estimates for job changes for
16Lalive et al. (2016), studying a reform in Austria, also find that the re-employment wage path is
unaffected by the PBD extension.
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each year after unemployment entry. Treated individuals are much less likely to start
new jobs in the first year after unemployment entry essentially because they have no
jobs in the first place due to prolonged nonemployment. Therefore, they cannot change
jobs very frequently. No apparent differences in job changes emerge in years 2 through
5 after unemployment entry. Starting with year 6, individuals from the treatment group
increasingly leave the current employer to find a new and possibly better job match.
Accepting a low-quality job after unemployment and changing jobs afterwards appears to
be a relevant margin of adjustment. Finding better jobs over time at least partly explains
why the earnings gap decreases over time.
Figure 2.7: Job Changes Conditional on Employment
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Notes: Figure 2.7 shows treatment effects for job changes by year after unemployment entry. Each point corresponds to a
single regression. The outcome variable is one if the individual starts a new job in a given year. The variable is zero for
the first job after unemployment. The full set of control variables is used in the regressions (see notes of Table 2.4). Own
illustration using data from ASSD.
2.4.4 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Age
Adjustments in employment are an important driver for the effect of earnings over time.
Both conditional employment days and employment status contribute to the absolute
decline in the earnings difference between treatment and control group. Adjustments in
employment take place very slowly and many individuals experience lower employment
beyond the period of initial unemployment benefit receipt. Unsuccessful job seekers re-
main nonemployed. The question is what happens to individuals who are not working or
not working all year long. To answer this question I break down nonemployment into var-
ious states of nonemployment beyond unemployment insurance including unemployment
assistance, disability, old-age and sickness. Individuals may also be unobserved in the
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data for various reasons for which case I label their status as "inactive". Breaking down
nonemployment is particularly important for older individuals. Particularly in Austria,
unemployed individuals above age 54 have eased access to early retirement in the form of
disability insurance. Inderbitzin et al. (2016) show that extended unemployment insur-
ance can substitute for other social benefits. It can also complement them if individuals
use extended unemployment to bridge the time to other social benefits.
To separate adjustments stemming from the reform and from potential program inter-
action effects, and because the treatment also differs by age, I split the treatment group
into individuals aged 49 or younger and aged 50 and older. As mentioned earlier, individ-
uals younger than 50 were eligible for an extension in PBD from 30 to 39 weeks, whereas
job seekers aged 50 and older were eligible for an extension from 30 to 52 weeks. Under
monotonicity of the treatment effect, we could expect the earnings response of older in-
dividuals to be stronger. Figure 2.8 plots the effect for earnings by the two age groups.
Younger individuals show a weaker response in earnings, about only half the size of the
response of older individuals. Yet, the estimated effect is still substantial and significant
suggesting that treated individuals find worse jobs. Interestingly, the earnings difference
for younger job seekers steadily converges back to zero. Returning to work is the single
most important outcome after unemployment, hence once back to employment earnings
differences vanish. However, the treatment group does not overtake the control group in
terms of earnings and there remains a gap in earnings measured over 10 years. Conversely,
the difference for older individuals turns positive after year 7. The decision to return to
work is potentially much different for older job seekers as they have various alternatives
to stay nonemployed.
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Figure 2.8: Treatment Effects by Age for Earnings
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Notes: Figure 2.8 shows treatment effects for earnings in each year before and after unemployment entry by age group.
Young consists of treated individuals aged 40 to below 50, old uses treated individuals aged 50 and older. The full set of
control variables is used in the regressions (see notes of Table 2.4). Own illustration using data from ASSD.
Changes in Nonemployment by Age. Figure 2.9 shows nonemployment decomposed
into various nonemployment states over the 10 years after unemployment entry by age
group. First of all, nonemployment can imply that job seekers are unemployed. Either job
seekers draw on unemployment insurance (UI) or unemployment assistance (UA). From
the top two graphs in Figure 2.9, it becomes clear that the response of younger job seekers
in either UI or UA is weaker than that of older job seekers. Furthermore, older job seekers
rely more heavily and more permanently on UA and are repeatedly unemployed starting
from year 7 after unemployment entry.
Overall, older treated job seekers remain in the unemployment system for an extended
amount of time due to the reform and far beyond PBD. The incidence of disability (DI) or
old-age (OA) pensions and also sick leave or inactivity is almost not existent for younger
job seekers as shown in the left graph of the second row. This is much different for older
job seekers. Starting with year four, treated individuals have a lower incidence of days in
disability and over time spend fewer days on old-age pensions. Both inactivity and sick
leave show minor responses. The response on both UI and UA may indicate program
substitution in particular in the short run as a direct consequence of the reform. The
results on DI and OA point in the same direction: treated individuals remain on UI or
UA and are therefore less likely to enter DI or OA. However, treated individuals show
higher employment beyond year 7 (lower days in old-age pension do not compensate for
higher unemployment).
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There are several candidates to explain why older treated individuals would have higher
employment and ultimately higher earnings after year 7. First, lower initial earnings as a
consequence of the reform can have two effects. One is a pure income effect, which induces
higher employment among treated individuals. The other is an anticipation effect because
lower earnings and employment translates into lower pension payments. A forward-looking
agent would want to increase earnings to not forgo pension payments. Both hypotheses
remain suggestive, as there is no data to test them. Second, the pattern could be the
consequence of disability and old-age reforms. Staubli (2011) studies a reform in 1996
that increased the age from 55 to 57 at which individuals have eased access to disability.
Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) study how the increase in early retirement age from 2001
onwards affects labor market participation and unemployment. Both reforms could in
principle have an impact on my results insofar as it could be that I compare treated
individuals who no longer have eased access to either DI or OA but remain in the labor
force. Accounting for the fact that certain individuals are no longer eligible for such eased
access has a clear effect on days in disability but virtually no effect on days in old-age
pension. Importantly, earnings are not affected neither.17
While the observed outcomes are unlikely to be the effect of a subsequent reform, it
could still be some form of interaction with other programs inducing more permanent
drop out of the labor force. In fact, there is substantial decline in labor force partici-
pation among older job seekers starting from year 5 after unemployment entry when all
individuals of this treatment group have reached age 55. Employment levels up to year
5 after unemployment start are fairly stable allowing for a clean interpretation of the
reform effect.18 Thus, the estimated differences up to year 4 after unemployment entry
are the result of the reform. Beyond that, it is more problematic to account the estimated
differences to the reform alone because it is likely that they are at least partially driven
by program substitution. Disentangling both the reform effect from eased access to other
programs is not possible in the current setting.
17See appendix Figure 2.14
18See appendix Figure 2.15 for employment levels of older job seekers.
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Figure 2.9: Treatment Effects by Age for Days on Different Social Benefits
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(b) Older
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Notes: Figure 2.9 shows treatment effects for each year before and after unemployment entry for days of benefit receipt by
different type of benefits: UI: unemployment insurance, UA: unemployment assistance, DI: disability insurance, OA: old-age
pension. Subfigure (a) is for the subsample of job seekers aged 45 or younger, Subfigure (b) is for the subsample of job
seekers aged 50 or older. The full set of control variables is used in the regressions (see notes of Table 2.4) Corresponding
regression results are available in Appendix Table 2.10. Own illustration using data from ASSD.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper analysis how an extension in PBD affects post-unemployment outcomes. The
main outcome considered is earnings. To assess long-term effects of increases in PBD,
I focus on earnings from the start of unemployment up to 10 years. With unemploy-
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ment entry, earnings for the treatment group drop substantially compared to those of
the control group. Earnings for treated individuals are lower beyond the period of initial
unemployment because they remain longer nonemployed. As time goes more treated in-
dividuals find back to employment and the difference in earnings shrinks. However, also
conditional on employment, treated individuals have lower earnings, suggesting that they
get worse jobs. Jobs are worse as measured with both daily earnings and employment
days. Daily earnings are permanently lower for treated individuals. That the difference
in employment days shrinks over time suggests that the treatment group manages to
improve – at least along one dimension of job quality. The extension in PBD has clear
implications beyond unemployment itself but also beyond the first employment spell after
unemployment. Focusing on the first job and the re-employment wage after UI overlooks
important implications: adjustments both in employment and over time.
Extending PBD has a differential impact by age group. Younger job seekers incur a
smaller earnings loss and virtually everyone returns to employment. However, increased
PBD still has a substantial negative impact on post-unemployment earnings. Older job
seekers incur a larger earnings loss, remain nonemployed longer and rely more heavily on
unemployment insurance and assistance. While these results are true in the first four year
after unemployment entry, the long-run effects for older job seekers are potentially partly
driven by interactions with other programs. As results on programme interaction remain
suggestive here, it would be interesting to study more thoroughly long-term implications
of extended PBD with such interactions.
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T
ab
le
2.7:
Sensitivity
A
nalysis
for
T
reatm
ent
E
ffects
on
E
arnings
Y
ear
after
U
I
start
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
O
utcom
e:
E
arnings
A
.
B
aseline
-1,174.5
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,405.9
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,181.0
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,181.4
⋆
⋆
⋆
-965.4
⋆
⋆
⋆
-673.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-389.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-127.9
-11.4
184.0
(94.2)
(121.2)
(129.0)
(135.1)
(140.2)
(144.0)
(146.6)
(148.1)
(149.1)
(149.2)
B
.
O
nly
age
35-45
-821.7
⋆
⋆
⋆
-854.5
⋆
⋆
⋆
-657.3
⋆
⋆
⋆
-723.0
⋆
⋆
⋆
-655.9
⋆
⋆
⋆
-530.0
⋆
⋆
⋆
-412.8
⋆
⋆
-148.0
-120.1
74.1
(121.1)
(154.5)
(163.9)
(171.6)
(178.6)
(185.0)
(190.5)
(195.1)
(199.2)
(202.3)
C
.
H
igh
experience
-1,079.4
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,453.7
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,315.9
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,388.2
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,192.3
⋆
⋆
⋆
-915.0
⋆
⋆
⋆
-579.3
⋆
⋆
⋆
-274.1
⋆
-166.7
93.5
(104.2)
(133.0)
(141.4)
(148.6)
(154.7)
(159.5)
(163.2)
(166.2)
(169.0)
(170.9)
D
.
R
estricted
years
of
inflow
-731.3
⋆
⋆
⋆
-828.5
⋆
⋆
⋆
-674.2
⋆
⋆
⋆
-740.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-622.7
⋆
⋆
⋆
-400.2
⋆
⋆
-71.6
93.7
-62.5
83.0
(133.1)
(171.1)
(181.0)
(188.0)
(193.5)
(197.5)
(200.6)
(203.6)
(205.8)
(206.3)
E
.
O
nly
A
ustrians
-1,091.1
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,432.1
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,228.0
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,276.5
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,156.6
⋆
⋆
⋆
-891.5
⋆
⋆
⋆
-620.1
⋆
⋆
⋆
-305.0
⋆
-163.2
55.0
(95.1)
(122.4)
(130.0)
(136.1)
(141.1)
(144.9)
(147.4)
(148.8)
(149.8)
(149.8)
F
.
N
o
inflow
1
year
before
reform
-1,266.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,493.3
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,271.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,218.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-977.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-706.9
⋆
⋆
⋆
-429.0
⋆
⋆
⋆
-131.6
54.1
208.9
(100.8)
(129.6)
(137.9)
(144.7)
(150.5)
(154.8)
(157.9)
(160.1)
(161.3)
(161.3)
N
otes:
T
able
2.7
contains
D
iD
estim
ates
for
various
sam
ple
restrictions
for
single
years
after
unem
ploym
ent
inflow
.
P
anel
A
corresponds
to
estim
ates
in
T
able
2.4.
P
anel
B
focuses
on
a
sam
ple
w
here
individuals
are
betw
een
35
and
45
years
old
at
inflow
.
P
anel
C
focuses
on
a
sam
ple
of
individuals
w
ith
experience
of
at
least
9
out
of
the
last
15
years
and
6
out
of
the
last
10
years
(see
T
able
2.1
for
the
definition
of
the
treatm
ent).
P
anel
D
uses
only
inflow
from
the
years
1987
to
1991
instead
of
1985
to
1996
as
in
P
anel
A
.
P
anel
E
uses
only
inflow
of
A
ustrians.
P
anel
F
excludes
inflow
from
the
12
m
onths
just
before
the
reform
.
M
ean
Y
refers
to
the
m
ean
outcom
e
in
levels
of
the
treatm
ent
group
before
the
reform
.
T
he
full
set
of
controls
is
used
(see
notes
of
T
able
2.9).
Standard
errors
are
in
brackets
and
clustered
on
individual
level.
Significance
is
indicated
as
follow
s:
⋆
(p
<
0.1),
⋆
⋆
(p
<
0.05),
⋆
⋆
⋆
(p
<
0.01).
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⋆
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⋆
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⋆
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1
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0.
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0.
18
8
δ O
17
.5
26
-6
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ot
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ab
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at
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pe
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an
el
A
.
P
an
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s
B
,
C
an
d
D
sh
ow
th
e
te
st
st
at
is
ti
c
(δ
O
)
fo
r
th
e
in
flu
en
ce
of
un
ob
se
rv
ed
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
y
fr
om
O
st
er
(2
01
3)
.
T
he
te
st
as
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ho
w
m
uc
h
m
or
e
im
po
rt
an
t
un
ob
se
rv
ed
re
la
ti
ve
to
ob
se
rv
ed
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
y
ha
s
to
be
to
re
ac
h
a
po
in
t
es
ti
m
at
e
of
ze
ro
fo
r
a
de
si
re
d
le
ve
l
of
R˜
2
.
C
al
cu
la
ti
on
s
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
th
e
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su
m
pt
io
n
th
at
th
e
ob
se
rv
ed
R
2
ha
s
to
in
cr
ea
se
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30
%
.
A
va
lu
e
of
δ O
be
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ee
n
0
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d
1
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pl
ie
s
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at
al
re
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y
m
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un
ob
se
rv
ed
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te
ro
ge
ne
it
y
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el
ds
a
po
in
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at
e
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ze
ro
.
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e
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th
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se
rv
ed
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
y
ha
s
to
be
m
or
e
im
po
rt
an
t
th
an
ob
se
rv
ed
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
y.
A
ne
ga
ti
ve
va
lu
e
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ie
s
th
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un
ob
se
rv
ed
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te
ro
ge
ne
it
y
w
ou
ld
dr
ag
th
e
po
in
t
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m
at
e
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e
ot
he
r
di
re
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io
n
th
an
ob
se
rv
ed
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
y
do
es
.
T
he
fu
ll
se
t
of
co
nt
ro
ls
is
(s
ee
no
te
s
of
T
ab
le
2.
9)
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
an
d
cl
us
te
re
d
on
in
di
vi
du
al
le
ve
l.
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
is
in
di
ca
te
d
as
fo
llo
w
s:
⋆
(p
<
0.
1)
,
⋆
⋆
(p
<
0.
05
),
⋆
⋆
⋆
(p
<
0.
01
).
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T
ab
le
2.9:
D
ecom
position
of
T
reatm
ent
E
ffects
on
E
arnings
O
ver
T
im
e
Y
ear
after
U
I
start
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A
.
E
arnings
-1,174.5
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,405.9
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,181.0
⋆
⋆
⋆
-1,181.4
⋆
⋆
⋆
-965.4
⋆
⋆
⋆
-673.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-389.8
⋆
⋆
⋆
-127.9
-11.4
184.0
(94.2)
(121.2)
(129.0)
(135.1)
(140.2)
(144.0)
(146.6)
(148.1)
(149.1)
(149.2)
M
ean
Y
9,272
13,420
13,757
13,645
13,165
12,427
11,500
10,416
9,330
8,252
N
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
B
.
E
m
pl.
-0.060
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.039
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.031
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.024
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.022
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.005
0.008
0.015
⋆
⋆
⋆
0.021
⋆
⋆
⋆
0.032
⋆
⋆
⋆
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
M
ean
Y
0.720
0.749
0.724
0.687
0.644
0.596
0.542
0.489
0.437
0.385
N
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
156,728
C
.
E
arnings|
em
pl.
-0.087
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.066
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.059
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.062
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.039
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.040
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.040
⋆
⋆
⋆
-0.025
⋆
⋆
-0.025
⋆
-0.020
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.014)
M
ean
Y
9.210
9.600
9.680
9.720
9.750
9.763
9.775
9.769
9.754
9.748
N
104,485
111,162
107,901
103,545
99,033
94,052
88,616
83,099
77,594
72,103
N
otes:
T
able
2.9
contains
D
iD
estim
ates
for
E
arnings
(P
anelA
),em
ploym
ent
(P
anelB
)
and
conditionalearnings
(P
anelC
)
split
by
year
after
unem
ploym
ent
entry.
C
olum
n
1
contains
results
w
hen
the
outcom
e
is
m
easured
in
the
first
year
after
unem
ploym
ent
entry.
C
olum
n
2
contains
results
w
hen
the
outcom
e
is
m
easured
in
the
second
year
after
unem
ploym
ent
entry
and
so
forth.
M
ean
Y
refers
to
the
m
ean
outcom
e
in
levels
of
the
treatm
ent
group
before
the
reform
.
T
he
full
set
of
controls
is
used
including
the
local
unem
ploym
ent
rate,
daily
w
age
and
tenure
of
the
last
job,
experience
in
the
last
5,
10
and
15
years,
earnings
and
unem
ploym
ent
days
in
the
10
years
before
unem
ploym
ent
inflow
,
indicator
variables
for
industry,
region,
year,
m
onth,
age,
fam
ily
status
and
education,
higher
order
polynom
ials
of
tenure,
last
daily
w
age
and
all
experience
m
easures.
Significance
is
indicated
as
follow
s:
⋆
(p
<
0.1),
⋆
⋆
(p
<
0.05),
⋆
⋆
⋆
(p
<
0.01).
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B Additional figures
Figure 2.10: Pre-trends for Women and Recalled Job Seekers
(a) Women
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(b) Recalls
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Notes: Figure 2.10 shows how treatment effects evolve in the 16 quarters before the reform for earnings (left) and unem-
ployment duration (right). Dashed lines are treatment effects interacted with indicator variables for quarters relative to
treatment. Shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals. The sample in subfigure (a) includes women but no recalled job
seekers. The sample in subfigure (b) includes women and recalled job seekers. Own illustration using data from ASSD.
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Figure 2.11: Evolution of the Treatment Effect Around the Reform
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Notes: Figure 2.11 shows how treatment effects evolve in the quarters around the reform. Dashed lines are treatment
effects interacted with indicator variables for quarter relative to treatment. Shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals.
Outcomes are measured in levels for the year after unemployment entry. The bottom right figure is for unemployment
duration as outcome. Own illustration using data from ASSD.
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Figure 2.12: Placebo Reforms for Initial Unemployment Duration
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Notes: Figure 2.12 shows point estimates for unemployment duration from Differences-in-Differences regressions for a series
of placebo reforms. Each placebo reform uses ± 3 years of inflow. Placebo reform dates start in August 1985 and shift
every 90 days up to August 1996. The x-Axis measures quarters relative to the actual reform. Shaded areas depict 95%
confidence intervals. The outcome is unemployment duration measured in weeks. Own illustration using data from ASSD.
Figure 2.13: The Effect of Extended PBD on Re-employment Wages Throughout the Non-
employment Spell
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Notes: Figure 2.13 shows re-employment daily earnings paths for treatment and control group. The difference is estimated
pointwise at each point of support using Differences-in-Differences estimation. The difference in point estimates is never
statistically significant. The full set of control variables is used in the regressions (see notes of Table 2.4). Own illustration
using data from ASSD.
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Figure 2.14: Treatment Effects for Older Individuals Accounted for Subsequent Reforms
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Notes: Figure 2.14 shows treatment effects for each year before and after unemployment entry for days of benefit receipt
by different type of benefits: UI: unemployment insurance, UA: unemployment assistance, DI: disability insurance, OA:
old-age pension. The full set of control variables is used in the regressions (see notes of Table 2.4), the regression also
control variables for restricted access to disability and old-age due to reforms of the programs. See text for details. Own
illustration using data from ASSD.
Figure 2.15: Employment Levels Older Job Seekers
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Notes: Figure 2.15 shows employment levels for older job seekers separated by treatment and control group. The right
graph additionally restricts the sample to outcomes where individuals are below age 55. After the sample is restricted to
age below 55, employment becomes much more stable also in years 0 to 4. Own illustration using data from ASSD.

3 Spatial Search Strategies of Job Seekers
and the Role of Unemployment
Insurance
Joint with Elisa Guglielminetti, Rafael Lalive, and Etienne Wasmer
A version of this paper has been published in the Sciences Po Spire Working paper
series and is under review at the Review of Economics Studies.
3.1 Introduction
Most people do not work where they live, and travel times to work are substantial. Com-
muters travel about 70 minutes to and from work in the US, and about 60 minutes in
Germany, the UK, and France (OECD (2010a)). Standard models of job search do not
account for the fact that job seekers work outside their homes. Neglecting space is, per-
haps, a useful simplification. But space has to matter in some decisions. The decision to
accept a job will depend on commuting costs and mobility costs, not only the wage and
its distribution. Job seekers who are looking for jobs will, optimally, want to use a reser-
vation strategy involving both a reservation wage and a reservation commute distance,
tied to each other. Further, even within acceptable commute distances, searching for jobs
far away from one’s residence may be expensive. Under liquidity constraints, job search
efficiency may be seriously limited. This implies that unemployment insurance plays a
role typically overlooked to improve the job search process.
The distance dimension of job search has several policy implications, beyond equi-
librium unemployment, notably on the optimal design of unemployment compensation.
Although explicit in many empirical and theoretical works, it is not central in most anal-
yses. As a matter of fact, the commute time dimension is relevant in job acceptance
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decisions, and its impact is of the order of magnitude of the wage dimension; to illustrate,
Table 3.1 shows that many job seekers report that the primary reason for rejecting a job
offer is not for too low wages, but for too high distance. Excluding all reasons but wages
and commute distance, the last column shows that 60% of job offers are rejected for too
low wages, but 40% are rejected for too high commute distances. The commute distance is
therefore a potentially first-order margin in job acceptance decisions. Of course, wage and
distances interact: there might be a wage level making a commute distance acceptable.
Table 3.1: Reasons for Rejecting Offers
% % excl. last 3 % comparedlast 3 last 3 & hrs to wage rate
1. rate of pay 12.1 21.8 24.7 59.7
2. temporary/insecure job 6.65 12.0 13.6 -
3. type of work 12.9 23.3 26.4 -
4. number of working hours 6.05 11.0 - -
5. working time (day/night time, shifts...) 6.42 11.6 12.4 -
6. working conditions / environment 3.06 5.54 6.27 -
7. distance to job / commuting 8.14 14.7 16.7 40.3
8. could not start the job at required time 4.82 - - -
9. other reasons for not accepting 20.99 - - -
10. not yet decided 18.93 - - -
Sum 100 100 100 100
Source: Rupert et al. (2009).
In this paper, we explore these trade-offs and proceed as follows. We first derive a
simple theory of job search in space that includes commute distance and optimal spa-
tial search strategies. This will introduce the key concepts and discipline the empirical
analysis in providing simple expressions for hazard rates. The three main endogenous
variables are: the wage reservation strategy for a given commute distance (or equivalently
the optimal reservation distance for a given wage); the optimal radius of job search in
space; and within this range, the optimal intensity of search effort. We solve for the op-
timal acceptance decision where the interplay of accepted wages and accepted commute
distance depends on the marginal rate of substitution between the two: individuals can
buy short commutes with a lower wage or seek to be compensated with a higher wage
for long commutes. This has obvious implications on job search strategies: indeed, once
they correctly anticipate their future decision rules, unemployed individuals looking for
a job may try to enter jobs that pay a higher wage and involve a shorter commute time
relative to the previous job. We explore the implications for hazard rates and the role of
unemployment insurance under various assumptions on liquidity constraints. As a matter
of fact, in several countries, the spatial component of the costs of job search is either
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partly financed by the employment agencies, or deductible from income taxes1.
We use an exhaustive panel of newly unemployed workers based on an administrative
dataset in Austria, covering years 1995 to 2004 and overall more than 150 000 spells
of unemployment to establish a few stylized facts related to commute distance and job
acceptance decisions. The choice of Austria is motivated by data availability: we know
the city of residence and the city of employment and can match these informations with
information about transportation time from a private company which provided a matrix
of travel time based on the existing network of roads and highways in 2000, approximately
in the middle of our sample. The choice of Austria is also relevant because we want to
isolate the commute time decision from the residential mobility decision. For unemployed
individuals, we calculate that about 6% change their residency over the turn of non-
employment. It turns out that the influence of mobility on the empirical results can be
neglected in a first order, which considerably simplifies the analysis
In the data,we observe fairly high dispersion in the change of commuting distance
and wage which make both margins relevant for unemployed individuals. We introduce
an analysis of a competing risks model and its relative hazard ratios. Newly unemployed
workers seem to start the job search from the same workplace as they used to be employed
and looking for high wage jobs. As the unemployment spell gets longer, they tend to accept
lower wages and progressively enlarge their range of search, ending up with a job farther
away from their previous workplace. We offer evidence of a reservation frontier strategy
in the wage/distance plane. We then investigate the role of policy and in particular
unemployment insurance, in estimating Cox Proportional Hazard models. They provide
measures of the causal effects of the unemployment insurance replacement rate, the social
assistance replacement rate, and benefit duration (proxied by potential benefit duration)
and show that their impact varies by destination (distance winners vs. losers, wage losers
vs. wage winners).
The empirical analysis thus offers guidance in the solution and the calibration of
an enriched model of the labor market capturing in a more accurate the regularities in
the data. The model is therefore enriched along several dimensions. First, we allow for
different unemployment compensation regimes: newly unemployed workers are covered by
1Eg. in the US, job search expenses are partly deductible from IRS. “To qualify for a deduction,
your expenses must be spent on a job search in your current occupation. You may not deduct expenses
you incur while looking for a job in a new occupation; (...) ; If you travel to look for a new job in
your present occupation, you may be able to deduct travel expenses to and from the area to which you
travelled. You can only deduct the travel expenses if the trip is primarily to look for a new job ; (...) ;
You cannot deduct job search expenses if you are looking for a job for the first time.” Source: http://
www.irs.gov/uac/Job-Search-Expenses-Can-be-Tax-Deductible. In France, a similar regime of tax
deduction applies, complemented with direct subsidies of job search from Pôle Emploi (the employment
agency): http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F1640.xhtml. In Austria, job search
assistance covers parts of job search costs.
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unemployment insurance, but they can subsequently loose it for a reduced level of benefits,
in the unemployment assistance regime. We also allow individuals to target their job
search activity in space, distinguishing effort inside and outside the previous workplace.
Finally, we also introduce non-separability in consumption and search costs to allow for
richer reservation strategies. Once calibrated, the model reproduces the empirical fact
that, over time and as unemployment benefits decrease, the unemployed progressively
adjust their reservation strategies: their reservation wage goes down and in addition
they start prospecting in different areas. The model predicts that individuals remaining
unemployed for longer time have a higher probability to enter less paying jobs and/or jobs
located farther away from the previous job. The model delivers simple expression for all
hazard rates (overall exit to employment, exits towards higher wages than in the previous
job, exits towards lower wages, exit towards higher commute distances and towards lower
distances) and all relative hazard rates.
A very large number of classical or more recent papers have been explicit about com-
mute distance. Crampton (1999) has a discussion of the optimal location of vacancies and
their number, illustrated by the classical papers by Seater (1979), Chirinko (1982) and
more recently van Ommeren et al. (1997). Racial differences have been analyzed through
the lens of distance and access to jobs in the spatial mismatch literature following Kain
(1968): papers include Holzer (1986; 1987; 1988), Ihlanfeldt (1997), Zax and Kain (1996),
Brueckner and Zenou (2003) and Coulson et al. (2001) and are summarized in Gobillon
et al. (2007) and Zenou (2009); see also van Vuuren (mimeo) and Nenov (2015). The artic-
ulation between commuting decisions and mobility decisions has been studied by Rupert
and Wasmer (2012) and applied to ethnic unemployment gaps in Gobillon et al. (2014) for
commuting vs mobility decisions. More closely related to our work, the role of local labor
markets has been investigated in Cheshire (1979), Rogerson (1982), Manning and Petron-
golo (2011), Gobillon et al. (2011) and Marinescu and Rathelot (mimeo). The latter find
in particular that job seekers’s applications from a particular website, Carreer.Builder,
decrease by 20% every 5 kilometres of distance between the applicant’s address and the
vacancy. Manning and Petrongolo (2011) also found a large decay, somewhat higher (ap-
proximately 80%), but for a different concept, the concept of job acceptance (and not of
simple applications). Finally our work is connected to the large literature measuring the
value of time across different transportation modes, at short and longer distances (see
Brownstone and Small (2005) for road use and Hammadou and Jayet (2003) for longer
transportation times). Recent papers, using experimental setups, have investigated the
role of information on search strategies, including the broadness of search. See notably
Altmann et al. (2015) and Belot et al. (2015).
Our paper also ties to a literature on the role of unemployment insurance for job
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finding and job quality. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) were the first to look at the effect
of unemployment insurance on post-unemployment outcomes and find positive effects of
unemployment benefits on post unemployment wages for different age groups and gender.
Addison and Blackburn (2000b) provide evidence for a weakly positive effect of unem-
ployment benefits on post unemployment wages. Centeno and Novo (2006) use a quantile
regression approach to analyze the relationship between the unemployment insurance sys-
tem and the quality of subsequent wages and tenure over the whole support of the wage
and tenure distributions. They find a positive impact of unemployment benefits on each
quantile of the wage and tenure distribution. Several recent studies, based on regression
discontinuity designs, find little or no effects of Potential Benefit Duration (PBD), mostly
looking at wage or job stability. Card et al. (2007a) and Lalive (2007) find little evidence
on wages and/or job stability in the Austrian context. van Ours and Vodopivec (2008)
find that a reduction in the potential benefit duration has only small effects on wages, on
the duration of subsequent employment and on the probability of securing a permanent
rather than a temporary job. Le Barbanchon (2012a) finds no effects on wages or employ-
ment. Two studies find positive effects of PBD on low wage earners or job seekers at risk of
exhausting their benefits. Centeno and Novo (2009) detect a positive impact on the match
quality for individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution. Caliendo et al. (2013) find
that the unemployed who obtain a new job close to benefit exhaustion are more likely
to leave subsequent employment and receive lower wages than than their counterparts
with extended benefit duration. Two studies on Germany find negative effects of PBD
extensions. Schmieder et al. (2012b) analyze the long-term effects of extensions in UI
durations taking into account not only the initial, but also all recurrent non-employment
spells. They find significant long-run effects of an extension in UI duration on the duration
of non-employment up to three years after the start of the initial spell. Schmieder et al.
(2016) study the effects of PBD changes on re-employment wages in Germany finding
sharp negative effects of PBD extensions for older workers. Two studies on the Austrian
context find positive effects of benefit extensions. Degen (2014) and Nekoei and Weber
(2015) study the effects of PBD for job quality in Austria, exploiting a sharp increase in
PBD from 30 to 39 weeks for workers aged 40 years or older. Both papers find a positive
effect of prolonged PBD on wages on the order of 0.5 percentage points. Nekoei and
Weber (2015) rationalize this finding in a directed job search framework and discuss the
implications of this finding for policy.
Our paper extends and complements this rich literature in several respects. We build
a simple theoretical search model where spatial decisions matter and make job acceptance
depend on both wages and commute distance. Although several papers have done sim-
ilar exercises, the model is flexible enough to provide functional forms that accurately
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match empirical concepts, such as hazards, sub-hazards and relative hazards ratios with
respect to both commute distance and wage changes across jobs. We discuss whether
and how much job seekers trade these two dimensions off. We use a rich framework and
study how liqudity constraints may impede job search and how a subsidy might improve
efficiency. The empirical exercise adds to the understanding of how unemployment bene-
fits impact post-unemployment outcomes. This paper adds to this literature in assessing
systematically not only how wages but also commuting distance is affected by the unem-
ployment insurance system by estimating the effects on both outcomes simultaneously.
This sheds light on how individuals not only decide for wages or distance but also for
wages and distance. The estimation by means of the competing risk approach together
with non-linearities in the determination of unemployment insurance parameters allows
for a credible estimation of the impact of these parameters on both distance and wages.
Overall, policy plays a crucial but complex role on job acceptance decisions and in turn
on job search processes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the key concepts behind
the spatial analysis of job search. Section 3.3 provides various and hopefully exhaustive
evidence of the role of space in job search and the spatial dispersion of commute distances,
based on our rich data set of unemployment spells in Austria. In Section 3.4, we extend
the model in order to provide a realistic calibration. In Section 3.5 we calibrate the
model based on relative hazard ratios in the data and draw lessons for policy. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 A Simple Theory of Search in Space
The goal of this section is to provide the basic trade-offs of spatial search and commute and
draw some implications of the theory. The model derives the reservation strategy defined
here as the minimum acceptable wage for a given commute distance. Commute distance
implies some costs and effort. Reciprocally, there is a maximum acceptable commute
distance at a given wage. The agents, knowing their future strategy of job acceptance,
optimally calculate the range of search, that is the maximum distance within which to
prospect; finally, they determine the optimal intensity of search effort, captured by the
arrival rate of job offers within the range of search.
3.2.1 Setup
Notations. Time is continuous. Individuals and firms discount the future at rate r.
The level of benefits is b. Searching for a job is more costly in more remote areas. Let
D be the radius of search, and 2πλ be the rate of arrival of search offers (where 2π is
Chapter 3 51
a simple proportionality factor coming from the integration of search in a circle around
the individuals’ location). Job seekers control both the intensity of search effort λ and
the range of search at a cost C(D,λ). At this stage we do not specify the nature of the
search costs but they may be both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. We also assume perfect
separability between search costs and consumption. Denote by U(D,λ) the value of job
search and byW (w, ρ) the value of being employed at a wage w and at a commute distance
ρ. The employed workers pay a commute cost c(τρ) which depends on commute time ρ
and the cost of transportation τ . We also assume perfect separability in consumption and
commute costs.
Unemployment and Employment Values. Each job offer consists in a random draw
of wage and distance from a given two-dimensional distribution. We do not restrict
the draws (w, ρ) to be independent. With notations Fρ(w) and G(ρ) for the associated
cumulated distributions of each variable separately, we can go one step further. In this
case, the Bellman equations for job search are:
rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2πλ
∫ D
0
(∫
w
Max[W (w, ρ)− U ; 0]dFρ(w)
)
dG(ρ) (3.1)
The value function for employment is:
rW (w, ρ) = w − c(τρ) + s(U −W (w, ρ)) (3.2)
3.2.2 Interior Solutions and Strategies
The surplus from employment can be easily calculated, given the linearity in income.
Noticing that ∂W
∂w
(w, ρ) = 1
r+s
; and denoting by R(ρ) the reservation wage associated
with distance ρ, defined as W (R(ρ), ρ) = U(D∗, λ∗) = U∗ , we can rewrite the value of
employment as a linear function of w:
W (w, ρ)− U∗ = w −R(ρ)
r + s
= S(w, ρ) (3.3)
where the notation S(w, ρ) is the surplus value of holding a job paid w at a commute
distance ρ.
We can now derive the reservation wage: it turns out to depend on commute costs
and on the equity value of being unemployed under the optimal job search strategy. We
have:
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Lemma 1. The reservation wage is linearly increasing in commute costs and in the un-
employment value:
R(ρ) = c(τρ) + rU∗
It is convex or concave in the commute distance, depending on the convexity or concavity
of commute costs. Convexity would result from disutility from time spent in commute,
while concavity may result from optimization of transportation modes.
The interior optimal search strategies also follow immediately. Let wmax be the upper
support of the wage distribution. Then, combining eq. 3.1 and 3.3 we have
rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2πλ
∫ D
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) (3.4)
The first order condition on the radius is obtained by deriving eq. 3.4:
C ′D(D
∗, λ∗) = 2πλ
(∫ wmax
R(D∗)
S(w,D∗)fρ(w)dw
)
g(D∗) (3.5)
= 2πλg(D∗)EwS(w,D∗)
so that U(D,λ) is maximised with respect to the search strategy D when the marginal
cost of searching at one more unit of distance is equal to the marginal gain. The marginal
gain depends first on the direct impact on the flow of offers (first term of the right hand
side) and second on the change of the surplus among acceptable offers (second term of the
right hand side). The first order condition on optimal search effort affecting the arrival
rate of offers λ reads as follows:
C ′λ(D
∗, λ∗) = 2π
∫ D
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) (3.6)
= 2πEw,ρS(w, ρ)
Both expressions show that the marginal cost has to equal the marginal gain of search,
either with respect to extending the range of search by one marginal unit D, or by in-
creasing the intensity of effort within the range. In both expressions, the marginal return
on search involves the expected surplus value of holding a job.
Lemma 2. Under separability of the cost function C(D,λ), equation (3.5) implies that a
higher arrival rate of offers λ is associated with a higher return on the range of search D,
implying a complementarity of the two dimensions of search.
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Lemma 2 is not general, and under complementarity in the cost function C(D,λ),
the two search variables may be more substitute to each other: a higher λ raising the
marginal cost of enlarging the range of search may in turn reduce the optimal radius
D∗. The dominance of each mechanism is an empirical matter and we leave the question
unanswered here.
3.2.3 Hazard Rates, Odds Ratios and Rejection Rate
The unemployment exit hazard is shaped by search intensity, search radius, and reserva-
tion wage as follows:
haz = 2πλ
[∫ D
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
The unemployment exit hazard depends on search intensity λ, search radius D, and
on the reservation wage R(ρ). Job seekers who search hard, or have a large search radius,
or have a low reservation wage, will leave unemployment for a regular job faster. The
unemployment exit hazard contains information on all three endogenous variables.
To anticipate the empirical part, we will decompose the total exit hazard into sub-
hazard rates that reflect the quality of jobs the unemployed might find: paying better or
worse, or being farther or closer to home than the previous job, like in a competing-risks
framework. More precisely, w−1 is the wage, and d−1 is the commuting distance in the job
prior to entering unemployment. w+ refers to a wage increase, d+ means an increase in
commute distance relative to the previous job. Equivalently, w− refers to a wage decrease,
d− means a decrease in commute distance relative to the previous job. The sub-hazard
rate haz(w+, d+), refers to job seekers accepting a new job with wage increase (w > w−1)
at the cost of commuting longer to this new job (ρ >d−1). The sub-hazard of finding
a better paying job located closer to home is defined as haz(w+, d−), the sub-hazard of
finding a worse paying job, located farther away from home is defined as haz(w−, d+),
and the sub-hazard rate of finding a worse paying job located closer to home is defined as
haz(w−, d−). We now express these sub-hazards in terms of the primitives of the model.
Under the assumption that determinants of job search have not varied since the previous
episode of job search, the search radius includes the previous distance, and the reservation
wage is below the wage earned in the previous job : job seekers would accept the previous
job if offered again to them. The four sub-hazard rates are then easy to write as:
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sub− haz(w+, d+) = 2πλ
∫ D
d−1
∫ wmax
w−1
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2πλ[1− F (w−1)][G(D)−G(d−1)]
sub− haz(w+, d−) = 2πλ
∫ d−1
0
∫ wmax
w−1
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2πλ[1− F (w−1)]G(d−1)
sub− haz(w−, d+) = 2πλ
∫ D
d−1
∫ w−1
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2πλ
∫ D
d−1
[Fρ(w−1)− F (R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
sub− haz(w−, d−) = 2πλ
∫ d−1
0
∫ w−1
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2πλ
∫ d−1
0
[Fρ(w−1)− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
As visible from the second equation, the first sub-hazard sub − haz(w+, d−) does not
depend on the endogenous variable D and on function R, which itself depends on the
value of unemployment U ; while the first one, sub− haz(w+, d+), depends only on search
radius, D, but not on the reservation wage. The last one, sub − haz(w−, d−), depends
on the reservation wage, R(ρ), but not on the search radius. Finally, the third one,
sub−haz(w−, d+), depends on both search radius, and reservation wage. All sub-hazards
depend on search intensity to the same extent, a result of our assumption that job seekers
can not engage in directed search.
Under the simplifying assumption that F is not indexed by ρ in the expressions above,
that is when the two distributions F and G are independent of each other, the relative
hazards – the odds ratios – with respect to sub−haz(w+, d−) can therefore be calculated
as follows:
relhaz =
sub− haz(w+, d+)
sub− haz(w+, d−) =
[G(D)−G(d−1)]
G(d−1)
relhaz2 =
sub− haz(w−, d+)
sub− haz(w+, d−) =
∫ D
d−1
[F (w−1)− F (R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
[1− F (w−1)]G(d−1)
relhaz3 =
sub− haz(w−, d−)
sub− haz(w+, d−) =
∫ d−1
0
[F (w−1)− F (R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
[1− F (w−1)]G(d−1)
The first ratio of sub-hazards, relhaz, compares the chances of finding a better paying
job farther away from home with the chances of finding a better paying job closer to home.
This ratio should in principle depend on both the wage and distance in the previous job,
but wage terms actually cancel each other out and the ratio only depends on the previous
distance and the search radius. The last ratio relhaz3 represents the relative probability of
accepting a job with a wage cut compared to a better paying job, where both jobs are closer
to home than the previous job. This odds ratio provides information on the reservation
wage only, as both jobs are within the search radius. The ratio relhaz2 represents the
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relative probability of accepting a job with a wage cut farther away from home relative
to a better paying jobs closer to home. Since the “bad” jobs in the numerator are worse
in both dimensions, the ratio relhaz2 reflects the joint evolution of reservation wages and
search radius. Odds ratios do not contain search intensity since it affects all sub-hazards
to the same extent.
The job rejection rate is, in the general case:
reject =
∫ D
0
Fρ(R(ρ))dG(ρ)
Under the assumption of independence of the joint distribution of wages and distance,
the rejection rate increases in D: at a higher distance, it is more likely that the drawn
wage will not compensate for distance.
3.2.4 The Effect of Distance on Wages
The model thus explicitly accounts for the role of distance on reservation wage and on
expected, accepted wage. The reservation frontier in wage and distance can be represented
as in Figure 3.1, here under the assumption of concave costs of distance c(τρ). The figure
also displays the proportions of each unemployment-employment trajectory from the data
used in next Section.2
2We use here the same notations as in previous sub-Section, as well as new notations for “wage stayers”
(w0) and “city stayers” (d0). Labels d+, d0 and d− therefore reflect the trajectories towards longer,
identical and shorter commuting distances respectively, while w+, w0 and w− represent trajectories
towards jobs paid more than +4% than the previous job, similar wages, that is in the interval (+4%;-4%)
and finally paid less than 4% than the previous job.
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Figure 3.1: Reservation Frontier and Acceptance-Rejection Areas.
Notes: Percentages reported on the Figure refer to the fraction in Austria of the newly employed individuals in each of the
quadrants defined by the wage/commute distance in their previous job. Source: author’s calculations from Section 3.
In the data, we do not directly observe the reservation distance but only accepted wages
and accepted commute distances. When the two distributions in wages and distances are
independent, it is possible to calculate conditional wages and their slope with respect to
commute distance with a simpler formula. In this specific case we have:
we(ρ) =
1
1− F (R(ρ))
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
wdF (w)
and the slope of we with respect to ρ is
∂we
∂ρ
=
c′(τρ).f(R(ρ))
[1− F (R(ρ))]2
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
wdF (w) +
−c′(τρ)R(ρ)f(R(ρ))
1− F (R(ρ))
=
f(R(ρ))c′(τρ)
1− F (R(ρ)) (w
e −R(ρ))
The slope is clearly positive, as accepted wages are above the reservation one at any given
distance. It is not linear and might be either convex or concave, depending on the features
of the wage distribution F (·).
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Geography and Institutional Background
Time and costs associated to commuting are relevant for the majority of Austrian workers.
Indeed, in the year 2001, 92% of the total workforce commuted and 86% of the total work-
force commuted daily. 67% of the daily commuter cover the major commuting distance by
car, 20% commute by public transport and 13% either walk or commute by bicycle. 68%
of the daily commuting individuals work in a different municipality than they live in. Yet,
80% stay within a political region (there are 99 political regions), hence many stay in the
same county, which means that mobility is limited in Austria. As people do not incur long
commutes on average, one concern for our analysis might be that individuals try to avoid
commuting by relocating. Although there can be benefits in terms of commuting, there
is certainly a cost involved in relocating. Compared to the US, residential mobility in
Austria is low. Fischer (2002) provides calculations for the US. For Austria, we calculate
that less than 6% (between 10-15% for the US) change the residential municipality and
less than 1.6% (above 5% for the US) cross the county border annually. In particular in
our sample, less than 5% change the residence over the turn of unemployment3.
The geography of Austria adds to make it an interesting country to study commuting.
Austria is a relatively small country yet with potentially large commute distances due to
the presence of the Alps and the particular longitudinal shape: the maximum distance
from west to east is around 700 kilometres. Cutting through Munich in Germany, the
distance between the northwestern city of Bregenz to Wien (Vienna) is 618 kilometres
and six hours drive. The distance between the southern city of Klagenfurt to the northern
city of Linz is only 251km but it takes 3 hours to reach the other city given the mountains.
Figure 3.2 plots Austria and the altitude of each municipality. The white lines constitute
borders of municipalities. The black lines depict the borders of NUTS3 regions. A dark
colour indicates that the municipality is high above sea level. Altitude ranges from 110
to 1600 meters above sea level. The Alps in the middle of the country are clearly visible
as are the flat parts in the east towards Hungary. This variety in the terrain is likely to
have an impact on how individuals commute.
We will study the effects of unemployment insurance extensively. The unemployment
system in Austria, as in many other countries, consists of a first part where eligible
individuals receive Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit (UB). The level of UI benefits
is calculated based on base earnings, where base earnings refer to average earnings in
the baseline period. The baseline period is the year t − 1 for job seekers who enter
3Sources: CPS 2001 Statistik Austria, own calculations from tax records.
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Figure 3.2: Altitude of Municipalities
Notes: The figure shows the altitude of municipalities measured at the town hall of each municipality. Source: Bundesamt
fuer Eich- und Vermessungswesen.
unemployment between July and December of year t. The baseline period is the year
t − 2 for job seekers who enter unemployment from January to June in year t. Baseline
earnings are multiplied with the replacement rate to calculate unemployment benefits.
Benefits are capped from below and above, the cap being adjusted annually for inflation.
We will exploit these caps to identify the effects of unemployment benefits in our analysis
below.
The potential duration of unemployment benefits (PBD) is a function of past work
experience and age. For instance, job seekers who have been working for a at least 3
out of the previous 5 years, and are 40 years or older when registering for unemployment
benefits receive 39 weeks of unemployment benefits compared to 30 weeks if they are less
than 40 years old.4 A similar discontinuity exists at age 50, where PBD increases from
39 to 52 weeks, for job seekers who worked 9 out of the previous 15 years.
Once unemployment benefits are exhausted, individuals are eligible for means tested
Unemployment Assistance (UA; Notstandshilfe) benefits. The means test includes in
particular family income and wealth which makes it unlikely for many individuals to
actually get UA benefits. Conditional on getting UA benefits they can be fairly high, as
much as 92% of UB. UA does not end, but job seekers need to re-apply for UA once every
26 weeks.
4See Nekoei and Weber (2015) who analyze this discontinuity.
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3.3.2 Data and Sample
We combine data from different sources to reach our final data set. First, the Austrian
Social Security Database (ASSD)5 contains detailed information on the work history for
all private sector workers from 1972 to present. It contains both a unique plant and person
identifier. Second, the unemployment register contains detailed information on both UI
and UA benefits for the years 1988 to 2007. Third, we use data from a road trip planning
firm to measure travelling time between any two municipalities.6
To construct our data set we obtain all unemployment spells from the ASSD that
last at least for 7 days. For a given unemployment spell we figure out information
about the last and next (if there is one) employment spell. For the relevant employer-
employee relation before and after unemployment, we obtain the following variables: exact
date of termination and start of the relation, average daily wage (yearly contribution to
the social security system divided by the number of working days), geographic location
(municipality-level7), industry affiliation of the employer. For the individual we know the
month of birth and gender and we can calculate tenure on either job, experience, sickness,
occupation (blue/white collar).
The two variables age and experience allow us to calculate the potential benefit du-
ration for UI benefits. Knowing this duration, we are able to distinguish between time
of UI and (potential) UA receipt for each unemployment spell. For each unemployment
spell we know the exact duration on days. Furthermore, the data allow us to calcu-
late the non-employment duration. This is the number of days between the succeeding
and the previous job. The ASSD data allow us to determine the basis on which bene-
fit are calculated, which is typically different from the previous wage. We can identify
the unemployment spells from the ASSD data in the unemployment register. From the
unemployment register, we obtain the municipality of residence, the UI and UA benefit
level, education and information on the family situation.
The third data set, road trip planning data from the year 2000, contains time and
distance in kilometres between any pair of municipalities. This distance is measured
between the centroids of the municipalities. Hence, for each unemployed individual we
5See Zweimüller et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the data set.
6Our data set only contains individuals who live and work in Austria. Hence we do miss commuters
across national borders. Official statistics suggest that we do not miss out many cases. From the census
2001, there are 3.6 millions individuals listed as employed of which 57,730 (1.59%) said they live in Austria
but work abroad, mostly in Germany. We know the precise number of Austrian cross border workers
only for Switzerland. Namely in 2013Q3 there were 8,119 Austrians who crossed the border at least once
a week to work in Switzerland. Back in 2002Q3 the figure was 6,985. Conversely, the tax data authority
indicates that of those who have to pay taxes in Austria, 5.8% live abroad and this latter number also
includes individuals temporarily living abroad.
7There were 2376 municipalities in 2014.
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can calculate previous and succeeding distance to the workplace8.
We restrict the analysis along some dimensions. First, we focus on unemployment
spells starting between January 1995 and December 2004. The main reason to start af-
ter 1994 is to avoid interactions with a major change in the unemployment system that
extended the potential benefit duration substantially for certain individuals9. Second, we
include individuals aged 20 to 54 at the start of unemployment. We do not want to include
older individuals to avoid interactions between unemployment and early retirement, which
is strong in Austria as assessed in Inderbitzin et al. (2016). Third, we exclude individuals
with a commute of more than two hours prior to unemployment. These are most likely
weekly commuters and may have a different search patterns relative to daily commuters,
who are of main interest in our study. Fourth, individuals who quit voluntarily10 and
those who return to the same employer are excluded. The particular data we use need
two more restrictions. First, the average daily wage we are measuring confounds hours
and the wage rate. This is a major problem for women but not for men. We focus on men
because virtually all men work full time. Second, the commuting time we measure is not
door to door but municipality to municipality. This is a potential source of measurement
error which may be particularly relevant in metropolitan areas, where the actual com-
muting time is highly affected by the exact location of residences and workplaces. As a
robustness check, we exclude the largest 5 cities in Austria except Vienna, namely Graz,
Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck and Klagenfurt. For Vienna we can identify the 23 districts
and treat each of them as single municipalities. This is not possible for the other cities.
A first look at the structure of commuting in Austria is given in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
Figure 3.3 illustrates commuting time by place of residence. It is evident that individuals
who live in mountainous areas commute longer. Those who live in flatter areas (north east)
or valleys (west) experience shorter commutes. Hence, workers do trade-off distances with
amenities (e.g. living in the countryside). If we draw the same picture not by municipality
of residence but municipality of work (Figure 3.4), we do not see such a clear geographical
pattern: for each workplace, there is a more balanced distribution of commute time and
we do not find strong evidence of concentration in space of larger commute times by
workplace.
8Note that our data contains information on plant location. People who work in headquarters of
firms are not in our data as their municipality code is missing.
9See Lalive and Zweimueller (2004) for an analysis of this reform.
10Identified through a waiting period of 28 days.
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Figure 3.3: Average Commuting Time by Residency
Figure 3.4: Average Commuting Time by Workplace
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3.3.3 Stylized Facts on Wage and Commute Changes
We report in Table 3.2 the summary statistics for the full sample (154,677 spells). We
also split these statistics for each of the four possible outcomes (where w+, w−, d+, d−
represent, respectively, workers experiencing a transition from a lower to a higher paid
job (w+), workers experiencing a transition from a higher to a lower paid job (w−),
workers experiencing a transition from a closer job to a job further away (d+), and finally
workers experiencing a transition from a job further away to a closer job (d−). The latter
subset also includes workers who find a job at the same distance, denoted hereafter by d0:
conditional on changes, there is a 16% mass of people remaining in the same city before
and after a transition through unemployment.
Workers, on average, spend 25 weeks in non-employment; those who find a wage at
least as high as the last wage spend 20 to 21 weeks in non-employment. Individuals
finding a job at the same distance as the previous job are non-employed on average for
22 weeks. Workers finding a job at a different location are non-employed on average for a
longer time (about 24 weeks). The number of weeks in registered unemployment is smaller
(row 2), around 15 to 20 weeks. We also calculate potential benefit duration, which is
around 32 weeks (row 3). The average replacement rate is around 40% for unemployment
benefits in the unemployment regime (UI, row 4). Data also include information on the
amount under an assistance regime (UA), which we will introduce in the next Section
to enrich the model. Row 5 gives the mean replacement rate including zeros (that is,
for workers eligible to the regular unemployment insurance regime) and row 6 gives the
mean replacement rate for workers under the UA regime. The replacement rate of the
UA regime is close to the UI regime. Indeed, once UA is granted, it amounts to around
90% of UI benefits which translates into the lower replacement rate despite the fact that
the sample is much different - UI is populated by higher wage workers.
Previous daily wage is 59.98 euros (full sample); the next wage is 57.67 after exiting
non-employment. For those getting a higher wage, the new wage is 67; for wage losers,
instead, the mean wage is around 50 euros. Previous commute time is .443 of an hour
(that is 0.438x60=26.58 minutes one way). Commute time after is 0.62 of an hour, almost
40 min. On average those who commute more now commute around an hour; those who
commute less commute 0.298 of an hour, that is 18 minutes.
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In Figure 3.5 we take a closer look at the distribution of commute and wage changes
between any two jobs spaced out by an unemployment spell. The first and the second
rows represent the distribution of commute and wage changes, respectively, in levels (left
panel) and in logs (right panel). The dispersion is quite large; in relative terms, given that
the mean commute time is about 30 minutes, it turns out that the typical dispersion is
higher for commute distances. From the left panels we can notice that commuting times
are right skewed, while wages are symmetric.
The third row of Figure 3.5 also reports in the scatter plot of changes in log wages
and commuting distance changes per unemployment status: we distinguish between indi-
viduals who find a new job while they are receiving unemployment benefits (black circles)
and individuals who find a job only after they have exhausted unemployment benefits
and eventually receive unemployment assistance benefits (crosses). In both cases, the
correlation appears to be positive: higher changes in commute time are associated with
larger wage gains while lower commute distances are typically associated with negative
wage growth between the previous and the next job. This scatter plot is first evidence
that time until a job is found matters: those finding a job under the UA regime face a
lower net wage growth conditional on distance change or vice versa.
We finally report the conditional densities of the sample in the cross section of accepted
jobs, in Figure 3.6. The joint density of accepted wages and commuting times shows a
peak at 57 Euros wage per day, and about 32 minutes of commuting time (top left and
right sub-graphs). Jobs that offer higher wages and longer commutes, or lower wages,
and shorter commutes are also quite frequent. This is the pattern we saw in the previous
figure.
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Figure 3.5: Changes in Commuting Time and Wage
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Figure 3.6: Joint Density Distributions for Commute Time and Wage
Notes: The figure shows the same data from Figure 3.5 but as joint distributions. Commuting is measured in hours, wages
are measured in Euros. Source: own calculations.
3.3.4 Empirical Hazard Rates and Competing Risks Analysis:
More Wage Cuts and Less “City Stayers” Over Time
With similar notations as in the theory part and in Table 3.2, we separate out transitions
of workers towards a larger distance job (d+), those staying in the same city (d0) and
finally those facing a decline in commute distance (d−). Similarly for wages, we separate
out workers facing transition to a higher wage (w+) and a lower wage (w−) and define
transition to the same wage (w0) if the new wage is within a range of 4% around the old
wage.
The results are presented in Figure 3.7; it displays the profile of the hazard rate for
the non-employment duration in the data. The unemployment exit hazard rate reaches
a maximum between two to six months before it declines continuously. This could be
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because job seekers entering unemployment apply for jobs right away but need to wait
until they receive a job offer. This is true for overall exits (top chart) and for each of the
destinations (middle and lower chart).
Figure 3.7: Empirical Hazard Rates by Exit State
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Our theory for job search in space predicted that relative hazards inform on search
strategies. We now establish a few stylized facts related to the “competing risks”, to assess
how the different sub-hazards relate to each other over time. We proceed as follows. We
first estimate sub-hazards using Cox-Regression defined by the type of job an individual
finds11. We distinguish better paying jobs, worse paying jobs, and about equal paying
jobs. The about equal paying category means the new wage is up to 4% above or below
the previous job. We introduce this category to deal with the issue that we do not know
for sure whether job seekers would accept the previous job. In a second step, we build
11Note that doing so does not mean we split the sample by wage or distance, the type of job an
individual finds merely defines which sub-hazard this individual contributes to estimating. We follow
standard practice in competing risks estimation.
68 Commuting and Unemployment
relative hazard rates. For instance, we calculate the relative hazard of wages by dividing
the hazard estimate for w− by the hazard estimate for w+ telling us how the relative
probability to end up in relatively worse jobs behaves over time. The same can be done
with distances.
The relative hazards are illustrated in Figure 3.8. Each plot includes the unconditional
relative hazard ratios (black lines in the graphs), as well as the hazard ratio after control-
ling for some observable characteristics (red solid line). The latter is a prediction from
a Cox-Estimation where we control for a variety of observed characteristics presented in
Table 3.2. The black dashed lines are the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
The upper left panel relates exits in worse paid jobs to exits in better paid jobs. As
expected, the relative likelihood that individuals leave into worse paid jobs increases with
the duration of non-employment. This is evidence that reservation wages are declining
over time, consistent with job search theory when workers loose eligibility. Degen (2014)
finds a very similar pattern for accepted wages in Austria. This result, well known, is in
line with a large body of evidence in other countries. Further, the left panel in the second
row shows that this arises mostly from strong wage cuts: the relative hazard w−/w0 goes
up, while the left panel in the third row shows stability over time of w0/w+.
The upper right graph relates exits into jobs farther away to jobs that are closer to
home. Both the unconditional and the conditional relative hazards are almost flat. This
implies that the succeeding job can be either closer or farther away from home. This
ratio is 1.5 and stable over time, meaning that there is a larger fraction of distance losers
(d+). This may be surprising since one would perhaps have expected, parallel to the
decline in the reservation wage over time, that workers could face an increase in their
reservation distance; this may suggest the absence of action along the distance margin.
However, this interpretation is wrong, as indicated in the subsequent rows. The reason is
not the insensitivity of the distance margin, but rather due to the fact that hazard rates
away from the previous city actually evolve relative to the hazard of the “city stayers”.
This hazard rate account for the 16% of individuals in our sample who do not change the
commuting distance in the new job as compared to the old job.
In fact, the unexpected result uncovered here is that the pattern of search with respect
to the previous city varies quite a lot over time. Indeed, we obtain instead quite strong
trends in relative hazard ratios where the denominator is the hazard rate of city stayers,
as shown in the right panel in the second and third rows. The second row (right panel)
relates exits into farther away jobs to exits into jobs at the same distance. Overall,
there is a larger portion of unemployed individuals finding a new job farther away than
staying in the same city. The proportion of “distance losers” (d+) relative to stayers (d0)
goes up over time. For workers experiencing such a move to a more distant city, this
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is indeed a change upward of the reservation distance strategy, that may be explained
by a decline in the unemployment insurance. We also find a positive trend in time for
the “distance winners” (d−) relative to stayers (d0) (third row, right panel): individuals
are indeed relatively more likely to find a job in the same place at the beginning of the
non-employment duration than to move closer to home. This suggests that workers tend
to search first for jobs in their previous workplace before searching jobs closer to home.
As time goes however, some workers give in and get closer, possibly sacrificing on wages.
Overall, it is relatively more likely to find a job in the same place at the beginning of the
non-employment duration than towards the end of the non-employment duration.
There are various possible interpretations of the above results, that the old workplace
is a relevant margin for job search, especially at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
Jobs are typically concentrated in space, e.g. finance jobs in the capital, and job seekers
have work experience in only a few industries. Job seekers in spatially concentrated in-
dustries are more likely to find a job in the same city as before, until they change sector
if unsuccessful. In that case, they also change their area of search and therefore move to
another city. Another explanation would be that unemployed workers have more informa-
tion about the old workplace e.g. through informal search channels. Both explanations
can be true simultaneously and would produce the same observable consequences. We
have explored these explanations by conducting the same analysis for workers who work
in geographically clustered industries as opposed to workers who work in geographically
uniformly distributed industries. We obtain similar results for both types of industries,
suggesting that the information channel is important.
3.3.5 The Impact of Unemployment Benefits on Hazard Rates:
Identification Strategy
We will estimate a basic Cox-model of the sub-hazard rates. Our particular focus here is
on identifying the effects of three unemployment insurance parameters on the nature of
jobs individuals accept. The identification of the effects of unemployment benefits, benefit
duration, and unemployment assistance is obtained as follows.
First, unemployment benefits are determined by previous earnings. The benefit sched-
ule exhibits two kinks as in Card et al. (2015), one at the bottom of insured earnings and
one at the top of insured earnings. Conditional on previous earnings and other observ-
ables, the remaining variation in unemployment benefits mainly stems from the presence
of the kinks. If individuals cannot manipulate previous earnings to shift themselves be-
yond one of the kinks, the variation in unemployment benefits generated by the kink can
be assumed to be exogenous. Importantly, the earnings that constitute the benefit base
are not necessarily the ones where the job was lost. The relevant earnings to determine
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Figure 3.8: Relative Conditional Hazard Rates from Empirical Data Analysis
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unemployment benefits are either from the previous year or two years before, depending
on when the individual starts claiming unemployment benefits. It is hardly possible for
job seekers to manipulate the relevant previous earnings that ultimately determine the
level of unemployment benefits.
Second, similar reasoning holds for the potential duration of unemployment benefits
(PBD). PBD depends on previous work experience and age with discontinuous changes
after several work experience thresholds, and two age thresholds (40 years and 50 years).
Our strategy to exploit those changes is to add flexible functions of previous work ex-
perience and age into the Cox-regressions. Appendix Figure 3.23 documents the non-
linearities used in the strategy. Recall that the coefficient of a regressor in the multiple
regression model is the partial correlation of that regressor with the dependent variable.
The bottom graph of Figure 3.23 shows PBD after all regressors in the model, including
work experience and age, have been partialled out. The residual is close to zero almost
everywhere, except at age 40 and age 50. PBD exhibits discrete jumps at these ages, thus
identifying the coefficient on PBD. PBD effects are identified from the age and previous
work experience discontinuities in PBD.
We are not aware of a quasi-experimental design for unemployment assistance. We
use the observed level of unemployment assistance conditioning on some potential deter-
minants of unemployment assistance receipt (marital status, previous wage).
3.3.6 Evidence of Disincentive Effects
Table 3.3 displays the effects of the level of benefits from unemployment insurance B and
from assistance b on hazard rates. Column 1 displays the results while controlling for
the effect of benefits under the UI regime (B) and potential benefit duration (PBD). The
sign on the hazard rate is strongly negative. The effect of potential benefit duration is
also negative and significant. The regressions include a number of other factors, including
tenure profiles, marital status and family composition, as well as provincial dummies
(NUTS3), industry dummies, altitude, and year effects12.
The second column introduces further the value of unemployment assistance (b) for
those having exhausted their UI rights. So B measures the replacement rate for job seekers
on UI, and b is the replacement on unemployment assistance for job seekers on assistance.
In this specification, potential benefit duration captures the number of weeks remaining
before exhausting benefits. Both levels of UI (B) and UA (b) reduce the hazard rate,
although the effect of b is smaller than B. The effect of PBD is still negative but less so.
12Table 3.15 in the appendix shows the full set of covariates.
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The next columns investigate which sub-hazards are more strongly affected by changes
in the unemployment insurance parameters. Making UI more generous should not affect
exits to good jobs (paying a higher wage), except via reduced search intensity. Indeed,
point estimates for UI benefits and assistance are small in column (w+). More generous
unemployment insurance makes exits to jobs that pay the same or worse much less likely
(columns w− or w0). So, making UI more generous improves chances that job seekers
find a better paid job, relative to finding a worse paid job.
Regarding the links between UI and distance, one would expect more generous UI to
reduce the rate of leaving to jobs further away from home (column d+). This is true for
potential benefit duration which reduces the rate of accepting jobs far away from home.
However, for benefits, we do not see that increasing UI reduces exists to jobs further away
from home. Instead, increased UI reduces the rate of leaving for a job in the same city
(column d0), relative to jobs closer or farther away from home. This might be because
increased UI facilitates job search in new areas. UI benefits enlarge the search radius
around the previous city. All estimates attached to UI generosity display negative signs,
this reflecting the effect of UI on search intensity. The impact of UI and UA on joint wage
and distance changes is displayed for completeness in Appendix Table 3.16.
Table 3.4 offers a summary of the differential effects of benefits and assistance on
changes in distance and wages, where the reference is staying in the same city and at a
wage within the -4%/+4% range. Interestingly, benefits and assistance raise significantly
the occurrence of the outcome “higher wage”; benefits reduce the occurrence of the outcome
“lower wage”, assistance being insignificant here. Further, netting out the d− coefficients
to the d0 coefficients, it appears that benefits increase the likelihood to get closer to home
than staying in the same city; and, for wage increases and wage stability (first two rows),
netting out the d+ coefficients to the d0 coefficients implies that benefits increase the
likelihood to get further away to home than staying in the same city.
In summary, in a majority of cases, unemployment insurance reduces reservation wages
at a given distance, and promotes search outside the same city, especially closer to home,
as expected, but also further away, which is per se a less expected result. Appendix D
explores whether this may be due to credit constraints. Evidence lightly points out in
this direction (see Appendix Table 3.19).
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Table 3.4: Coefficients from Table 3.16, Relative to Exit (w0, d0)
Benefits Assistance
d+ d0 d− d+ d0 d−
w+ 1.49⋆⋆⋆ 1.177⋆⋆⋆ 1.508⋆⋆⋆ 0.529⋆⋆ 0.533⋆ 0.539⋆⋆
w0 0.454⋆⋆⋆ 0 0.348⋆⋆ 0.491⋆ 0 0.226
w− -0.694⋆⋆⋆ -0.585⋆⋆⋆ -0.758⋆⋆⋆ 0.22 0.412 0.241
Notes: The table summarizes estimates from a competing risk Cox regression to each combination of wage and distance
destination. The table reports coefficients on unemployment benefits (B) and unemployment assistance (b) relative to the
coefficient estimated for the constant wage and same municipality of residence destination (w0,d0). Significance is indicated
as follows: *(p<0.1), **(p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).
3.4 Extending the Model to Account for the Empirical
Facts
This Sections enriches the model to take stock of these finding. It adds several dimensions
to the previous analysis in Section 3.2. In particular, it shows how to account in a simple
way:
1. for the existence of potential credit market imperfections;
2. for the local dimension of job search, and the particular role of the previous work-
place that seems to be central in the Austrian case;
3. it also extends the model to the existence of two unemployment compensation pro-
files, insurance and assistance.
3.4.1 Mild Liquidity Constraints, Unemployment and the Role of
Benefits
The previous results were derived under the assumption that agents face no liquidity
constraint. Under the assumption of a search cost taking the form C(D,λ) = M(D) +
e(λ,D), where the first part may be thought as a monetary component and the second
part as disutility of effort and distance, this requires that the income from benefits and
other assets is larger than the financial cost, or that the unemployed workers may borrow
at the same rate as the employed workers save. Indeed, this assumes that the rate of
interest r is the same for borrowers (the unemployed) and savers (some of the employed).
Another “almost equivalent” assumption is that the unemployed workers who have just
been laid-off either still have financial assets or full access to financial liquidity. In that
case, the situation of the newly unemployed workers is similar to that of the employed
workers, which was our working hypothesis so far.
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We represent this alteration with the assumption that the newly unemployed workers
have access to the same rate of interest for a random time, and under some Poisson
intensity process, undergo a drop in their financing capacity.
In that case, a mild liquidity constraint is that they face a higher interest rate r+ but
may still borrow at this rate and therefore, choose the optimal range of search. Another
extreme assumption is that these unemployed workers, after being hit by a financial
constraint, cannot even borrow and face a strict liquidity constraint, under which their
current income must equal their spendings: consumption and monetary search costs. We
do not detail the model solutions in this case since we do not find strong evidence in favour
of such strict constraints in the data and only leave this for the Appendix (sub-section
B.2). These unemployed workers must now discount the future at their rate of pure time
preference, and r+ must now be interpreted as such a rate, going say from 4% a year to
20% a year.
In other words, the newly unemployed workers are decumulating assets and make
optimal search decisions; following a financial shock unemployed workers have no longer
any asset and must either borrow at a higher rate or face cash-constraints and discount
the future at their rate of time preference.
Lemma 3 (unemployment benefits impact). i) In the absence of liquidity constraints,
an increase in unemployment benefits increases the value of unemployment by a factor 1/r.
ii) Under mild liquidity constraints, the impact is 1/r+ and thus smaller.
The proof of the impact of unemployment benefits on the value of unemployment is
also in Appendix B.2 in all possible cases.
3.4.2 Introducing Two Levels of Unemployment Compensation
Now, we assume that there are two levels of benefits: B (insurance) and b (assistance).
Workers switch randomly from B to b at Poisson rate α13. The value of unemployment
depends on the eligibility status; let Uc and U be these values for workers covered by UI
and by UA, respectively, and ρ the commute distance. Let λ and λc be the arrival rates
of job offers per unit of superficy, and first simplify the exposition in treating λ and λc as
simple parameters. As already shown in Section 3.2, the optimal values of λ can be easily
calculated once the optimal search radius D∗ has been chosen.
We also assume that the financial constraint of the unemployed gets more severe as
time goes. However, instead of assuming that agents can accumulate and decumulate
13Many real world UI systems are not stationary, e.g. unemployment benefits run out after a fixed
number of months. Non-stationarity can matter for job search behavior, as studies on benefit exhaustion
show (Meyer (1990)). Card et al. (2007b) discuss end of benefit behavior and find it matters much less
than earlier studies would suggest. Our specification buys us simplicity at a reasonable cost.
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wealth, we make the simplifying assumption, already discussed in Section 3.4.1, that
individuals face a higher rate of discount after a Poisson shock; although in principle the
loss of eligibility to unemployment insurance and the more difficult access to liquidity are
distinct stochastic processes, we assume that they occur simultaneously, which simplifies
the derivation of the model. Then, we simply assume that the covered unemployed workers
access to credit at rate rc, which is lower than that the rate r faced by the uncovered
workers. We also assume that search effort dimensions (here D only) and consumption
are non-separable, with an interaction term proportional to parameters δ and δc; δ (δc)
positive (negative) means that the disutility of distance is lower (higher) for higher income
recipients. The full derivation of the extended model can be found in Appendix A.2.
The following Lemma highlights how job seekers change their reservation wage when
switching from the UI to the UA regime.
Lemma 4. Assuming δ = δc and r = rc, the reservation wage for a given distance
is higher for eligible unemployed workers than for ineligible workers. The difference is
in(de)creasing in commute distance if δ < (>)0.
Rc(ρ)−R(ρ) = rc + s
1 + δτρ
(Uc − U) > 0. (3.7)
We can grasp the main intuition by focusing on the simple case with separability
between monetary income and distance and linear commute distance cost function. In
this case, we already proved that reservation wages are linear in the commute distance
and the marginal rate of substitution is constant, denoted by τ . In this case, the linearity
comes from the fact that wages enter linearly in the utility function and that commute
costs are linear in distance. It follows that the reservation frontier in wage and distance
is linear, and can be represented as such in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: Theoretical Reservation Frontiers and Acceptance-Rejection Areas
3.4.3 Directing Search Towards the Previous City
The main insight of the previous empirical part is that workers seem to search first in
the previous city, and then extend their range of search. We want to give a theoretical
counterpart to this complex job strategy. Assume now that workers can target the effort
strategy λ differentially in space, contrary to what was assumed before. To keep things
relatively simple, we assume that workers can distribute their search effort either in the
previous city (with intensity of arrival of offers λ0) or in any other city within the range
D (with intensity of arrival of offers λ). Because space is continuous in our setting, we
define the previous workplace as a range of values centered on the mean of the distance
distribution (d0): the lower and the upper bounds of the range are denoted as d0−and
d0+ , respectively.
The optimal search strategy is therefore six-tuple (D, Dc, λ0, λ0c , λ, λc). The first order
conditions for the optimal search radius stay as in the benchmark model (see equation
3.18 and 3.19). The new first order conditions on optimal search intensity are reported
in Appendix A.3.
The specification we adopt for the cost functions is the following:
C(D,λ, λ0) = τD + c0Dηc + cλ
[
γλ
0
(λ0)ηλ + (λ)ηλ
]
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C ′λ(D,λ, λ
0) = cληλ(λ)
ηλ−1; C ′λ0(D,λ, λ
0) = cλγλ
0
ηλ(λ
0)ηλ−1;
As regards the part of the search cost which depends on distance (D), we assume that
it is made by two components: the first one is a monetary component, and the second
one is a convex function which represents agent’s disutility from searching farther away
from residence. The cost of search effort only presents a convex disutility component. As
discussed in Section 3.4.1, the monetary component of the search cost (summarized by τ)
enters the agent’s budget constraint. In this way we can study the case of binding liquidity
constraints, which leads to sub-optimal choices of the radius of search. Regarding the
disutility component, c0 and cλ are the weights of the distance and the effort dimensions,
respectively. ηc and ηλ are the elasticities of the subjective part of the cost function to
these two search margins. Furthermore,γλ0 captures how costly is the search effort in
the previous workplace relatively to search outside. We assume γλ0 < 1 to indicate that
the search efficiency is likely to be larger in the previous workplace, either for industry
concentration or for existing social networks.
Furthermore, covered workers are assumed to be relatively more efficient in searching
in the previous workplace (γλ0c < γλ
0): in absence of other dimensions of heterogeneity,
the asymmetry in the search cost is needed to rationalize the empirical observations
that covered workers exit unemployment more quickly and they are relatively more “city
stayers”. Moreover, there are several empirical reasons that may justify this choice: shorter
non-employment spells are often associated with a richer human and social capital and
are considered as a positive signal by potential employers.
3.5 Calibration of the Richer Model and the Role of
Policy Parameters
3.5.1 Calibration Parameters and Summary of the Main Vari-
ables
As Figure 3.7 showed, the hazard rates decrease over time. This may arise due to: i)
discouragement from job seekers as time goes - e.g time varying search costs; ii) lower
quality of job offers due to the exhaustion of offers in the initial pool of search (e.g. the
same city); iii) a stigma effect from being long-term unemployed and thus less efficient
search as time goes; iv) more impatient workers over time, hence reducing their search
effort; v) illiquid workers who cannot afford paying for the optimal search effort and who
restrict their range of search; vi) finally, heterogeneity of workers and a composition effect
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in the pool, so that those less efficient dominate over time. Mechanisms ii) and iii) are
for instance assessed in Kroft et al. (2013), who find a negative association between the
length of elapsed unemployment spells and the likelihood to obtain a job interview.
We therefore enrich the model with a set of assumptions encompassing these various
mechanisms and consistent with these interpretations. Assume the existence of two types
of unemployed workers: covered workers are entitled to benefits B, and uncovered workers
are assistance recipients b < B . Covered workers are assumed to face a relative higher
efficiency of search in the same city, while uncovered workers face instead a less efficient
search effort. This hypothesis captures the first three explanations of the declining hazard
rate listed above. Additionally, covered unemployed workers face a lower rate of interest
and are thus more patient and search ceteris paribus more; the uncovered, under assis-
tance, face a higher rate of interest and search less. This assumption is consistent with
previous point iv). Appendix B.2 extends the model in the direction indicated by point
v). We do not explicitly address point vi), instead. Hence, as time goes, we observe both
a decline in the absolute hazard rate and, under adequate choice of the relative efficiency
of search in the same city, a decrease over time of the hazard rate in the same city relative
to the hazard rate outside the city.
We then choose the various parameters so as to replicate the qualitative results on
hazards, relative hazards and sub-hazards as in Section 2. The full calibration is reported
in Table 3.5. The rate of interest is set to 4% annually for the employed workers and
for the covered unemployed workers (under UI), and at 12% for the uncovered workers
(under UA). The discount in the search cost of prospecting in the same city is γλ0c =0.07
for covered workers, but that comparative advantage of the previous city decreases for the
uncovered workers and that discount parameter goes to γλ0=0.14 instead. Further details
on the calibration strategy are relegated to Appendix A.5.
Table 3.6 reports the main equilibrium variables of the model. The simulated reser-
vation frontier, the counterpart of the theoretical Figure 3.1, is instead represented in
Figure 3.10: since we assume a negative δ = δc and a linear cost function, the reservation
frontier turns out to be convex. The blue and the red vertical lines represent the radius
of search for uncovered and covered workers, respectively.
An outcome of the model is that covered workers ask for higher wages (Rc > R)14,
search closer (Dc < D) and search more intensely (λc > λ; λ0c > λ0). The higher search
intensity of covered workers is due to their comparatively higher efficiency, as stressed in
the previous section. This allows them to exit unemployment more quickly (hazc > haz).
Moreover, job seekers under the UI regime are more likely to find a job in the previous
14More exactly, covered workers have a higher reservation frontier: their reservation wage is higher for
any given commute distance. The figures reported in Table 3.6 are the reservation wages calculated at
D.
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Figure 3.10: Simulated Reservation Frontiers
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Notes: The vertical dashed line is the previous city (d0); the vertical red (resp. blue) solid line is the optimal range of
search of covered unemployed workers D∗c (resp. of uncovered workers D∗). Distance is measured in hours.
workplace, as evident from the higher fraction of city stayers among covered workers.
3.5.2 Search Strategies, Hazard and Relative Hazards as a Func-
tion of Non-employment Spells
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 plot the results of the simulations. The model performs relatively
well under different dimensions. First, we are able to replicate the decrease in the absolute
hazard and in the sub-hazard rates (Figure 3.11). Second, we match the empirical result
that the share of workers exiting unemployment as wage losers is increasing over time
(column one in row two of Figure 3.11). Third, the model can account for the fact that
agents are more likely to expand the radius of search the more time they spend into
unemployment (column 2 in row two of Figure 3.11). Fourth, agents exhaust job offers
inside the previous workplace as time goes. In summary, the lower part of Figure 3.11
shows that the extended model qualitatively accounts well for the empirical dynamics of
sub-hazards that were depicted in Figure 3.8.
The underlying mechanisms of the model are represented in Figure 3.12: as time goes,
the reservation wage R goes down and the search radius D on average increases. This
happens because covered workers search closer and are more picky regarding the wage.
The right panel of Figure 3.12, however, shows a new finding: a large part of the action
here also comes from the changes over time of the hazard rate for the category of “city
stayers” d0, that is people getting job offers in the same city where they used to work.
This is an interesting finding, because it suggests that two spatial margins matter: a) the
commute distance, based on search strategy D centered around the city of residence; b)
the targeted search strategy λ but especially λ0, that may temporarily be centered around
the previous city of work.
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Table 3.5: Calibration
Parameter Description Value
r discount rate 0.01
s separation rate 0.004
c0 cost of search (distance) 5.00
cλ = cλc cost of search effort 80000
ηc, ηλ elasticity of the search effort cost 1.50
γλ0 cost of search in the same city 0.07
δ = δc complementarity between income
and distance
-0.20
Policy parameters
B Unemployment Insurance (UI) 20.59
b Unemployment Assistance (UA) 1.76
1/α Potential Benefit Duration 5.00
τ unit commuting cost 1.00
Wage and distance distributions
µF = µFc mean wage 58.84
σF = σFc sd wage 18.90
µG = µGc mean distance 0.47
σG = σGc sd distance 0.47
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Table 3.6: Main Endogenous Variables of the Calibrated Model
Covered Not covered
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 64.75 60.25
Average distance (min) 25.51 25.84
Hazard rate 0.1126 0.0467
Rejection rate 0.012 0.003
Share city stayers 18.88 5.12
Unemployment 0.012 0.051
Decisions
Reservation wage 43.63 33.03
Search radius (min) 71.08 73.84
Effort outside d0 0.0030 0.0020
Effort inside d0 0.0200 0.0100
Sub-hazard rates
sub− haz(w+, d+) 0.0098 0.0052
sub− haz(w−, d+) 0.0096 0.0064
sub− haz(w+, d−) 0.0256 0.0131
sub− haz(w−, d−) 0.0295 0.0166
sub− haz(w+, d0) 0.0182 0.0024
sub− haz(w−, d0) 0.0199 0.0030
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Figure 3.11: Simulated Hazard Rates from the Extended Theory.
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3.5.3 Comparison of Calibration Moments with the Data
The map of densities of hazard rates in the cross-section of unemployed workers repre-
sented in Figure 3.13 in the distance-wage space, for both covered and uncovered workers,
are quite similar to the equivalent empirical densities in Figure 3.6. One can also repre-
sent the “predicted” accepted wages in the model for both covered and uncovered workers.
This corresponds to the solid and dashed lines in Figure 3.14. The solid line for covered
workers is close to the empirical observations. The dashed line for uncovered workers is
higher compared to the empirical observations. This suggests that our model may cap-
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Figure 3.12: Search Strategies from the Extended Theory: Reservation Wage, Search Radius
and Relative Intensity of Effort in the Same City (λ0) relative to other cities (λ)
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ture well the effects of unemployment insurance but less so the effects of unemployment
assistance. This gives room for improvement of the calibration exercise, introducing more
ex ante heterogeneity in the pool of uncovered workers (those under UA).
Figure 3.13: Joint Density Distributions from Simulations of the Extended Theory
Notes: Commute Distances are measured in hours. Daily wages are measured in euros.
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Figure 3.14: Changes in Commuting Time and Wage
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
Ch
an
ge
 in
 L
og
W
ag
e
-100 -50 0 50 100
Change in Commute [min]
Leave during Covered Leave during Uncovered
Accepted Wages Covered Accepted Wages Uncovered
Accepted Wages are model predictions
Notes: Empirical data is shown as dots (covered) and stars (uncovered). Simulations results from extended theory are
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3.5.4 Policy Implications from the Calibration
The next stage is to describe the comparative statics of unemployment insurance for agents
subject to mild liquidity constraints. In what follows, we will explore systematically the
comparative statics of B, b and Potential Benefit Duration (1/α) on the main endogenous
variables of the model, the reservation strategies and distance search as well as employ-
ment and unemployment. In Appendix B.2 we further consider the case of agents who are
strictly liquidity constrained and compare the difference in the search behaviour implied
by the calibration exercise.
Figure 3.15 shows the response of the main variables of the model to a variation of the
policy parameters, namely the unemployment insurance enjoyed by covered workers (B),
the unemployment benefit received by workers who lost the insurance (b) and Potential
Benefit Duration (PBD).
Variation of B and PBD often have opposite effects on covered (on UI) and uncovered
(on UA) workers. Increases in B and PBD make the covered workers choosier: they
decrease their radius of search and their reservation wage increases. Furthermore, they
reduce the search intensity both inside and outside the previous workplace. The joint
effect is a reduction in the hazard rate for covered workers. On the contrary, B has
no disincentive effect on uncovered workers, since they do not actually receive it. We
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can observe a mild entitlement effect instead: B raises the value of re-employment and
therefore the effort made by uncovered workers to find a job. The result of a larger B
on uncovered workers is therefore that D increases as long as the search effort increases,
while R decreases. As a result, uncovered workers are more likely to exit unemployment.
Changes in b makes both types of workers choosier, leading to a reduction of the hazard
rate for both types of searchers.
Table 3.7 presents the elasticities of outcomes and decisions with respect to the pa-
rameters of the unemployment insurance system. Consider, first, the effects of increasing
the unemployment benefit level for covered job seekers. Accepted wages and commuting
distance display only a small reaction, but the unemployment exit hazard decreases, so
unemployment duration increases, and job seekers reject more wage offers. Why does
unemployment duration increase? The reservation wage barely increases, explaining the
small increase in rejections, but the search radius decreases substantially. Moreover, job
seekers search less, both inside the previous workplace, and outside it.
Changes to the duration of unemployment benefits also affect covered job seekers
directly. Increasing the duration of benefits increases wages somewhat, and reduces com-
muting distance. The unemployment exit hazard decreases substantially, rejections in-
crease, more people work in the previous workplace, and more people are unemployed.
Job seekers increase their reservation wage strongly, and decreases their search radius.
Search intensity also plummets, both inside and outside the previous workplace.
Changes in unemployment assistance, b, affect covered job seekers only once their
benefits have run out. Covered job seekers react to unemployment assistance changes
in a way that mimics unemployment insurance, B, but elasticities are smaller because
job seekers discount the future changes in unemployment assistance. Forward-looking job
seekers do take changes to the social assistance level into account.
Table 3.7 also shows results for uncovered job seekers. Changes in unemployment
assistance affect uncovered job seekers directly. Assistance levels have small effects on
accepted wages, and distances, but lower the unemployment exit hazard considerably.
Uncovered job seekers reject more wage offers, and unemployment increases, once the
unemployment assistance level is increased. Uncovered job seekers leave unemployment
less quickly because they search less, both inside and outside the previous workplace. The
reservation wage increases somewhat, and the search radius decreases, but the elasticities
are a bit smaller than the effort elasticities.
Uncovered job seekers could also be affected by changes in the benefits levels and du-
rations of covered job seekers because, by leaving unemployment, uncovered job seekers
gain entitlement to regular unemployment benefits. Yet, the entitlement effect of rais-
ing the benefit level is small for uncovered job seekers. Elasticities are essentially zero.
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Table 3.7: Elasticities from Simulations of the Extended Theory
Covered job seekers Uncovered job seekers
B b PBD B b PBD
Observed outcomes
Average wage -0.00707 0.00091 0.02100 -0.00017 0.00081 -0.00105
Average distance -0.03718 -0.00182 -0.05775 0.00038 -0.00591 0.00238
Hazard rate -0.08693 -0.01569 -0.40646 0.00314 -0.02832 0.01993
Rejection rate 0.02072 0.01303 0.24616 -0.00884 0.06527 -0.05663
Share city stayers -0.00718 0.00349 0.24564 0.04675 0.00327 -0.34502
Unemployment 0.02950 0.00384 0.75683 0.02634 0.03240 -0.20575
Decisions
Reservation wage 0.01606 0.00418 0.09902 -0.00150 0.01181 -0.00957
Search radius -0.10222 -0.00519 -0.14854 0.00112 -0.01752 0.00710
Effort outside d0 -0.07389 -0.01310 -0.33641 0.00283 -0.02460 0.01796
Effort inside d0 -0.04779 -0.01243 -0.31006 0.00264 -0.02078 0.01678
Notes: The elasticity of y with respect to x is defined as
(
∆y
y
)
/
(
∆x
x
)
. Elasticities are computed from simulations,
considering the following policy changes: ∆B from 40 to 50 % of the previous wage; ∆b from 8% to 10% of the benchmark
B; ∆ PBD 30 to 39 weeks.
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Changes to potential benefit duration have somewhat larger effects for uncovered job
seekers, especially on the share city stayers and unemployment.
We would like to stress three insights from these simulations. First, studying average
wages and average commuting distances will not necessarily provide information on the
underlying decisions. Wages and commuting distances move less than reservation wages
and search radius. Second, studying how many job seekers work in the same workplace
as prior to unemployment is potentially revealing about the allocation of effort. The
“share city stayers” reacts strongly to changes in potential benefit duration but not at
all to changes in the benefit level with corresponding changes in search effort. Third,
benefit levels affect outcomes less strongly than corresponding changes in the duration of
unemployment benefits. This is interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive since changes
to the unemployment benefit duration have no immediate impacts on covered job seekers.
But job seekers are forward looking and the threat of loosing benefit payments changes
decisions already well ahead. This finding, based on simulations, is in line with empirical
studies on the effects of potential benefit duration vs benefit duration, e.g. Lalive et al.
(2006).
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Figure 3.15: Policy Effects on Search Strategies from Extended Theory
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3.6 Summary and Conclusion
Taking the wage-commute distance arbitrage seriously, the paper has developed and then
enriched a search model where the unemployed choose a range over which to search, an
intensity of search in that area and how to allocate search effort in a particular city (their
previous workplace). This model allows us to define the main concepts and to discipline
the empirical analysis. It additionally clarifies the efficiency role for unemployment insur-
ance, namely to alleviate the liquidity constraints of the unemployed. Indeed, if search
in space is costly not only in terms of effort but also financially, especially away from the
city of residence, benefits will help expanding the range of search under the existence of
liquidity constraints.
The data analysis uncovers many regularities. Based on an administrative social secu-
rity dataset covering all newly unemployed workers in Austria, which contains information
on the current residence, the previous workplace and the subsequent workplace for those
re-hired, we established a set of facts.
A. Commute time is dispersed and leads to a wage-distance trade-off: i) in
a sample of employed workers having entered the unemployment spells, 57.2% of them
had more than 20 minutes of one way commute distance, while 23.7% had more than 40
min to the workplace; 22.6% of them used to work in the same city as where they live;
ii) there is a positive correlation in the data between finding a job with a higher wage
and finding a job with a higher distance; iii) almost as many people face a wage increase
as a wage decrease after finding a new job; iv) almost as many workers face a commute
distance increase as people facing a commute distance decrease.
B. Reservation wage strategies vary over time: the hazard rate of getting a
lower paid job increases relative to the hazard rate of getting a better paid jobs, both
for individuals facing an increase in the commute distance and for individuals facing a
decline in the commute distance.
C. Spatial search strategies vary over time too: i) over time, after the initial
peak, people are much less likely to find a job in the same city than to face an increase in
the commute distance. An interpretation is that job seekers initially search more intensely
in the same city and then prospect relatively more outside the city; those prospecting at a
shorter distance may be liquidity constrained unemployed, who will accept a lower wage
but cannot afford expensive job search; ii) over time, the likelihood to commute longer
distances increases relative to other hazard rates (no distance change or lower distance);
an interpretation is that, for a given wage offer, the reservation distance increases over
time for those not liquidity constrained.
D. Disincentive effects of social transfers (UI, UA and duration of UI) are
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quite robust: i) they imply a negative effect on hazard rates and this applies to all sub-
hazard rates (higher and lower wages, higher and lower commute distance); ii) in relative
terms however, they raise the incidence of getting higher paid jobs as compared to the
previous wage; iii) Quantitatively, our calibrated model implies an elasticity of hazard rate
to benefits of -0.12; while explorations of the role of strict liquidity constraints suggest
negligible effects on unemployment.
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3.7 Appendix
A Theory Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof is easy. The reservation wage R(ρ) is defined by
rcW (R(ρ), ρ) = R(ρ)− c(τρ) + s(Uc −W (R(ρ), ρ))
= R(ρ)− c(τρ) + s(Uc − U) = rcU
so that
R(ρ) = τρ+ rcU + s(U − Uc) (3.8)
and similarly,
rcW (Rc(ρ), ρ) = Rc(ρ)− c(τρ) + s(Uc −W (Rc(ρ), ρ))
= Rc(ρ)− c(τρ) = rcUc
so that
Rc(ρ) = c(τρ) + rcUc (3.9)
Hence Lemma 1.
A.2 Extended Model: Two Levels of Unemployment Compensation
This Section contains the equations from the extended model presented in Section 3.4.
As in Section 3.2, we use notations Fρ(w) and G(ρ) for the cumulated distributions of
wages and distances separately. The Bellman equations with two levels of unemployment
insurance are, respectively:
rcUc(D) = B − c(Dc) + δcDcB
+ 2πλc
∫ Dc
0
(∫
w
Max[W (w, ρ)− Uc; 0]dFρ(w)
)
dG(ρ) + α(U − Uc) (3.10)
rU(D) = b− c(D) + δDb+ 2πλ
∫ D
0
(∫
w
Max[W (w, ρ)− U ; 0]dFρ(w)
)
dG(ρ) (3.11)
The value functions for employment are, under the assumption that the employed
workers have the same easy access to credit and saving plans as the covered unemployed:
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rcWc(w, ρ) = w − c(τρ) + δc(τρ)w + s(Uc −Wc(w, ρ)) (3.12)
where c(τρ) is the commute cost for employees. The presence of τ captures the possibil-
ity that search and commuting distance may affect disutility differently. Equation 3.12
similarly applies to uncovered workers.
The solutions proceed from the previous analysis, except that ∂Wc
∂w
(w, ρ) = 1
rc+s
(1 + δcτρ);
∂Wc
∂ρ
(w, ρ) = 1
rc+s
(−c′(τρ)τ + δcτw) so that, denoting by Rc(ρ) the reservation wage of an
eligible worker associated with distance ρ, defined as Wc(Rc(ρ), ρ) = Uc(D∗c ) = Uc (for
simplicity we drop the optimal strategy D∗c ) and by R(ρ) the reservation wage of an un-
covered worker associated with distance ρ, defined as W (R(ρ), ρ) = U(D∗) = U , we can
rewrite the value of employment as a linear function of w:
Wc(w, ρ)− Uc = 1 + δcτρ
rc + s
(w −Rc(ρ)) = Sc(w, ρ) (3.13)
Similar steps lead to
W (w, ρ)− U = 1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ)) = S(w, ρ)
We can now derive the reservation wages:
R(ρ) =
1
1 + δτρ
[c(τρ) + rcU + s(U − Uc)] (3.14)
Rc(ρ) =
1
1 + δcτρ
[c(τρ) + rcUc] (3.15)
From 3.14 and 3.15 we can compute the derivative of the reservation wage with respect
to distance:
∂R
∂ρ
=
c′(τρ)
1 + δτρ
− δτ
(1 + δτρ)2
[c(τρ) + rcU + s(U − Uc)] (3.16)
Equation 3.16 shows that the reservation wage is a non linear function of commute dis-
tance. This slope should be compared to the slope of the empirical relationship displayed
in the last panel of Figure 3.5. Our calibration ensures the positivity of the relationship.
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Optimal Search Strategies
The first order condition on the radius can now be derived. Let wmax be the upper support
of the wage distribution. We have
rU(D) = b− C(D) + δDb+ 2πλEw,ρS(w, ρ) (3.17)
U(D) is maximised when
C ′D(D
∗)− δb = 2πλEwS(w,D∗)g(D∗) (3.18)
Similarly, Uc(Dc, λc) is maximised when:
C ′D(D
∗
c )− δcB = 2πλcEwS(w,D∗c )g(D∗c ) (3.19)
Similar expression as in Section 3.2 hold for the optimal search intensity λ and λc.
Extension of Lemma 3 to Two Types of Unemployed Workers
We now have:
rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2πλ
∫ D
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
rcUc(Dc, λc) = B − C(Dc, λc) + 2πλc
∫ Dc
0
∫ wmax
Rc(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) + α(U − Uc)
The first value equation, through the envelope condition, leads as before to: r dU
db
= 1; the
second value equation leads to
(rc + α)
dUc
dB
= 1 + α
dU
dB
Dynamics of the Pool of Covered and Uncovered Job Seekers
Let us denote by Nc(t) and Nnc(t) the number of covered and uncovered unemployed
workers at time t for a given cohort entering unemployment at time t = 0. We have, for
all t > 0:
dNc/dt = −(hazc + α)Nc
dNnc/dt = −hazNnc + αNc
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These first order partial differential equations are easy to solve. In particular, we have
that:
Nc(t) = Nc(0)e
−(hazc+α)t (3.20)
Nnc(t) = Nnc(0)e
−haz.t +
αe−haz.t
hazc + α− hazNc(0)
(
1− e−(hazc+α−haz)t) (3.21)
where both lines are obtained in fixing the integration constant to get the initial value
at time t = 0 (entrance into the unemployment spell). Further, if all new entrants are
covered, we have that Nnc(0) = 0. The two equations (3.20) and (3.21) determine the
fractions of each of the four groups, that is, the covered and uncovered job seekers in the
population of applicants.
A.3 Extended Model: Directing Search Towards the Previous City
The new first order conditions on optimal search intensity now read as follows:
C ′λ(D,λ, λ
0) = 2π
[∫ d0−
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
[
1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ))
]
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
+
∫ D
d0−
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
[
1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ))
]
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
(3.22)
C ′λ0(D,λ, λ
0) = 2π
∫ d0+
d0−
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
[
1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ))
]
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) (3.23)
A.4 Extended Model: Hazard Rates
There are now six sub-hazard rates sub−haz(w+, d+), sub−haz(w+, d−), sub−haz(w−, d+),
sub− haz(w−, d−), sub− haz(w+, d0), sub− haz(w−, d0), where the sum of these six sub-
hazard rates is the total hazard rate haz. Taking advantage of the empirical evidence,
we assign a peculiar role to the previous workplace, here proxied by the median distance.
To discretize space, we define the area around the previous workplace as a small circle
centered in d0. Let ε be the radius of this small circle, it is useful to define d0− ≡ d0 − ε
and d0+ ≡ d0 + ε. We calibrate ε to be 10% of d0.
Moreover, we allow for the possibility that individuals exert effort in the previous
workplace at a different (possibly higher) rate, denoted by λ0 and λ0c for uncovered and
covered workers, respectively. Notice that, under this assumption, the value of unemploy-
ment should be rewritten:
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rU(D) = b− c(D) + δDb+ 2πλ0Eρ|ρ∈[d0− ,d0+ ]S(w, ρ) + 2πλEρ|ρ∈[0,d0− )∪(d0+ ,D]S(w, ρ)
The optimality conditions conversely do not change, provided that we always ensure
D > d0+ and Dc > d0+,c.
We thus define the total hazard rate of covered and uncovered workers as:
haz = 2πλ
[∫ d0−
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) +
∫ D
d0+
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
+ 2πλ0
[∫ d0+
d0−
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
= 2πλ
[∫ d0−
0
[1− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ) +
∫ D
d0+
[1− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
]
+ 2πλ0
[∫ d0+
d0−
[1− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
]
hazc = 2πλc
[∫ d0−
0
∫ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ) +
∫ Dc
d0+
∫ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ)
]
+ 2πλ0c
[∫ d0+
d0−
∫ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ)
]
= 2πλc
[∫ d0−
0
[1− Fc,ρ(Rc(ρ))]dGc(ρ) +
∫ Dc
d0+
[1− Fc,ρ(Rc(ρ))]dGc(ρ)
]
+ 2πλ0c
[∫ d0+
d0−
∫ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ)
]
A.5 Calibration
The calibration strategy is as follows. First, we fix the parameters for which we have some
information. For instance, we set B (the unemployment insurance) and b (unemployment
benefits) to be 35 % and 3% of the average wage, respectively. Our benchmark calibration
assumes an annual interest rate of 4% for workers covered by unemployment insurance (B),
while long-term unemployed face a higher borrowing rate (rc = 12% annually). We assume
wages and distances are distributed log-normally and we set the mean and the standard
deviation to their empirical counterparts. We can allow for arbitrary values of correlation,
but in the baseline calibration strategy we start with independent distributions. We set
the separation rate so as to match an average unemployment rate around 6%. For the
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disutility component of the search cost function we assume separability between distance
and search intensity and convexity in each argument (ηc = ηλ = 1.5). Importantly,
we assume that agents (both covered and uncovered) weight less the effort provided to
search in the previous workplace rather than outside (γλ0 , γλ0c < 1). Moreover, covered
workers suffer less from the intensity of search in the previous workplace than uncovered
agents (γλ0c < γλ
0). This is an important assumption: because we do not introduce other
dimensions of heterogeneity, the asymmetry in the search cost is needed to rationalize
the empirical observations that covered workers exit unemployment more quickly and
they are relatively more “city stayers”. The weight on the cost of search intensity has an
alternative interpretation as the efficiency of the search process. It is rational to make
the assumption that covered workers are relatively more efficient in searching jobs for
several not self-excluding reasons, as discussed in Section 3.5.1. We set δ = δc = −0.2;
this calibration implies that, for any given income (consumption) level, agents are better
off when they search/commute less.
Given that our dataset does not provide any specific information about the private
cost of commuting and the transport infrastructures, we choose a linear commuting cost
function with coefficient (τ) equal to 1. This monetary component also enters the search
cost function with the same coefficient.
For a given set of parameters, the dynamic of the hazard rate, the sub-hazards and
their ratios is driven by the relative share of workers belonging to the covered or uncovered
state, respectively. More precisely, in each period the hazard rate is a weighted average
of the hazard rate of covered and uncovered workers, where the weights are represented
by the share of workers in these two states, respectively. As time goes, the share of
uncovered workers increases, thus triggering the dynamic of the hazard rates. Hence, in
the model, the dynamic is entirely due to the different search strategies chosen by covered
and uncovered workers.
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Table 3.8: Effects of Potential Benefit Duration on Covered Job Seekers
PBD (weeks) 0 26 52 99 104
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 61.73 65.15 66.24 67.21 67.27
Average distance (min) 27.51 25.14 23.97 22.53 22.41
Hazard rate 0.2307 0.1004 0.0707 0.0481 0.0466
Rejection rate 0.004 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.017
Share city stayers 0.15 20.54 24.67 28.38 28.67
Unemployment 0.000 0.015 0.025 0.042 0.043
Decisions
Reservation wage 33.55 44.80 48.41 51.83 52.09
Search radius 1.52 1.14 1.01 0.87 0.86
Effort outside d0 0.0297 0.0144 0.0108 0.0079 0.0077
Effort inside d0 0.1042 0.0520 0.0401 0.0307 0.0301
B Supplementary Results: Theory
B.1 Policy Simulations
Tables from 3.8 to 3.13 report the changes in the observed outcomes and the decisions
of the unemployed for different policy experiments. Regarding the Potential Benefit Du-
ration, we consider the absence of UA (0 weeks), 26 weeks like in the US, the double
of this value (52 weeks) and two extreme values (99-104 weeks) which correspond to the
maximum reached during the last recession. For the UI we consider a wide range of val-
ues, varying the replacement rate from 0 to 80%, which is among the maximum values
observed in reality (Denmark). In Austria the current replacement rate is around 40%.
UA is expressed in terms of UI, ranging from 0 to 50%.
The information conveyed by the tables are the same as in Figure 3.15 and discussed
in Section 3.5.4.
B.2 The Strict Liquidity Constraints Case
In the case the unemployed have decumulated their assets and face a subsistence level
for consumption, say C, they face the following strong cash constraint that prevents them
from searching optimally in space:
b ≥ C +M(D)
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Table 3.9: Effects of Potential Benefit Duration on Uncovered Job Seekers
PBD (weeks) 0 26 52 99 104
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 60.51 60.34 60.29 60.25 60.24
Average distance (min) 25.70 25.86 25.91 25.95 25.96
Hazard rate 0.0446 0.0469 0.0477 0.0484 0.0484
Rejection rate 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Share city stayers 11.58 4.61 3.46 2.70 2.65
Unemployment 0.082 0.048 0.041 0.035 0.034
Decisions
Reservation wage 34.00 33.19 32.94 32.70 32.68
Search radius 1.21 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.25
Effort outside d0 0.0078 0.0082 0.0083 0.0084 0.0084
Effort inside d0 0.0072 0.0075 0.0076 0.0077 0.0077
Table 3.10: Effects of Unemployment Insurance (B) on Covered Job Seekers
Replacement rate 0 0.20 0.4 0.6 0.8
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 65.34 64.97 64.69 64.47 64.31
Average distance (min) 26.35 25.86 25.39 24.92 24.44
Hazard rate 0.1209 0.1162 0.1114 0.1066 0.1016
Rejection rate 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Share city stayers 18.99 18.93 18.86 18.80 18.72
Unemployment 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Decisions
Reservation wage 43.38 43.72 44.06 44.42 44.79
Search radius 1.31 1.23 1.17 1.11 1.06
Effort outside d0 0.0169 0.0163 0.0157 0.0151 0.0145
Effort inside d0 0.0592 0.0579 0.0565 0.0552 0.0538
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Table 3.11: Effects of Unemployment Insurance (B) on Uncovered Job Seekers
Replacement rate 0 0.20 0.4 0.6 0.8
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 60.37 60.37 60.36 60.36 60.35
Average distance (min) 25.83 25.84 25.84 25.85 25.85
Hazard rate 0.0466 0.0466 0.0467 0.0468 0.0468
Rejection rate 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Share city stayers 4.93 5.03 5.15 5.27 5.40
Unemployment 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.053
Decisions
Reservation wage 33.47 33.45 33.42 33.40 33.37
Search radius 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23
Effort outside d0 0.0081 0.0081 0.0081 0.0082 0.0082
Effort inside d0 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074 0.0075 0.0075
Table 3.12: Effects of Unemployment Assistance (b) on Covered Job Seekers
Percentage of B 0 0.25 0.5
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 64.69 64.88 65.09
Average distance (min) 25.55 25.41 25.23
Hazard rate 0.1145 0.1089 0.1028
Rejection rate 0.012 0.012 0.013
Share city stayers 18.81 19.03 19.30
Unemployment 0.012 0.012 0.012
Decisions
Reservation wage 43.46 44.04 44.70
Search radius 1.19 1.17 1.15
Effort outside d0 0.0161 0.0154 0.0147
Effort inside d0 0.0576 0.0554 0.0529
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Table 3.13: Effects of Unemployment Assistance (b) on Uncovered Job Seekers
Percentage of B 0 0.25 0.5
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 60.31 60.47 60.66
Average distance (min) 26.00 25.52 24.97
Hazard rate 0.0481 0.0439 0.0395
Rejection rate 0.003 0.003 0.004
Share city stayers 5.10 5.16 5.21
Unemployment 0.050 0.055 0.062
Decisions
Reservation wage 32.53 33.76 35.12
Search radius 1.25 1.19 1.12
Effort outside d0 0.0083 0.0077 0.0070
Effort inside d0 0.0076 0.0071 0.0066
Lemma 5 (strict liquidity constraints). In the absence of assets and under separability
of the cost function, e.g. C(D,λ) =M(D) + e(λ,D) where the first part is monetary, the
constrained range of search is sub-optimal if
D¯(b) =M−1(b− C) < D∗
The constrained value is increasing in the level of benefits and decreasing in the subsistence
level. In turn, the optimal effort λ∗ will itself react to the constrained value D¯(b).
This Lemma introduces a new role of unemployment insurance in the presence of
imperfect financial markets as studied in Baily (1978), Chetty (2008) or Werning (2002)
or Shimer and Werning (2003). It recognizes that search costs are not only time costs
or disutility costs, but have a monetary component due to the existence of the spatial
dispersion of jobs. The equivalent results of Lemma 3 in the strict liquidity constraints
case can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 6 (unemployment benefits impact). Under strict liquidity constraints as in
Lemma 5, the impact of benefits on U is larger than the inverse of the discount rate.
The proof of this Lemma and 3 in the text is based on the derivatives of
rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2πλ
∫ D
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
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with respect to b for the ongoing rate of interest. Denote by D˜ the minimum between the
optimal search radius D∗ and the constrained level D¯(b): we have
r
dU
db
= 1
+
∂λ∗
∂b
[−C ′λ + 2πEw,ρS(w, ρ)]
+
∂D˜
∂b
[
−C ′D(D˜, λ) + 2πλEwS(w, D˜)
]
+ 2πλ
∫ D
0
∂R(ρ)
∂b
[−S(R(ρ), ρ)f(ρ)] dG(ρ)
The last line is by definition equal to zero since the surplus is equal to zero at R(ρ). In
interior solutions, by the envelope theorem, the second and third lines are equal to zero
as well. Hence, the effect of benefits is equivalent to a permanent rise in the income of the
unemployed workers, who will enjoy both higher benefits as unemployed and choose higher
wages in the future. The situation is different for credit constrained unemployed workers;
indeed, if D = D¯(b) < D∗ is the constrained level of the range of search, then the envelope
condition of the third line does not hold. In this case, −C ′D + 2πλEwS(w,D∗) > 0; then,
the effect of benefits on the value of unemployment is larger than 1/r.
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 compare the dynamics of the simulated hazard rates and of the
search strategies with and without liquidity constraints.
Starred lines in Figures 3.18 and 3.19 represent policy simulations under a calibration
that implies strict liquidity constraints for uncovered workers (D = ¯D(b)) . Covered
workers turn out not to be constrained because the unemployment insurance they are
entitled to is substantially higher than assistance. The results are especially interesting
for policy changes affecting unemployment assistance (b). For low values of b, uncovered
agents are liquidity constrained: this implies a sub-optimally low search radius and hazard
rate. Notice that the presence of liquidity constraints affects search strategies also at
early stages of the unemployment spell, since agents take into account the possibility of
switching to the uncovered state.
Table 3.14 summarizes these results in terms of elasticities.
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Figure 3.16: Simulated Hazard Rates: Strict Liquidity Constraints for the Unemployed Under
the UA Regime
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Figure 3.17: Search Strategies: Strict Liquidity Constraints for the Unemployed Under the UA
Regime
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Figure 3.18: Policy Effects on Hazard Rates: Strict Liquidity Constraints for the Unemployed
Under the UA Regime
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Notes: solid lines refer to the regime with mild liquidity constraints (r > rc); dotted lines show results when unemployed
agents under UA are subject to strict liquidity constraints.
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Table 3.14: Elasticities of the Model With Strict Liquidity Constraints (for Workers Under the
UA Regime)
Covered job seekers Uncovered job seekers
B b PBD B b PBD
Observed outcomes
Average wage -0.00701 0.00934 0.02091 -0.00018 0.05378 -0.00115
Average distance -0.03702 -0.00802 -0.05842 0.00000 0.46273 0.00000
Hazard rate -0.08625 -0.11424 -0.40725 0.00277 0.53952 0.01776
Rejection rate 0.02079 0.10929 0.24895 -0.01042 1.56581 -0.06749
Share city stayers -0.00558 -0.19833 0.23877 0.04798 -0.37945 -0.35029
Unemployment 0.02930 0.06746 0.75717 0.02651 -0.41595 -0.20347
Decisions
Reservation wage 0.01597 0.03255 0.09952 -0.00160 0.09303 -0.01034
Search radius -0.10181 -0.02287 -0.15013 0.00000 1.29386 0.00000
Effort outside d0 -0.07337 -0.09554 -0.33739 0.00262 0.31476 0.01683
Effort inside d0 -0.04732 -0.09486 -0.31042 0.00277 -0.15647 0.01779
Notes: The elasticity of y with respect to x is defined as
(
∆y
y
)
/
(
∆x
x
)
. Elasticities are computed from simulations,
considering the following policy changes: ∆B from 40 to 50 % of the previous wage; ∆b from 8% to 10% of the benchmark
B; ∆ PBD 30 to 39 weeks.
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Figure 3.19: Policy Effects on Search Strategies: Strict Liquidity Constraints for Unemployed
Under the UA Regime
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Notes: solid lines refer to the regime with mild liquidity constraints (r > rc); dotted lines show results when unemployed
agents under UA are subject to strict liquidity constraints.
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B.3 Maximizing the Social Welfare Function with Benefits
The social welfare function is the sum of the value of unemployment and the social value of
employment, possibly incorporating the social costs of commutes, to which unemployment
insurance and assistance must be deducted. Some intermediate results will be useful.
Denote by uc and unc the number of unemployed workers who are covered and non covered,
respectively; we have the differente rates of unemployment by equality of inflows and
outflows:
s(1− uc − unc) = uc.(hazardc + α)
ucα = unc.hazardnc
uc =
s
α + s+ hazardc + αs/hazardnc
;
unc =
s
α + s+ hazardc + αs/hazardnc
α
hazardnc
u = uc + unc
There are two special cases: when α = 0 we obtain u = s/(s + hazardc); and when
hazardc = hazardnc, we also have u = s/(s+ hazardc).
Introducing the notations:
rU˜(D,λ) = 0× b− C(D,λ) + 2πλ
∫ D
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
S˜(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
rcU˜c(Dc, λc) = 0×B − C(Dc, λc) + 2πλ
∫ D
0
∫ wmax
R(ρ)
S˜(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) + α(U˜ − U˜c)
the social welfare function is therefore
Ω = uncU˜(D,λ) + ucU˜(Dc, λc) + (1− uc − unc)Ew,ρ [W (w, ρ)− SC(ρ)] .
where SC(ρ) represent the social costs of commuting15. We vary B and b under
two polar cases: one where agents under unemployment assistance (b) are only mildly
constrained; one where agents under unemployment insurance B are not liquidity con-
strained but agents under unemployment assistance b cannot afford to pay for long search
distances. The effects of policy changes on social welfare are plotted in Figure 3.20 , where
the solid line represents the behavior of the social welfare function under mild financial
15For the social costs of commuting we utilize the following specification: SC(ρ)=
τsocial
[
haz·unc
s Enc(ρ) +
hazc·uc
s Ec(ρ)
]
.
108 Commuting and Unemployment
Figure 3.20: Policy Effects on Social Welfare
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constraints and the starred line refers to the case where the uncovered workers are liquid-
ity constrained for low values of assistance. It can be seen that the socially optimal level
of unemployment insurance is zero, since welfare declines monotonically with B. Instead,
if under mild liquidity constraint the same is true for b (unemployment assistance), in the
more realistic case of liquidity constraints for households in the assistance regime, there
is an optimal level of unemployment assistance and social welfare, which first goes up
as the range of search can be extended and the constraints are reduced. Once the cash
constraint is suppressed however, higher levels of assistance reduce search intensity and
welfare goes down again.
The gap between the dotted line and the solid line in Figure 3.21 represents the per-
centage points of unemployment that can be attributed to the existence of strict liquidity
constraints, the fact that the unemployed cannot search over the optimal range. This
gap is 0.3 percentage points in the left panel, but the gap depends very much on the
value of b which determines the value of D in the case of strict liquidity constraints; in
the middle panel, the difference is as high as 0.072-0.064, that is 0.8 percentage points of
unemployment.
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Figure 3.21: Policy Effects on the Unemployment Rate: Strict Liquidity Constraints for Un-
employed Under the UA Regime
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Notes: solid lines refer to the regime with mild liquidity constraints (r > rc); dotted lines show results when unemployed
agents under UA are subject to strict liquidity constraints.
C Supplementary Results: Empirics
Figure 3.22: Average Commuting Time by Workplace (left) and Residency (right) around
Vienna
Notes: The figure is a zoomed-in version of Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
Table 3.16 reports the estimates of the effects of the policy parameters when the wage and
the distance dimensions are considered jointly. We start by looking into how UI affects the
rate of finding a better paying job, closer to home (w+ /d−). This transition should not
be affected by changes in the reservation wage or search radius, just by search intensity,
thus representing a convenient baseline. Indeed, point estimates on UI parameters are
small in absolute value. Compared to this baseline, UI significantly reduces exits to worse
paid jobs, regardless of whether the job is closer or farther from home (w−/d+, w−/d−).
Compared to the baseline, neither UI benefits nor assistance affect exists to better paid
jobs located further away from home (w+/d+). The key effect on distance is via potential
benefit duration which reduces the transitions to jobs located further from home but has
no effect on the baseline. Results for job seekers who make transitions into jobs that are
different from the previous one suggest reservation wages adjust but search radius does
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Figure 3.23: Kinks in the UI Benefit Schedule and Discontinuity in Age
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Notes: The top graph shows average daily UI benefits around the bottom kink (vertical line). The middle graph shows
the average daily UI benefits around the top kink (vertical line). The bottom graph shows the residual variation from
discontinuities in the eligibility rule for PBD at age 40 and 50 conditional on observable individual characteristics.
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not.
The remaining bivariate transition rates feature either a wage that stays the same (w0)
or a distance that stays the same (d0). Results from outcomes where distance stays the
same (columns 7 to 9) indicate a strong effect of UI benefits and assistance on transitions to
worse paid, w−/d0, (or equally paid, w0/d0) jobs, compared to the transition to better paid
jobs (w+/d0). The outcomes where wages stay the same (columns 3, 6 and 9 again) show
somewhat more reduced transitions to the same city (w0/d0) as unemployment benefits or
assistance increase, compared to being either further (w0/d+) or closer to home (w0/d−).
Results on bivariate estimates are generally consistent with the univariate results.
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D Appendix: Robustness Checks of Cox-Estimates and Some
Light Evidence of Strong Credit Constraints
Table 3.17 investigates the robustness of the estimates to the exclusion of largest cities.
Differences are marginal.
Table 3.19 is an attempt to decompose the results of the effects of benefits and assis-
tance on different outcomes for individuals likely to be credit-constrained (people with at
least 3 years of tenure on the job before UI (getting 2 months of salary as cash-on-hand) and
those not. Interestingly, coefficients of the effect of benefits B of larger distance in the
left of the table are larger for credit constrained agents, suggesting the existence of such
effects.
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Table 3.19: Cox-Model Estimates, Sub-Hazards by Previous Tenure
Benefits Assistance
d+ d0 d− d+ d0 d−
Constraint
w+ 1.680⋆⋆⋆ 1.366⋆⋆⋆ 1.065⋆⋆⋆ 0.001 0.066 -0.523
w0 0.669⋆⋆⋆ 0 -0.008 0.382 0 -0.603
w− -0.250 -0.019 -0.695⋆⋆⋆ 0.504 0.735 0.321
Unconstraint
w+ 1.468⋆⋆⋆ 1.150⋆⋆⋆ 1.498⋆⋆⋆ 0.649⋆⋆ 0.634⋆⋆ 0.737⋆⋆
w0 0.458⋆⋆⋆ 0 0.380⋆⋆ 0.538⋆ 0 0.439
w− -0.675⋆⋆⋆ -0.587⋆⋆⋆ -0.704⋆⋆⋆ 0.127 0.310 0.235
Notes: The table summarizes estimates from a competing risk Cox regression to each combination of wage and distance
destination. The table reports coefficients on unemployment benefits (B) and unemployment assistance (b) relative to
the coefficient estimated for the constant wage and same municipality of residence destination (w0,d0). Significance is
indicated as follows: *(p<0.1), **(p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). Unconstraint : people with at least 3 years of tenure on the
job before UI (getting 2 months of salary as cash-on-hand). Constraint : other.

4 Financial Incentives and Earnings of
Disability Insurance Recipients:
Evidence from a Notch Design
Joint with Stefan Staubli
A version of this paper is under review at the American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy
4.1 Introduction
Disability Insurance (DI) programs are among the largest social insurance programs.
In OECD countries, total expenditures on disability benefits account for approximately
2.5 percent of GDP on average (OECD, 2010b). DI programs are designed to provide
income replacement in the case of a permanent loss of earnings capacity due to poor or
deteriorating health, but there have been concerns that DI discourages work. A work
disincentive that exists in many DI programs is the policy that beneficiaries lose part or
all of their benefits if earnings exceed a substantial gainful activity (SGA) amount. The
loss of benefits at the SGA threshold – also referred to as the “cash cliff” – induces a high
implicit tax on work and creates an incentive for beneficiaries to keep their earnings below
the SGA threshold in order to retain benefits.
If “parking” just below the SGA threshold is widespread, then policies that relax
the threshold could increase earnings among DI beneficiaries, potentially improving their
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economic well-being and their autonomy while reducing dependency on benefits.1 Yet,
these policies could create unintended costs if they induce more individuals to apply for
and ultimately receive disability benefits. If, instead, few beneficiaries reduce earnings
because of the SGA threshold, then efforts to lower the implicit tax on work are likely to
have small impacts on earnings and benefits. Despite numerous anecdotes of beneficiaries
intentionally keeping their earnings just below the SGA threshold, there is little empirical
evidence on the impact of the SGA threshold, and financial incentives in general, on
earnings of beneficiaries.2
This paper helps to fill this gap by investigating whether earnings thresholds induce DI
recipients to adjust their earnings as well as providing an estimate of an earnings elasticity
to financial incentives. Our estimation strategy exploits quasi-experimental variation in
the implicit tax on work in the DI program in Austria. Specifically, DI beneficiaries in
Austria can earn up to an SGA threshold of e439 per month (around USD 500) without
losing benefits. If monthly earnings exceed the SGA threshold by e1, then DI benefits
are reduced by up to 50 percent in that month. These rules generate a discontinuous
increase in the (implicit) tax liability – a notch – at the SGA threshold and create a
strong incentive for many DI beneficiaries to “bunch” on the low-earnings side of the SGA
threshold.3 The amount of bunching can be used to estimate the elasticity of earnings
with respect to the net-of-tax rate, as shown by Saez (2010).
Observed bunching might be attenuated if some individuals do not respond due to
optimization frictions such as adjustment costs and inattention. The long-run or structural
response absent frictions is likely to be larger. One advantage of our notch design as
opposed to a kink design (see, e.g., Chetty et al., 2011; Saez, 2010) is the ability to
estimate a long-run earnings response. The reason is that a notch creates a region of
1Many countries are considering or have recently implemented policy reforms designed to increase
work incentives for DI recipients. For example, the U.S. is currently testing a benefit offset policy that
reduces benefits by $1 for every $2 of earnings above the SGA threshold, rather than fully suspend
benefits. Switzerland tested a conditional cash program that offered DI recipients a cash payment if they
take up or expand employment and reduce disability benefits (see Bütler et al., 2014, for an evaluation of
the program). Other recent examples include the United Kingdom and Norway (see Kostol and Mogstad,
2014).
2For example, the article “Disability Insurance: Not Working” in the magazine the Economist (issue
from January 24, 2015) provides anecdotal evidence for such behavior in the U.S. Social Security Disability
Insurance. Empirical evidence is provided byCampolieti and Riddell (2012); Kostol and Mogstad (2014);
Schimmel et al. (2011); Weathers and Hemmeter (2011) (discussed in detail below).
3Recent studies relying on notches in the budget set examine such diverse topics as earnings adjust-
ments to income and payroll taxes (Kleven and Waseem 2013; Tazhitdinova 2015), automaker responses
to fuel economy regulations (Ito and Sallee 2014; Sallee and Slemrod 2012), the impact of transfer taxes
on the real estate market (Best and Kleven, 2014; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2014), the effect of tax credits
on retirement savings and income (Ramnath, 2013), the labor supply effects of social security (Manoli
and Weber, 2011), and firm responses to stricter tax enforcement (Almunia and Lopez Rodriguez, 2014).
Our paper contributes to this literature by studying behavioral responses at a notch in the disability
benefit schedule.
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strictly dominated choices on the high-earnings side of the SGA threshold. In this range,
beneficiaries can increase both total net income and leisure by moving below the SGA
threshold. Since without frictions no individual should locate in the dominated region, we
can use the observed density mass in this region to estimate the magnitude of attenuation
bias from frictions.
The SGA threshold in Austria is an appealing context to study earnings adjustment to
financial incentives for at least two reasons. First, the increase in tax liability at the SGA
threshold is large in magnitude and very salient. The average DI beneficiary loses around
8.5 percent of his or her total net income if earnings exceed the SGA threshold by e1.
Detecting behavioral responses would be more difficult in other contexts because earnings
rules are typically more complex and therefore less salient.4 The large variation in tax
liability facilitates the identification of behavioral responses to financial incentives even
if the responses are small. Second, bunching below the SGA threshold is often difficult
to detect in administrative data, because earnings are measured at the annual level while
the SGA threshold is specified at the monthly level. Hence, recipients who bunch at the
SGA threshold only for some months of the year would not appear to bunch in annual
data. We rely on very detailed administrative data from social security and tax registers,
allowing us to precisely measure earnings and DI benefits at the monthly level. Moreover,
since sample sizes are very large, we can graphically demonstrate bunching, providing
transparent evidence of a behavioral response.
The insights from our empirical analysis can be summarized by five broad conclusions.
First, there is large and sharp excess bunching in earnings of DI beneficiaries just below the
SGA threshold. We estimate that DI beneficiaries who earn just below the SGA threshold
would increase monthly earnings by up to e400 if the notch at the SGA threshold did not
exist. This represents a 91 percent increase relative to the SGA earnings level. Second,
bunching is very persistent over time; almost 60 percent of those who bunch after entering
the program do so five years later. Third, observed bunching is attenuated by frictions, as
many beneficiaries are located in the dominated range. Yet, over time beneficiaries leave
the dominated range quickly and the majority moves to the SGA threshold. Fourth, even
though the estimated earnings response is large, the implied earnings elasticity accounting
for frictions is small with 0.206. This elasticity estimate masks significant heterogeneity
in the responsiveness to financial incentives across subgroups. Specifically, we find that
4For example, beneficiaries in the public DI program in the U.S. can earn above SGA for nine
months (not necessarily consecutive) over any five-year period. After exhausting the nine-months period,
beneficiaries enter the extended period of eligibility (EPE). If earnings are above the SGA threshold during
the EPE, benefits are paid for three additional months, but are suspended in full thereafter during each
month that beneficiaries earn above SGA. If earnings are above the SGA three years after entering the
EPE, benefits are terminated. Chetty et al. (2009) provide evidence that individuals are not as responsive
to less salient policies compared to more salient policies.
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women and younger age groups are more responsive to financial incentives compared
to men and older age groups. Fifth, simulations show that replacing the notch with
a e1 benefit offset for every e2 of earnings would increase work and reduce benefit
payments among current beneficiaries. However, overall government expenditures would
likely increase to the extent that such a policy would induce more individuals to seek DI
benefits.
To assess the generalizability of our results, we complement our empirical analysis
by comparing the estimates of the work capacity of DI beneficiaries in Austria to other
countries. We follow the approach suggested by Bound (1989) who uses the labor force
participation rate of rejected DI applicants as an estimate of the labor force participation
rate of DI beneficiaries had they not received benefits. Applying this approach to Austria,
we obtain estimates that are similar to the OLS estimates reported in Maestas et al.
(2013) for the U.S and Kostol and Mogstad (2014) for Norway. Nevertheless, caution
applies when extending our findings to other countries. Our estimation approach exploits
variation in earnings of beneficiaries located around the SGA threshold in Austria. In
countries with different SGA thresholds characteristics of beneficiaries around the SGA
thresholds may differ, which could result in different elasticity estimates.
Our paper is primarily related to the literature that studies the effects of policy reforms
to increase work incentives for DI beneficiaries. Hoynes and Moffitt (1999) simulate the
financial impacts of a number of potential reforms and conclude that the effects on work
effort are often not as strong as expected. Consistent with this view, Schimmel et al.
(2011) find that a small increase in the monthly SGA threshold from USD 500 to USD
700 in the U.S. had only a modest impact on earnings of DI beneficiaries. However,
more recent evidence suggests that some policies appear to be quite effective in increasing
employment. Campolieti and Riddell (2012) find that the introduction of an earnings
exemption of CAD 3,800 per year in Canada led to a significant increase in disability
beneficiaries’ propensity to work, but did not have an effect on program inflow or outflow.
Weathers and Hemmeter (2011) and Kostol and Mogstad (2014) find that replacing the
cash cliff with a gradual reduction in benefits leads to a significant increase in work effort
of DI beneficiaries. Our contribution is to provide the first empirical evidence of bunching
at the SGA threshold – a work disincentive that is present in many DI programs – and
to document the dynamics of earnings adjustment over time.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the work potential of disability beneficia-
ries (e.g., Bound, 1989; Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008; French and Song, 2014; Maestas
et al., 2013; von Wachter et al., 2011). Since these studies use rejected applicants as a
control group to estimate the extent to which DI benefits distort work effort, they there-
fore provide a good estimate for the employment potential of beneficiaries at the time of
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applying. Yet, there is much less evidence on the employment potential of beneficiaries
who have been on the program for some time. Prior literature also focuses primarily on
the impact of the DI program on labor force participation and has not examined intensive
responses, which is the focus of this paper.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes Austria’s DI program. Section
4.3 outlines the bunching methodology, summarizes the data, and presents descriptive
statistics. Section 4.4 shows descriptive evidence for bunching at the SGA threshold,
presents our estimates for the earnings elasticities, and simulates the fiscal effects of
hypothetical reforms. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Background
4.2.1 The Austrian DI Program
The Austrian DI program is part of the larger social security system that is financed by
a payroll tax on earned income. The program provides partial earnings replacement to
workers below the full retirement age who are unable to engage in substantial gainful
activity due to a medically determinable health impairment that has lasted for at least
six months. As Figure 4.1 shows, the percentage of the working age population receiving
DI benefits in Austria has been relatively constant at 4.3 percent to 5.2 percent from 1985
to 2012, while the rate of DI receipt in the U.S. increased from 2.2 percent to 5.3 percent
over the same time period.5
To apply for DI benefits, an individual must submit an application to the DI office
in their state of residence (there are nine states in Austria). Employees at the DI office
first check the non-medical eligibility criteria for DI benefits. Only individuals who have
contributed to the program for at least 5 years in the past 10 years and are not yet
eligible for retirement benefits can apply for DI benefits. DI eligibility in Austria is
not conditioned on earnings, so individuals can continue to work while they apply for
and receive benefits. If an applicant meets the nonmedical criteria, a team of disability
examiners and physicians assesses the applicant’s overall ability to work and the medical
severity of the applicant’s disability. A disability award is made if the medical examination
finds that a medically determinable impairment causes more than 50 percent of a reduction
in ability to work relative to that of a healthy person with comparable education.6 If the
5Other countries have experienced similar or even more striking increases in disability recipiency rates
as the U.S., from 2 percent to around 6 percent in Australia and Ireland, from 3 to 6 percent in the U.K.,
and from 6 to 10 percent in Norway.
6Medical criteria for disability classification are relaxed starting at age 57. See Staubli (2011) for the
impact of this relaxation on labor force participation of older workers.
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Figure 4.1: Disability Insurance Recipiency per Adult Ages 25-64
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ichischen Sozialversicherungstraeger”. Source for the United States: Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement;
Bureau of the Census, Census Population Estimates, available at http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest.html.
health impairment is expected to be temporary, DI benefits are granted for a limited time
period of typically two years. DI benefits are awarded for an indefinite time period in
case of permanent health impairments. Applicants who disagree with the decision of the
DI office can appeal within three months.
Once DI benefits are awarded, there are three main pathways out of the program.
First, DI claimants may no longer meet the medical or non-medical eligibility criteria for
disability benefits. For example, the health status may improve such that the DI recipient
is no longer disabled. In 2012, medical improvements and return to work accounted for
88.4 percent of program exits. Second, DI claimants may reach the full retirement age,
at which point they can ask to be transferred to the old-age pension program. However,
few beneficiaries do so because in most cases the corresponding old-age pension would be
lower than the disability pension. In 2012, 8.7 percent of those who left the DI program
were shifted to the old-age pension program. Third, the DI recipient may die. Death
accounted for 2.9 percent of program exits in 2012. In 2012, the DI exit rate stood at 1.6
percent which is lower than in many other countries. For example, the exit rate in the
U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance is four times higher (Moore, 2015).
DI benefits are fairly generous and replace about 60 percent of pre-disability earnings
up to a maximum of approximately e2,800 per month (around USD 3,150). Benefits
are subject to income tax and mandatory health insurance contributions. The level of
benefits depends on an assessment basis and a pension coefficient. The assessment basis
corresponds to the average earnings over the best 20 years after applying a cap to earnings
in each year. The pension coefficient is the percentage of the assessment basis that is
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received in the pension. The pension coefficient increases with the number of contribution
years up to a maximum of 80 percent (roughly 45 contribution years). Applicants under
age 60 qualify for a special increment if their pension coefficient is below 60 percent.
4.2.2 The Substantial Gainful Activity Threshold
Like in the United States and other countries, DI beneficiaries in Austria can earn up to
a Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) threshold without losing any benefits. All earnings
are subject to regular income tax. In 2012, the monthly SGA threshold in Austria was
e439 (around USD 500), which is about half of the SGA threshold for non-blind DI
recipients in the U.S. (USD 1,010 in 2012). However, DI recipients lose a fraction of their
benefits in each month in which earnings exceed the SGA threshold. The loss in benefits
if a beneficiary earns above the SGA threshold in a given month depends on the sum of
benefits and earnings in that month and is calculated as follows:
△s =

0 if s+ z ≤ K1
0.3(s+ z −K1) if K1 < s+ z ≤ K2
0.3(K2 −K1) + 0.4(s+ z −K2) if K2 < s+ z ≤ K3
0.3(K2 −K1) + 0.4(K3 −K2) + 0.5(s+ z −K3) if s+ z > K3,
(4.1)
where s denotes monthly before-tax DI benefits and z are monthly before-tax earnings.
The values K1, K2, and K3 are adjusted each year to account for inflation; in 2012 the
corresponding values were e1,258, e1,887, and e2,515. Equation 4.1 illustrates that the
reduction in benefits ∆s is increasing in s and z. However, the maximum reduction is
capped at 50 percent of full benefits; thus DI recipients are always allowed to keep 0.5s
independent of how much they earn. The SGA threshold coincides with the earnings
threshold above which workers are automatically insured by the public pension system.
DI recipients with earnings above the SGA threshold are therefore required to pay social
security contributions on all earnings. The social security tax is 18 percent for workers
and 21 percent for employers.
Together, these rules change the implicit tax on work at the SGA threshold in two ways.
First, there is a discrete jump in the overall tax liability—a notch—because beneficiaries
lose a fraction of their benefits and their earnings on the first Euro of earnings above
the SGA threshold. The average beneficiary loses about e100, or 8.5 percent of total
after-tax income, of which 70 percent are due to the benefit loss and 30 percent are due to
social security contributions. Second, there is a discrete change in the implicit marginal
tax—a kink—because for each Euro of earnings above the SGA threshold beneficiaries
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lose between 30-50 cents in benefits, as illustrated in equation (4.1), and they have to pay
18 cents in payroll taxes.
Both the notch and the kink create a strong incentive for DI recipients to bunch just
below the SGA threshold in order to avoid the high implicit tax on work and retain full
DI benefits. In the next section, we will describe our methodology how we combine the
amount of bunching with the change in the implicit tax at the SGA threshold to estimate
an elasticity of earnings with respect to the implicit net-of-tax rate.
4.3 Methodology and Data
4.3.1 Theoretical Framework
A series of recent studies estimate the income elasticity of taxpayers by exploiting kinks
and notches in the income tax schedule (Chetty et al. (2011); Kleven and Waseem (2013);
Saez (2010)). We begin with a model that follows Kleven and Waseem (2013) with the
difference that we focus on a notch in disability insurance and not in the income tax
schedule. Specifically, suppose that individual preferences are described by a quasi-linear
and iso-elastic utility function of the form
u(z) = z − T (s, z)− n
1 + 1/e
( z
n
)1+1/e
(4.2)
where T (s, z) is the tax liability, n is an ability parameter, and e is the elasticity of
earnings with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate 1 − t. This specification rules out
income effects and below we also present an alternative approach that does not rely on
a specific form of the utility function. In the counterfactual case of a linear tax system
T (s, z) = −(1 − t)s + tz, the distribution of ability, which is assumed to be smooth,
translates into a smooth distribution of earnings.
Now suppose that a notch and a kink are introduced at the earnings threshold z∗,
representing the SGA threshold. The tax schedule with the notch and the kink can be
written as T (s, z) = −(1 − t)s + tz + [∆T + ∆tz]1(z > z∗) where ∆T is the size of the
notch, ∆t is the size of the kink, and 1(z > z∗) is an indicator for earning above the
SGA threshold. The upper panel of Figure 4.2 shows that the notch shifts the budget
constraint downward at z∗ while the kink rotates the budget constraint. As a consequence,
all DI beneficiaries who earned in the interval (z∗, z∗ + ∆z∗) before the SGA threshold
is introduced would instead move to z∗, implying that the earnings distribution with
the SGA threshold exhibits bunching at z∗, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 4.2.
Moreover, the earnings distribution with the SGA threshold features a hole because the
notch creates a region of strictly dominated choices between z∗ and zI . The earnings
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distribution above z∗ also shifts to the left because the kink induces all DI recipients to
earn less.
Figure 4.2: Budget Sets and Density Distributions
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Notes: The figure shows after-tax monthly income as a function of monthly gross earnings; z∗ denotes the SGA threshold;
zD denotes the earnings level at which the after-tax income is equal to the after-tax income at the SGA threshold.
The width of the earnings response ∆z∗ is proportional to the size of the kink-notch
and the elasticity e. Since the tax parameters are known, we only need to estimate ∆z∗ to
uncover an estimate for the elasticity e. As shown by Saez (2010), the amount of bunching
B observed at kinks can be used to identify ∆z∗. The estimate of the earnings response
from a kink likely captures a short-run effect if some individuals do not respond because
they face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs and inattention; the long-run,
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structural response absent frictions might be substantially larger.7 A key advantage of a
notch is that it allows for the estimation of a long-run earnings response. The reason is
that no individual should choose an earnings level in the dominated range and any mass
in the dominated range should therefore be the result of adjustment frictions. Following
Kleven and Waseem (2013), we determine the long-run earnings response ∆z∗ as the point
of convergence between the observed and the counterfactual earnings distribution in the
absence of a kink-notch (the next section describes how we estimate the counterfactual
earnings distribution).
The approach to pin down ∆z∗ implicitly assumes that the observed mass in the
bunching segment (z∗, z∗ + ∆z∗) is driven by frictions and that the excess mass at the
SGA threshold is coming from the area between the observed and the counterfactual
distribution. With heterogeneity in elasticities, it is possible that some of the mass in
the bunching segment is explained by low elasticities and not frictions, in which case the
convergence point overestimates the true ∆z∗. Moreover, in a dynamic setting the loss in
current income from being in the bunching segment may be compensated by higher future
earnings through career effects. In the empirical application, we will shed light on the
size of the bias created by low elasticities and career effects by examining the dynamics
of earnings adjustment. More specifically, we expect that over time individuals subject
to frictions or career effects will move away from the bunching segment while those with
low elasticities will stay.
Finally, to estimate the earnings elasticity e, we exploit the fact that the marginal
buncher is indifferent between the SGA threshold z∗ and the interior point zI , as shown
in Figure 4.2. Thus, we can set u(zI) = u(z∗) using equation (4.2) and rearrange terms
to obtain the following expression which defines the elasticity e as an implicit function of
the tax parameters, the SGA threshold z∗, and the earnings response ∆z∗ (see Appendix
D for derivation):
1
1 + ∆z∗/z∗
[
1 +
∆T/z∗ −∆t
1− t
]
− 1
1 + 1/e
(
1
1 + ∆z∗/z∗
)1+1/e
− 1
1 + e
(
1− ∆t
1− t
)1+e
= 0. (4.3)
Equation (4.3) cannot be solved explicitly for e, but it can be solved numerically after
we have estimated ∆z∗since the tax parameters and the SGA threshold are known.
One drawback of the above approach is that it relies on a specific functional form for
7Gelber et al. (2013) show that it is possible to estimate a structural earnings response from kinks by
exploiting policy-changes in the magnitude or the location of the kinks. More specifically, they estimate
adjustment costs using the speed by which earnings adjust to policy changes.
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utility. To relax this assumption, we also implement a reduced-form approach following
Tazhitdinova (2015) that does not depend on the structure of the underlying utility. The
key idea is to split the amount of bunching B into bunching generated by the notch
and bunching generated by the kink, assuming that the same elasticity is driving both
responses. To be able to estimate the fraction of bunching from the notch and the kink,
we first need to guess the elasticity e0. After estimating the counterfactual earnings
distribution, we can then convert each bunching response into a corresponding earnings
response, denoted by ∆z∗kink for the kink and ∆z∗notch for the notch. In the case of the
kink, we can back out the earnings elasticity by relating the estimated earnings response
∆z∗kink to the change in the marginal tax rate ∆t using the definition of the earnings
elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate
e =
∆z∗kink/z
∗
∆t/(1− t) (4.4)
Applying the same logic is less straightforward for the notch, because the notch induces
a jump in the average tax rate rather than the marginal tax rate. However, Kleven and
Waseem (2013) show that it is possible to approximate the size of the notch ∆T by an
equivalent increase in the implicit marginal tax rate from t to
t∗ =
T (s, z∗ +∆z∗notch)− T (s, z∗)
∆z∗
. (4.5)
With this approximation we can back out the elasticity using equation (4.4). The resulting
elasticity estimate eˆ will typically not match the initial guess e0. We therefore update the
initial guess to eˆ and repeat the estimation procedure to get a new elasticity estimate.
We continue this iterative process until it converges to a fixed point eˆ = e0.
4.3.2 Empirical Implementation
Our framework relies on a credible identification of the counterfactual earnings density—
the distribution of earnings under a linear tax system without any notch or kink. Following
Kleven and Waseem (2013), we begin by grouping DI recipients into earnings bins of e10
based on their monthly earnings. We proceed by estimating a flexible polynomial to the
observed earnings distribution, excluding observations in a range [zL, zU ] below and above
z∗:
Cj =
p∑
i=0
βi(zj)
i +
zU∑
k=zL
γk1(zj = k) + εj, (4.6)
where Cj is the number of individuals in bin j, zj is the earnings level in bin j, and
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p is the order of the polynomial. The excluded range [zL, zU ] corresponds to the area
that is affected by the SGA threshold either because of excess bunching or missing mass.
Because we include indicator variables for each bin in the excluded range, the polynomial
is estimated without considering data from the excluded range. The counterfactual dis-
tribution is given by the predicted values from equation (4.6) omiting the dummies in the
excluded range: Cˆj =
∑p
i=0 βˆj(zj)
i. Excess mass is the difference between the observed
and counterfactual earnings distribution in the range [zL, z∗]: Bˆ =
∑z∗
k=zL(Ck−Cˆk). Miss-
ing mass is the difference between the observed and counterfactual earnings distribution
in the range (z∗, zU ]: Mˆ =
∑zU
k>z∗(Cˆk − Ck).
Since bunching below the SGA threshold is very sharp, we can determine the lower
bound of the excluded range zL by visual inspection. A similar approach is not feasible
for the upper bound zU because missing mass is fuzzier and cannot be easily determined
visually. Instead, we exploit the fact that the missing mass on the right of the SGA
threshold must be equal to the bunching mass on the left of the SGA threshold. More
specifically, we start by setting zU equal to the first bin on the right of z∗ and estimate
the counterfactual earnings density using equation (4.6). The resulting bunching mass in
this case will exceed missing mass. We then increase the upper bound in small increments
and re-estimate equation (4.6) until the estimated missing mass is equal to the estimated
bunching mass. Importantly, the resulting upper bound zU directly represents our esti-
mate for the long-run earnings response ∆z∗. Plugging this estimate into equation (4.3)
allows us to uncover the structural elasticity.
Estimating the counterfactual density as outlined above ignores the potential left shift
in the observed distribution above the SGA threshold due to the kink, as illustrated in
Figure 4.2. This assumption makes sense in Kleven and Waseem (2013) because in their
setting the change in the marginal tax above the notch is small. It may not hold in
our setting because the change in the marginal tax above the SGA threshold is large.
Not accounting for this kink may bias the counterfactual distribution downward in which
case Bˆ would overestimate the true excess mass. To examine this concern, we estimate
a version of the counterfactual density that accounts for the kink by shifting the density
on the right of zU upward until the area under the counterfactual and the empirical
distribution is identical. It turns out that the elasticity is similar independent of the
estimation approach for the counterfactual density.
Since notches introduce a discrete jump in tax liability, they may induce some individ-
uals to stop working altogether. Such extensive responses would lower the counterfactual
density, introducing an upward-bias in our estimate of the excess mass, because fewer
individuals are located to the right of the SGA threshold. The size of the bias is likely
to be small because our estimation approach relies on excess mass and missing mass in
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a narrow range around the SGA threshold, while extensive responses around the SGA
threshold will be small. The reason is that recipients, who would locate just above z∗ in
the absence of the earnings threshold, are likely better off by moving to z∗ in the presence
of the earnings threshold because z∗ is almost as good as the pre-threshold state.
We calculate standard errors for all estimated parameters using a bootstrap procedure,
as in Chetty et al. (2011). Specifically, we generate a large number of earnings distributions
by random resampling with replacement from the population and calculate new estimates
for ∆z∗ and e by applying the above techniques. We define the standard error of ∆z∗ and
e as the standard deviation of the distribution of estimates.
4.3.3 Data and Sample Selection
We combine register data from two different sources. First, the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD) contains very detailed longitudinal information for all private sector
workers in Austria between 1972 and 2012. At the individual level the data include
gender, nationality, month and year of birth, blue-collar or white-collar status, and labor
market history. Labor market histories are summarized in spells. Specifically, the start
and end dates of all employment, unemployment, disability, sick leave, and retirement
spells are recorded. The data contain several firm-specific variables: geographical location,
industry affiliation, and firm identifiers that allow us to link both individuals and firms.
Second, we use income tax reports that firms and the social security administration are
required to submit to the tax office at the end of each year. These reports contain
detailed information on benefits from the various social insurance programs, earnings,
social security contributions, and income tax withholdings for the tax office. We have
access to the tax records for the years 1994 to 2012 which can be linked with the ASSD
via an identifier variable.
To investigate the effect of the SGA threshold on earnings, we consider all DI spells
that were initiated between 2001 and 2012 by individuals younger than age 57 at the time
of entry into the program. We exclude spells that started prior to 2001 because earnings
restrictions were not uniformly regulated for these spells. We focus on DI recipients who
are younger than age 57 because individuals who start claiming benefits after age 57 face
stricter earnings restrictions. These individuals lose all benefits if earnings exceed the
SGA threshold and they are not allowed to work in the same occupation as before the
onset of the disability. We observe individuals at a monthly frequency up to eight years
before they enter the DI program, while they are on the DI program, and up to four
years after they exit the DI program (in case program eligibility ceased due to medical
recovery). Having data at the monthly level is crucial given that the SGA limit applies
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monthly.8
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for our analysis samples. Column 1 shows
summary statistics for all DI recipients in our sample, columns 2 shows summary statistics
for DI recipients who work at least once during the observation period, and column 3 shows
summary statistics for the subset of DI recipients who are working just below the SGA
threshold. DI recipients are on average 48.2 years old at program entry and 59 percent
suffer from a musculoskeletal disease or a mental disorder which are typically difficult
to verify. 9 A comparison of columns 1 and 2 shows that only about 15 percent of DI
beneficiaries are working while receiving benefits. Compared to all DI recipients, working
DI recipients are younger, had a lower wage in their last job, have lower DI benefits,
have more labor market experience, and suffer less from difficult-to-verify disorders. On
average, they earn about 50 percent less than what they earned before entering the DI
program. This drop is explained to a large extent by the fact that many DI beneficiaries
are earning just below the SGA threshold; column 3 illustrates that over 25 percent of
working DI beneficiaries are located just below the SGA threshold.
8It would be harder to detect bunching with annual earnings data because beneficiaries who earn just
below the SGA for several months (but not the whole year) would not appear to bunch in annual data.
Figure 4.8 in Appendix B shows the distribution of annual earnings around the SGA limit. While there
is clear evidence for bunching at the SGA threshold, the amount of bunching is an oder of magnitude
lower than in monthly data (see Fig 4.3).
9The high fraction beneficiaries with difficult-to-verify disorders is typical for DI programs in many
countries. For example, the fraction of recipients suffering from a mental illness or a musculoskeletal
disease is 57.4 percent in the U.S. Social Security DI program (Maestas et al. (2013)) and 61.4 percent
in Norway (Kostol and Mogstad (2014)).
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
All DI recipients Working DI recipients
All At notch
(1) (2) (3)
Female ( percent) 45 45 48
Age at DI entry (years) 48.2 (8.0) 46.6 (9.0) 45.3 (9.1)
Blue-collar ( percent) 67 68 62
UI duration last 15 years 1.12 (1.31) 0.93 (1.19) 1.14 (1.21)
Experience last 15 years 9.67 (4.71) 11.1 (4.00) 10.3 (4.00)
Sick leave last 15 years 0.71 (0.79) 0.60 (0.71) 0.69 (0.75)
Monthly DI benefits (in e)
Full DI benefits 974 (498) 920 (472) 1,040 (490)
Partial DI benefits 964 (507) 688 (584) 1,040 (490)
Monthly gross earnings (in e)
Last job before DI 3,009 (5,674) 2,411 (3,766) 1,992 (3,916)
While claiming DI 54 (533) 1,179 (2,227) 375 (43)
Health impairment
Mental disorders ( percent) 40 38 44
Musculoskeletal system ( percent) 19 16 16
Cardiovascular system ( percent) 10 10 8
Other ( percent) 31 36 31
No. of individuals 183,168 27,054 7,084
No. of observations 7,562,737 334,461 84,787
Notes: UI duration last 15 years, experience last 15 years and sick leave last 15 years are measured prior to DI entry. Sample
standard deviations for continuous variables in parentheses. Monthly DI benefits and monthly gross earnings are measured
during DI. Health impairment is only observed for DI spells that start in 2004 or after.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Descriptive Evidence of Behavioral Responses
Evidence for Bunching in Pooled Data. We start our analysis by examining graph-
ically whether there is evidence for bunching at the SGA threshold. To do so, we pool
all available years of data and calculate the difference between earnings and the SGA
threshold in a given year, given that the SGA threshold increases from year to year by
about e10 to account for inflation and wage growth. We then group individuals into
e10 bins and quantify excess mass and missing mass by estimating a sixth-degree poly-
nomial to the observed earnings distribution using equation (4.6).10 Figure 4.3 shows the
normalized earnings distributions around the SGA threshold as well as our estimate of
the counterfactual earnings density (black line). The vertical solid line denotes the SGA
threshold and the vertical short-dashed lines denote the excluded range [zL, zU ].
Figure 4.3: Earnings Distribution Around the SGA Threshold
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Notes: The figure shows the earnings distribution of monthly gross earnings around the SGA threshold (marked by the
vertical solid line) for DI beneficiaries between 2001 and 2012. The excluded range [zL, zU ] is marked by vertical dotted
lines. The histogram bins are monthly gross earnings relative to the SGA threshold in the relevant year. The bin width
is e10. The solid line beneath the empirical distribution is a sixth-degree polynomial fitted to the empirical distribution
using equation (4.6). Bunching b is excess mass in the excluded range below the notch relative to the average counterfactual
density in the interval [zL, z∗] and zU has been estimated such that missing mass equals bunching mass. Bootstrapped
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Several things can be observed from the figure. First, there is large and sharp bunching
at the SGA threshold. We measure excess bunching relative to the average counterfactual
density between zL and z∗: bˆ = Bˆ∑z∗
k=zL
Cˆk/((z∗−zL)/10+1)
. Excess bunching is 14.54 times the
average height of the counterfactual density and precisely estimated. Second, the earnings
10Figure 4.9 in Appendix B plots the counterfactual earnings distribution for lower and higher poly-
nomial degrees, showing that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of the degree of polynomial.
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distribution exhibits significant missing mass given that the density falls discretely above
the SGA threshold. However, there are no visible holes as the distribution of earnings is
relatively flat above the SGA threshold, suggesting that frictions are an important factor
that prevent DI beneficiaries from adjusting their earnings. Third, the SGA threshold
significantly reduces earnings of DI beneficiaries. The point of convergence zU where
missing mass equals bunching mass is e400, suggesting that without the SGA threshold
beneficiaries who bunch would earn up to e400 more.
As equation (4.1) illustrates, the change in tax liability that beneficiaries experience
at the SGA threshold varies depending on the level of DI benefits. For example, the drop
in net-of-tax income due to notch ranges from e66 to e357 and the marginal tax rate
increases between 18 and 50 percent. Theory predicts that excess bunching should be
more pronounced the larger the change in tax liability. To test this prediction, we group
beneficiaries into different bins as a function of the size of the notch relative to total
pre-tax income and calculate the fraction of beneficiaries that are bunching in each bin.11
Figure 4.4 shows a strong positive relationship between the relative size of the notch and
the fraction of beneficiaries that are bunching. A 1 percent increase in the size of the
notch leads to a 1 percent increase in the fraction of beneficiaries that are bunching.
Figure 4.4: Relative Size of the Notch and Fraction of Beneficiaries at the SGA Threshold
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Notes: The figure shows the relationship between the size of the notch relative to the total pre-tax income (=DI benefits
and earnings) and the fraction of beneficiaries that are located just below the SGA threshold, i.e. in the earnings interval
[zL, z
∗]. Beneficiaries are grouped into bins according to the size of the notch. The size of the circles indicates the number
of beneficiaries within each bin.
The identification assumption underlying our estimates for excess bunching and miss-
ing mass is that the earnings distribution would be smooth if there was no jump in the
11As equation (4.1) illustrates, both the size of the notch and the kink depend on total income (=DI
benefits+earnings), Thus, DI beneficiaries who face a larger notch will also face a larger kink.
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tax liability at the location of the SGA threshold. We can shed light on this identification
assumption by exploiting the movement of the SGA threshold across years. Figure 4.5
displays the distribution of earnings around the SGA threshold for the years 2006, 2008,
2010, and 2012. We restrict the sample to DI recipients who entered the program in
the five year window before the observation year, so that the number of observations is
roughly constant across different years. The vertical line denotes the corresponding SGA
threshold in a given year, while the vertical dashed line denotes the SGA threshold in
2012. Clearly, the excess mass follows the movement of the SGA threshold very closely.
Figure 4.5: Earnings Distribution around the SGA Threshold in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012
SGA2012
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
Gross Monthly Wage
z*: 389
b: 16.38 (1.31)
SGA2012
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
Gross Monthly Wage
z*: 407
b: 14.37 (1.00)
SGA2012
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
Gross Monthly Wage
z*: 427
b: 14.29 (0.98)
SGA2012
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
Gross Monthly Wage
z*: 439
b: 16.09 (1.12)
Notes: The figures show the earnings distribution of monthly gross earnings around the SGA threshold (marked by the
vertical solid line) for DI beneficiaries in the years 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. The sample in each figure consists of DI
beneficiaries who entered the program in the five year window before the observation year. The SGA threshold in 2012 is
marked by the vertical dashed line. The histogram bins are monthly gross earnings relative to the SGA threshold in the
relevant year. The bin width is e10. The solid line beneath the empirical distribution is a sixth-degree polynomial fitted to
the empirical distribution using equation (4.6). Bunching b is excess mass in the excluded range below the notch relative
to the average counterfactual density in the interval [zL, z∗]. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Persistency of Bunching and Dominated Behavior. Taking advantage of the lon-
gitudinal aspect of our data, we next investigate the dynamics of bunching and dominated
behavior over time. More specifically, we group beneficiaries in each quarter in one of four
segments as a function of their earnings z: (i) bunching segment (zL ≤ z ≤ z∗), (ii) dom-
inated segment (z∗ < z < zU), (iii) below segment (0 < z < zL), and (iv) above segment
(zU ≤ z). Figure 4.6 illustrates the fraction of beneficiaries in each segment over time
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for beneficiaries who in the first quarter after DI entry are in the bunching segment (left
panel) or in the dominated segment (right panel).
The left panel shows that bunching is highly persistent over time. Around 60 percent
of DI beneficiaries who are located in the bunching segment in the first quarter after DI
entry are still bunching five years later. On the other hand, the fraction of beneficia-
ries in the dominated and above segment is always very low (below 10 percent). Some
beneficiaries move to the dominated region, presumably because it is difficult to con-
trol earnings perfectly. Over time there is an increase in fraction of beneficiaries in the
below segment, perhaps reflecting that some beneficiaries reduce their earnings due to
deteriorating health.
The right panel shows that there is a drastic and fast decline in the fraction of bene-
ficiaries in the dominated region. Five quarters after DI entry only about 30 percent of
beneficiaries are still located in the dominated region and this fraction declines further
to about 20 percent. The beneficiaries who remain in the dominated range in the long
run are likely those with a low elasticity. Over time almost 40 percent of beneficiaries in
the dominated range move to the bunching segment, suggesting that adjustment frictions
prevent many beneficiaries from bunching in the short run. About 20 percent of benefi-
ciaries move to the above segment, indicating the importance of career effects. Similarly
to the left panel, there is an increase in the fraction of beneficiaries in the below segment,
probably because of deteriorating work potential over time.
Figure 4.6: Dynamics of Dominated and Bunching Behavior over Time
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Notes: The left panel shows the dynamics of dominated behavior by quarter after DI entry. The sample consists of all DI
beneficiaries who are located in the dominated range (z∗, zU ] in the first quarter after DI entry. The right panel shows the
dynamics of bunching behavior by quarter after DI entry. The sample consists of all DI beneficiaries who are located in the
bunching segment [zL, z∗] in the first quarter after DI entry. “Below” and “above” denote the earnings intervals (0, zL) and
(zU ,∞), respectively.
Speed of Earnings Adjustment. The jump in implicit tax liability at the SGA thresh-
old is much smaller for individuals not receiving DI compared to individuals on the DI
program. Individuals on DI lose a portion of their benefits and have to pay social security
contributions while those not on DI only have to pay social security contributions. As a
138 Disability Notch
consequence, we would expect to see more bunching while individuals receive DI benefits
and less bunching before individuals enter the program or after they exit the program
due to medical recovery. The availability of data both before individuals enter and after
they exit the DI program allows us to examine how fast bunching adjusts to changes in
tax liability at the SGA threshold.
Figure 4.7: Bunching Before/After DI Entry and Before/After DI exit
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Notes: The left panel shows the amount of bunching b for different years before and after DI entry (vertical solid line). The
sample consists of DI recipients who are working at least once in the first five years after program entry. The right panel
shows the amount of bunching before and after exit from the DI program (vertical solid line). The sample consists of DI
recipients who exit the DI program between 2004 and 2007; exits into the old-age pensions are excluded. The dashed lines
denote 95 percent confidence intervals.
The left panel of Figure 4.7 plots estimates of b and 95 percent confidence intervals
in the years before and after DI entry for beneficiaries who work at least once in the first
five years on the program. The earnings distribution around the SGA threshold in each
year is shown in Figure 4.11 in Appendix B. The amount of bunching is close to zero eight
to six years before program entry and increases steadily to 5.41 in the year of program
entry. Excess bunching jumps to 12.74 in the first year on the program and continues to
increase to 18.39 five years after program entry, highlighting the persistency of bunching
over time. This pattern suggests that some individuals adjust earnings before DI entry in
anticipation that they will be awarded benefits, but most of the adjustment takes place
within the first year on the program.
We can perform a similar analysis when individuals exit the DI program by examining
whether excess bunching becomes smaller or even disappears as individuals leave the DI
program. The right panel of Figure 4.7 plots estimates of b and 95 percent confidence
intervals for each year before and after DI exit for recipients who lose benefits between 2004
and 2007. Figure 4.12 in Appendix B displays the corresponding earnings distributions
around the SGA threshold. There is a substantial reduction in bunching from 15.81 in
the last year on the program to 8 in the first year after program exit. However, excess
mass around the SGA threshold is highly persistent after program exit; the amount of
bunching is still almost 8 four years after program exit. One potential explanation for the
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slow earnings adjustments is that many individuals who lose benefits may be speculating
that they will return to program in the near future. We find that around 66 percent of
DI recipients who lose benefits appeal the decision and 72 percent of those who appeal
are eventually readmitted to the program.
4.4.2 Estimating Labor Supply Responses and Elasticities
Main Results. In this section we present estimates of earnings elasticities, by combining
the nonparametric evidence on bunching presented above with the framework in Section
4.3. Specifically, we derive an estimate for the earnings response ∆z∗ using the point
of convergence zU and then solve equation (4.3) numerically for the elasticity e. The
results are presented in Table 4.2, which displays the amount of bunching in column
(2), the earnings response in column (3), and the elasticity in column (4). Panel A
of Table 4.2 shows that the earnings response is very large and highly significant. DI
beneficiaries who bunch would increase earnings by up to e400 per month or 91 percent
more than the SGA threshold. Even though the estimated earnings response is large,
the implied earnings elasticity is modest with 0.206. The earnings elasticity is robust
over time; separate elasticity estimates for the first seven years after DI entry range from
0.132-0.201, as shown in Table 4.5 in Appendix A. Our estimates are comparable to the
estimates presented in Gelber et al. (2013) who study earnings responses to the Social
Security Earnings Test in the U.S. and around twice as large as the estimates presented in
Kleven and Waseem (2013) who exploit notches in Pakistan’s income tax schedule. Both
this study and Gelber et al. (2013) focus on discontinuities at a low earnings thresholds
where most individuals work only part-time. Since part-time workers can adjust working
hours more easily, they tend to be more responsive to taxes than full-time workers.
It is important to keep in mind that our approach relies on excess and missing mass
around the SGA threshold and therefore provides a good estimate for the work capacity
of beneficiaries who are located around the SGA threshold. The earnings elasticity might
differ in countries with a different SGA threshold than in Austria if the elasticity is het-
erogeneous across subgroups of beneficiaries and if characteristics of beneficiaries around
the SGA threshold vary with its level. Given that Austria’s earnings threshold is quite
low, it is likely that beneficiaries around the SGA threshold have a low work potential.
Consistent with this view, Table 4.1 shows that beneficiaries around the notch had lower
earnings in their last job compared to the full population of beneficiaries. This suggests
that our earnings elasticity may represent a lower bound.
Since not all beneficiaries have the same work capacity, the impact of the SGA thresh-
old on earnings is likely to differ across beneficiaries. Our estimation strategy can be used
to test for heterogeneity in earnings elasticities, provided that the number of observations
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Table 4.2: Earnings Elasticities for Full Sample and Subgroups
Bunching Earnings response Earnings elasticity
b ∆z∗ e
A. Full sample
14.54⋆⋆⋆ 400⋆⋆⋆ 0.206⋆⋆⋆
(0.470) (16.41) (0.018)
B. Age
< 35 14.54⋆⋆⋆ 690⋆⋆⋆ 0.695⋆⋆⋆
(1.877) (224.9) (0.270)
35− 49 14.96⋆⋆⋆ 400⋆⋆⋆ 0.232⋆⋆⋆
(0.720) (27.01) (0.031)
50− 56 14.12⋆⋆⋆ 380⋆⋆⋆ 0.143⋆⋆⋆
(0.618) (17.87) (0.018)
C. Gender
Men 14.61⋆⋆⋆ 390⋆⋆⋆ 0.118⋆⋆⋆
(0.698) (21.57) (0.021)
Women 14.22⋆⋆⋆ 390⋆⋆⋆ 0.316⋆⋆⋆
(0.669) (23.78) (0.033)
D. Health impairment
Mental 12.24⋆⋆⋆ 340⋆⋆⋆ 0.167⋆⋆⋆
(0.808) (30.00) (0.034)
Physical 14.65⋆⋆⋆ 400⋆⋆⋆ 0.164⋆⋆⋆
(1.243) (42.55) (0.043)
Other 15.88⋆⋆⋆ 460⋆⋆⋆ 0.269⋆⋆⋆
(1.142) (65.93) (0.068)
E. Worker status
Blue-Collar 11.76⋆⋆⋆ 310⋆⋆⋆ 0.115⋆⋆⋆
(0.685) (21.57) (0.023)
White-Collar 20.32⋆⋆⋆ 670⋆⋆⋆ 0.361⋆⋆⋆
(1.295) (148.0) (0.120)
F. Company status
No Jobs Below SGA 14.11⋆⋆⋆ 350⋆⋆⋆ 0.153⋆⋆⋆
(0.509) (15.80) (0.017)
Jobs Below SGA 24.31⋆⋆⋆ 1050⋆⋆⋆ 0.871⋆⋆⋆
(1.913) (40.88) (0.040)
Notes: The table presents estimates of bunching b, the earnings response ∆z (based on the point of convergence zU between
the observed and the counterfactual density), and the structural earnings elasticity e. Standard errors in parentheses are
obtained using a bootstrap procedure where we sample from the population with replacement. The standard deviation of
the distribution is shown in brackets. All estimates are based on a sixth-order polynomial fitted to the empirical earnings
distribution. Significance levels: ⋆⋆⋆ = 1%, ⋆⋆ = 5%, ⋆ = 10%.
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within each subgroup is sufficiently large to detect excess mass and missing mass. In Pan-
els B-E of Table 4.2 we present estimates of the impact of the SGA threshold for groups
defined by age, gender, health impairment, and worker status. There is significant hetero-
geneity in the responsiveness to the SGA threshold. Panel B illustrates that bunching and
elasticities are larger for DI beneficiaries below age 50 than for DI beneficiaries above age
50. This finding is consistent with existing evidence that younger DI beneficiaries exhibit
the highest responsiveness to financial work incentives (Kostol and Mogstad, 2014). As
Panel C shows, female DI recipients are more responsive to financial incentives than their
male counterparts. Previous studies have found a similar pattern in other contexts (see,
e.g., Chetty et al., 2011). There are also significant differences across impairment types,
as illustrated in Panel D. DI recipients with mental and physical disorders are less re-
sponsive compared to DI recipients with other impairments. Finally, Panel E shows that
white-collar workers are more responsive to financial incentives than blue-collar workers.
The reason is that eligibility criteria for disability benefits are less strict for white-collar
workers compared to blue-collar workers.12 As a consequence, white-collar beneficiaries
are healthier on average than blue-collar beneficiaries, facilitating adjustments in earnings
to financial incentives.
Since firms are also required to pay social security contributions if workers earn above
the SGA threshold, firms may have an incentive to help workers respond to taxes by of-
fering jobs at the threshold. Such firm behavior would amplify the bunching response. To
examine firm incentives, we group firms into two categories according to whether they em-
ploy workers below the SGA threshold who are not on the DI program. Panel F shows that
bunching is substantially larger in firms who employ non-DI workers below the threshold
(24.31) compared to firms who do not employ non-DI workers below the threshold (14.11).
This pattern suggest that firms help coordinate beneficiaries’ employment response.
Robustness Checks. Table 4.3 presents several robustness checks to examine the sen-
sitivity of our estimates to different subsamples and specifications. First, we take into
account that the point of convergence zU may overstate optimization frictions because, as
Figure 4.6 shows, not all beneficiaries in the dominated range move to the SGA threshold
over time either due to low elasticities or career effects. In particular, we multiply the
observed mass in each bin above the threshold by the fraction of beneficiaries who are
bunching five years after DI entry and then re-estimate both the earnings response and the
elasticity. This approach yields a lower earnings response of e270 and a lower elasticity
12White-collar workers are classified as disabled if their ability to work is reduced to less than 50
percent in the last occupation, while blue-collar workers are only eligible if they suffer a reduction in the
ability to work of 50 percent or more relative to a healthy person in any reasonable occupation that the
individual is able to carry out.
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of 0.064. Second, we use an alternative approach to estimate the counterfactual density
which incorporates intensive responses above the SGA threshold due to the increase in
the marginal tax rate by dt. Specifically, we shift the bin counts to the right of zU upward
until the area under the counterfactual and the empirical distribution is identical. The
elasticity estimate using the modified counterfactual density is similar (0.163). This is not
surprising given that the density is almost flat above the SGA threshold, implying that
the interior shift has little impact on the bin counts. As discussed in section 4.3, we derive
the elasticity estimates assuming a quasi-linear utility function, which rules out income
effects. To relax this assumption, we also estimate a model that does not depend on the
functional form of the underlying utility and find a slightly larger elasticity of 0.247. The
magnitude of the behavioral responses depends also on the shape of the counterfactual
density. We examine the robustness of our results with respect to the shape of the coun-
terfactual by varying the degree of the polynomial in equation (4.6). We find that the
elasticity is not very sensitive in this respect.
Table 4.3: Earnings Elasticities, Robustness Checks
Bunching Earnings response Earnings elasticity
b ∆z∗ e
Fraction bunching after 5 years 14.54⋆⋆⋆ 270⋆⋆⋆ 0.064⋆⋆⋆
(0.470) (9.58) (0.011)
Counterfactual with kink response 14.36⋆⋆⋆ 360⋆⋆⋆ 0.163⋆⋆⋆
(0.475) (13.20) (0.015)
No functional form assumption 15.34⋆⋆⋆ 430⋆⋆⋆ 0.247⋆⋆⋆
(0.539) (17.73) (0.018)
Alternative polynomials
5th order polynomial 18.01⋆⋆⋆ 430⋆⋆⋆ 0.239⋆⋆⋆
(0.473) (13.36) (0.015)
7th order polynomial 14.27⋆⋆⋆ 540⋆⋆⋆ 0.357⋆⋆⋆
(0.516) (35.57) (0.038)
Workers not on DI program 3.94⋆⋆⋆ 400⋆⋆⋆ 0.787⋆⋆⋆
(0.036) (14.93) (0.04)
Notes: The table presents estimates of bunching b, the earnings response ∆z (based on the point of convergence zU between
the observed and the counterfactual density), and the structural earnings elasticity e. Standard errors in parentheses are
obtained using a bootstrap procedure where we sample from the population with replacement. The standard deviation of
the distribution is shown in brackets. All estimates are based on a sixth-order polynomial fitted to the empirical earnings
distribution. Significance levels: ⋆⋆⋆ = 1%, ⋆⋆ = 5%, ⋆ = 10%.
The change in the implicit tax rate at the SGA threshold is not only driven by the
reduction in DI benefits, but also by the fact that individuals have to start paying social
security contributions on all earnings. This rule implies that for individuals who are not
receiving DI benefits the tax liability also changes discontinuously at the SGA threshold.
The last row of Table 4.3 shows that among employed individuals who are not on DI
bunching is about four times smaller compared to DI beneficiaries (b=3.94). Yet, the
implied earnings elasticity is significantly larger (e=0.787). As Figure 4.10 in Appendix
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B illustrates, the reason is that frictions are very large for this group of workers because
there is very little missing mass just to the right of the SGA threshold. Since the change
in tax liability at the SGA threshold is smaller for this group, the utility gain from moving
to the threshold is lower as well, making it less attractive to adjust earnings if there is a
fixed adjustment cost.
We complement our empirical analysis with an estimation of the counterfactual labor
force participation rate of DI recipients had they not received DI benefits. This exercise
sheds light on the external validity of the earnings elasticity estimates for Austria. We
follow the approach by Bound (1989) who uses the labor force participation rate of rejected
DI applicants as an estimate of the counterfactual labor force participation rate of DI
recipients.13 Table 4.6 in Appendix C shows that being awarded DI benefits leads to a
22.7-27 percentage point drop in employment. These estimates are very close to OLS
estimates for the U.S. (Maestas et al., 2013) and for Norway (Kostol and Mogstad, 2014).
Table 4.7 displays corresponding estimates for a sample of DI recipients whose benefits
are terminated due to medical recovery. The estimates are quite similar to the results for
DI entrants, suggesting that many DI recipients have considerable work capacity. They
are in line with the estimates presented in Moore (2015) who studies the effects of the
removal of drug and alcohol addictions as qualifying conditions in the U.S. Overall, the
similarity of the estimates indicate that the work capacity of DI recipients in Austria is
comparable to that of DI recipients in other countries.
4.4.3 Fiscal Effects and Policy Implications
This section discusses the fiscal effects of the SGA threshold for the government and
the associated policy implications. More specifically, using data for the year 2012 we
investigate the fiscal impacts of two hypothetical policy changes. Under the first policy, DI
beneficiaries would keep full benefits if earnings exceed the SGA threshold (but they would
still have to pay social security contributions). Under the second policy, DI beneficiaries
would lose benefits more gradually. Specifically, they would lose e1 of benefits for every
e2 of earnings above the SGA threshold. This policy is currently being tested in the U.S.
and is known as the “$1 for $2 benefit offset” (Wittenburg et al. (2015)).
We are interested on the long-run impact of each policy on DI benefits paid, payroll
taxes received, and government net expenditures. To calculate these effects, we proceed
in several steps. First, we calculate the new tax parameters ∆T and ∆t under each policy.
13This approach arguably yields an upper bound because rejected DI applicants are likely to be in
better health on average than DI recipients. However,Autor et al. (2015) show that the Bound approach
is not an upper bound if there are unobservable factors that are negatively correlated with subsequent
labor supply–such as unobserved labor force attachment or application processing time.
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Table 4.4: Annual Fiscal Effect of Abolishing the Notch
Status quo Abolish DI notch e1 for e2 benefit offset
(million e) (million e) (million e)
DI benefits 1025.5 7.1 (0.7%) -0.8
(-0.1%)
Payroll tax revenues 15.1 1.5
(21.1%)
0.8 (5.3%)
Net expenses 1010.4 5.6 (0.6%) 1.5 (0.2%)
Induced entry elasticity -0.09 0.10
Notes: All money amounts are in 2012 Euros.
For example, under the benefit offset policy we have ∆T = 0 and ∆t = 0.5. We then feed
these tax parameters and our estimate of the earnings elasticity (e = 0.206) into equation
4.3 to obtain an estimate of the earnings response ∆z′ under the new tax policy. This
estimate implies that beneficiaries who stopped bunching due to the policy change would
now earn in the interval (∆z∗ − ∆z′). Given knowledge of the earnings distribution of
beneficiaries who stop bunching, we can calculate the change in payroll tax revenues and
DI benefits induced by the policy change.14
The results for the two hypothetical policy changes are reported in Table 4.4. The
first column shows that under the status quo the government spends e1,025.5 million on
DI benefits per year and receives e15.1 million in payroll taxes. As shown in the second
column, abolishing the DI notch generates additional DI benefit payments of e7.1 million,
because beneficiaries who earn above the SGA threshold now receive full benefits.15 The
policy generates additional payroll tax revenues as some beneficiaries work more, but this
effect is too small to offset the rise in DI benefit payments so that annual net government
expenses increase by e5.6 million. Implementing a e1 for e2 benefit offset policy, on
the other hand, would not only increase payroll tax revenues but also reduce DI benefit
payments. The reason is that DI beneficiaries who increase earnings above the threshold
lose part of their benefits, but this loss is offset by higher earnings so their total income
still increases.
Our calculations above ignore the possibility that relaxing the earnings restrictions
could induce more program entry by those able to earn above the SGA threshold.16
14Since DI benefits vary across beneficiaries, we calculate the policy-induced change in DI benefits
using the average DI benefits of beneficiaries just below the SGA threshold.
15In our calculations, we ignore that the increase in DI benefits may induce beneficiaries above the
SGA threshold to reduce their earnings (and payroll tax contributions) through an income effect.
16Making the earnings rules more generous could also lead to fewer program exits by current benefi-
ciaries. However, this effect is likely to be small given that the DI exit rate is already very low under the
current rules (around 1.6 percent per year).
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Because the SGA threshold is identical for all beneficiaries and has not changed during the
observation period (except for small inflation adjustments), we are not able to estimate the
size of induced entry that may occur if earnings restrictions were to be relaxed. However,
we can calculate how elastic DI program inflow would need to be to lead to an increase
in government net expenditure. We follow Kostol and Mogstad (2014) and calculate
an elasticity of induced entry, defined as the percentage increase in the number of DI
beneficiaries relative to the percentage change in disposable income as a DI beneficiary.
The abolishment of the DI notch yields a negative induced entry elasticity of -0.09 because
this policy increases net expenses. The benefit offset policy yields a positive induced entry
elasticity of 0.10. However, this estimate is well below the 1.2 elasticity that Mullen and
Staubli (2015) find in the context of Austria, suggesting that after accounting for induced
entry responses both policies would increase government net expenses.17
4.5 Conclusion
Many countries specify a substantial gainful activity (SGA) threshold in their DI program
and if earnings exceed the SGA threshold for an extended period of time DI beneficiaries
lose part or all of their benefits. This rule results in a discontinuous change in tax liability
at the SGA threshold, creating a strong incentive for many beneficiaries to park earnings
just below the SGA threshold. In this paper, we have examined whether DI recipients
adjust their earnings because of the SGA threshold as well as how elastic their earnings
are to changes in financial incentives.
Using a large and salient notch located at the SGA threshold in Austria’s DI program,
we provide transparent and credible documentation of behavioral earnings responses of DI
beneficiaries. We find evidence for large and sharp bunching just below the SGA threshold
and missing mass just above the SGA threshold, suggesting that many DI recipients would
earn considerably more in the absence of the notch at the SGA threshold. Our estimation
approach implies that the excess number of DI beneficiaries at the threshold equals the
total number that should be observed with monthly earnings up to e400 higher. This
effect represents a substantial 91 percent increase relative to the monthly SGA threshold
of e439.
While the earnings responses to the SGA threshold are large, the elasticities driving
those responses are modest, even after taking into account that observed earnings re-
17The two policies likely affect government expenses also through extensive labor supply responses, as
the reduction in the implicit average tax rate induces some beneficiaries to enter the labor force. Such
extensive responses generate additional payroll tax revenues and lead to a higher elasticity of induced
entry. However, it is unlikely that the extensive responses would be big enough to get an elasticity of
induced entry of 1.2 or more. Thus, even after accounting for extensive responses both policies would
likely lead to an increase in government net expneses.
146 Disability Notch
sponses are attenuated by adjustment frictions. We estimate that the earnings elasticity
with respect to the implicit net-of-tax rate is 0.206, suggesting a relatively low respon-
siveness of earnings to financial incentives. The reason is that notches create extremely
large implicit marginal tax rates and thus behavioral responses are large, even when elas-
ticities are quite small. The elasticity estimates are heterogeneous across subgroups of
the population, with women and younger age groups being more responsive to financial
incentives compared to men and older age groups.
Our results are derived in the context of Austria and one needs to exercise caution
when applying these conclusions to other countries. The DI program in Austria shares
similarities with DI programs in other countries in terms of size and composition of ben-
eficiaries. Moreover, our estimates of the counterfactual labor force participation rate of
DI beneficiaries using rejected applicants as a control group are similar to those found
in recent studies, suggesting that our findings may be informative for other settings as
well. However, there are also some characteristics that are distinct from other programs,
most notably the level of the SGA threshold. This difference is important because our
estimation strategy exploits variation in earnings of beneficiaries located around the SGA
threshold. The elasticity may be different in countries with a different SGA threshold
than in Austria.
Our framework is useful to shed light on the fiscal effects of policy reforms encouraging
work among DI beneficiaries by reducing the implicit tax on earnings. Our calculations
suggest that replacing the notch at the SGA threshold with a e1 benefit offset for every e2
of earnings would increase work and reduce government expenditures. However, allowing
DI recipients to earn more while keeping benefits may increase the incentive to apply for
DI benefits. While we cannot estimate the level of induced entry that would occur if
earnings restrictions were relaxed, we instead calculate how elastic entry responses would
have to be to increase net expenditure. We find that the elasticity of program inflow
to changes in benefits estimated in previous studies is above our break-even elasticity,
suggesting that government net expenditures would increase after accounting for induced
entry responses.
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4.6 Appendix
A Additional Tables
Table 4.5: Earnings Elasticities in Different Years After DI Entry
Bunching Earnings response Earnings elasticity
b ∆z∗ e
1 Year after Entry 13.37⋆⋆⋆ 400.0⋆⋆⋆ 0.178⋆⋆⋆
(0.603) (21.80) (0.023)
2 Years after Entry 15.81⋆⋆⋆ 400.0⋆⋆⋆ 0.166⋆⋆⋆
(0.690) (22.81) (0.023)
3 Years after Entry 16.81⋆⋆⋆ 420.0⋆⋆⋆ 0.188⋆⋆⋆
(0.873) (32.63) (0.033)
4 Years after Entry 14.97⋆⋆⋆ 370.0⋆⋆⋆ 0.132⋆⋆⋆
(0.916) (27.74) (0.027)
5 Years after Entry 15.81⋆⋆⋆ 390.0⋆⋆⋆ 0.153⋆⋆⋆
(1.118) (37.67) (0.037)
6 Years after Entry 17.76⋆⋆⋆ 430.0⋆⋆⋆ 0.183⋆⋆⋆
(1.308) (48.95) (0.046)
7 Years after Entry 17.64⋆⋆⋆ 440.0⋆⋆⋆ 0.201⋆⋆⋆
(1.598) (56.55) (0.055)
Notes: The table presents estimates of bunching b, the earnings response ∆z (based on the point of convergence zU between
the observed and the counterfactual density), and the structural earnings elasticity e for different years after entry into
DI. Standard errors in parentheses are obtained using a bootstrap procedure where we sample from the population with
replacement. The standard deviation of the distribution is shown in brackets. All estimates are based on a sixth-order
polynomial fitted to the empirical earnings distribution. Significance levels: ⋆⋆⋆ = 1%, ⋆⋆ = 5%, ⋆ = 10%.
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B Additional Figures
Figure 4.8: Distribution of Annual Earnings Around the SGA Threshold
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Notes: The figure shows the earnings distribution of annual gross earnings around the annual SGA threshold (marked by
the vertical solid line) for DI beneficiaries between 2001 and 2012. The histogram bins are annual gross earnings relative to
the SGA threshold in the relevant year. The bin width is e120.
Figure 4.9: Estimated Counterfactual Earnings Distributions Around the SGA Threshold for
Fifth-degree (left panel) and Seventh-degree (right panel) Polynomials
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Notes: The figure shows the earnings distribution of monthly gross earnings around the SGA threshold (marked by the
vertical solid line) for DI beneficiaries between 2001 and 2012. The excluded range [zL, zU ] is marked by vertical dotted
lines. The histogram bins are monthly gross earnings relative to the SGA threshold in the relevant year. The bin width is
e10. The solid line beneath the empirical distribution in the left (right) panel is a fifth-degree (seventh-degree) polynomial
fitted to the empirical distribution using equation (4.6). Bunching b is excess mass in the excluded range below the notch
relative to the average counterfactual density in the interval [zL, z∗] and zU has been estimated such that missing mass
equals bunching mass. Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 4.10: Earnings Distribution Around the SGA Threshold for Workers not Receiving DI
Benefits
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Notes: The figure shows the earnings distribution of monthly gross earnings around the SGA threshold (marked by the
vertical solid line) for individuals not receiving DI benefits between 2001 and 2012. The excluded range [zL, zU ] is marked
by vertical dotted lines. The histogram bins are monthly gross earnings relative to the SGA threshold in the relevant year.
The bin width is e10. The solid line beneath the empirical distribution is a sixth-degree polynomial fitted to the empirical
distribution using equation (4.6). Bunching b is excess mass in the excluded range below the notch relative to the average
counterfactual density in the interval [zL, z∗] and zU has been estimated such that missing mass equals bunching mass.
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 4.11: Earnings Distribution Around the SGA Threshold Before and After DI Entry
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Notes: The figure shows the earnings distribution of monthly gross earnings around the SGA threshold (marked by the
vertical solid line) for DI beneficiaries 8, 6, 4, 2, 1 years before DI entry and 0, 1, 2, 4 years after DI entry. The sample
consists of DI beneficiaries who are working at least once in the first five years after program entry. The histogram bins are
monthly gross earnings relative to the SGA threshold in the relevant year. The bin width is e10. The solid line beneath
the empirical distribution is a sixth-degree polynomial fitted to the empirical distribution using equation (4.6).
Figure 4.12: Earnings Distribution Around the SGA Threshold Before and After DI Exit
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Notes: The figure shows the earnings distribution of monthly gross earnings around the SGA threshold (marked by the
vertical solid line) for DI beneficiaries 3, 1 years before exit from the DI program and 0, 1, 2, 4 years after exit from the
DI program. The sample consists of DI recipients who exit the DI program between 2004 and 2007; exits into the old-age
pensions are excluded. The histogram bins are monthly gross earnings relative to the SGA threshold in the relevant year.
The bin width is e10. The solid line beneath the empirical distribution is a sixth-degree polynomial fitted to the empirical
distribution using equation (4.6).
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C Labor Supply Response Using Bound-Approach
This section presents estimates of the counterfactual labor force participation rate of DI
recipients had they not received benefits. We follow the method by Bound (1989) who uses
the labor force participation rate of rejected DI applicants in the U.S. as an estimate of
the counterfactual labor force participation rate of DI recipients. This approach arguably
yields an upper bound because rejected DI applicants are likely to be in better health on
average than DI recipients.18 We extend his approach in two dimensions: first, our data
contain information on the receipt of unemployment and sick leave benefits allowing us to
examine benefit substitution between DI and related social insurance programs. Second,
we also estimate the effects of terminating DI benefits using the labor force participation
rate of beneficiaries whose program eligibility ceased due to medical recovery as an upper
bound of the labor force participation rate of beneficiaries who continue on the program.
This estimate is informative on the effectiveness of return-to-work policies in returning
beneficiaries to the labor force.
Figure 4.13: Employment Before and After Initial Decision (left panel) and DI-Exit (right
panel)
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Notes: The figure shows employment rates relative to the year of the initial decision (left panel) and relative to the year of
DI-exit (right panel) for different groups of individuals. Employment is measured as having positive working days in the
year in consideration. The sample consists of all initial applicants in the years 2004-2007 (left panel) and all DI recipients
who left the DI program in the years 2005-2007 (right panel), except for those who have been transferred to the old-age
pension program.
The left panel of Figure 4.13 displays the employment rate of 2005-2007 applicants
up to fifteen years before and five years after their initial determination. Employment is
defined as having positive working days in a given year. Before the initial determination,
the employment rate of applicants who were initially allowed is very similar to that of
applicants allowed on appeal. There is a sharp drop in employment in the determination
year and by three years after the decision employment rates are relatively constant at
18Autor et al. (2015) note that the Bound approach is not an upper bound if there is omitted vari-
able bias from unobservable factors that are negatively correlated with subsequent labor supply–such as
unobserved labor force attachment or application processing time.
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around 5 percent for both groups. In contrast, ultimately denied applicants have lower
employment rates before the initial determination and significantly higher employment
rates after the initial determination. Denied applicants who do not appeal and those
who appeal have similar employment rates prior to the initial decision, but employment
rates are around twice as large for denied applicants who do not appeal after the initial
decision. The right panel of Figure 4.13 shows the employment rate of DI recipients who
lost their benefits between 2005 and 2007 up to fifteen years before and five years after DI
exit. Before the withdrawal of benefits, the employment rate of recipients who do not ap-
peal differs only very little from that of recipients who do (successfully or unsuccessfully)
appeal. The employment rate increases sharply after the withdrawal of benefits for bene-
ficiaries who do not appeal, while the employment rate steadily declines for beneficiaries
who are re-allowed. There is also a rise in the employment rate after benefit withdrawal
for recipients who are denied on appeal, although the employment rate is considerably
lower compared to recipients who do not appeal.
Figure 4.14: Unemployment (left panel) and Sick Leave (right panel) Before and After Initial
Decision
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Notes: The figure shows the share of individuals in unemployment and sick leave before and after the year of the initial
decision for different groups of DI applicants. The sample consists of all initial applicants in the years 2005-2007.
In addition to disability insurance, unemployment and sick leave insurance also provide
income replacement in the case of a separation from the labor market for economic or
health reasons. It is likely that the receipt of disability benefits impacts unemployment
and sick leave enrollment. Figure 4.14 display trends in unemployment and sick leave
up to fifteen years before and five years after the initial determination, while 4.15 shows
analogous trends before and after the removal of disability benefits. Both figures show
that spillover effects among these government transfer programs are important. More
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Figure 4.15: Unemployment (left panel) and Sick Leave (right panel) Before and After DI-Exit
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Notes: The figure shows the share of individuals in unemployment and sick leave before and after the year of DI-exit for
different groups of DI claimants. The sample consists of all individuals who left the DI program in the years 2004-2007,
except for those who have been transferred to the old-age pension program.
specifically, in the year before the initial decision 30-50 percent of applicants are registered
as unemployed and about 20 percent claim sick leave benefits. These numbers drop to
zero five years after the initial determination for applicants awarded DI benefits, while
the unemployment and sick leave rates remain large for ultimately denied applicants.
Similarly, there is sizeable increase in the unemployment and sick leave rate in the first
year after individuals lose their DI benefits. These rates decline steadily for recipients
who are re-allowed to the program but remain high for those who permanently exit the
DI rolls.
Table 4.6 presents OLS estimates on the impact of being awarded DI benefits on
employment (positive working days), employment above SGA (e.g., earning more than
e5,268 in 2012), annual earnings, registered unemployment, and sick leave.19 The key
explanatory variable ALLOW is equal to one if an applicant is awarded benefits (up to
five years after the initial decision), and zero otherwise. Panels A-C show that receiving
DI leads to a 22.7-27 percentage point drop in employment, a 19.4-22.5 percentage point
drop in the probability of earning more than the annual SGA threshold, and a e4,278-
e4,726 drop in annual earnings. These estimates are very close to the OLS estimates
(and slightly above the IV estimates) reported in Maestas et al. (2013) for the United
States. Moreover, panels D and E show that receiving DI is associated with a 35.1-39.3
percentage point decrease in unemployment and a 7.7-8.6 percentage point decrease in
sick leave absence.
Table 4.7 displays corresponding estimates for the sample of DI recipients who lose
benefits between 2005 and 2007. Here, ALLOW is equal to one if a recipient is not
19More specifically, the regression takes the following form yi = Xiβ + γALLOWi + εi, where yi is
the outcome variable of interest of applicant i, Xi denotes observed characteristics (past labor market
experience, past average wage, and dummies for gender, occupation, region, and industry), ALLOWi = 1
if the applicant is awarded DI benefits up to five years after the initial determination, and εi is an error
term.
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Table 4.6: Impact of DI Benefit Receipt on Employment, Earnings, and Transfers
Years after decision Two Three Four Five
A. Working days > 0
Coefficient on ALLOW -0.265⋆⋆⋆ -0.270⋆⋆⋆ -0.251⋆⋆⋆ -0.227⋆⋆⋆
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
R2 0.150 0.168 0.172 0.170
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.047 0.049 0.049 0.049
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.248 0.221 0.194 0.172
B. Earnings > SGA
Coefficient on ALLOW -0.217⋆⋆⋆ -0.225⋆⋆⋆ -0.213⋆⋆⋆ -0.194⋆⋆⋆
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.125 0.141 0.145 0.146
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.041
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.208 0.182 0.160 0.143
C. Earnings
Coefficient on ALLOW -4,410⋆⋆⋆ -4,726⋆⋆⋆ -4,591⋆⋆⋆ -4,278⋆⋆⋆
(69) (70) (66) (66)
R2 0.102 0.111 0.119 0.107
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 898 918 915 970
Mean dependent Variable | denied 4,389 3,773 3,361 3,054
D. Unemployment
Coefficient on ALLOW -0.381⋆⋆⋆ -0.393⋆⋆⋆ -0.384⋆⋆⋆ -0.351⋆⋆⋆
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.226 0.252 0.261 0.244
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.025
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.405 0.344 0.298 0.257
E. Sick leave
Coefficient on ALLOW -0.077⋆⋆⋆ -0.084⋆⋆⋆ -0.086⋆⋆⋆ -0.078⋆⋆⋆
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.028 0.038 0.046 0.046
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.010
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.105 0.086 0.071 0.062
Observations 88,562 87,285 86,114 84,997
Notes: The sample consists of first applicants for DI benefits in the years 2005-2007. Control variables include: experience
past 15 years, unemployment past 15 years, sick leave past 15 years, tenure in years prior to decision, average wage, and
dummies for gender, occupation, region (37) and industry (251). Significance levels: ⋆⋆⋆ = 1%, ⋆⋆ = 5%, ⋆ = 10%.
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re-allowed to the DI program, and zero otherwise. The estimates are quite similar to
the results for DI entrants, suggesting that many DI recipients have considerable work
capacity. More specifically, panels A-C indicate that exiting the DI programs leads to a
20.6-29.2 percentage point rise in employment, a 19.6-27.6 percentage point increase in
the probability of earning above the annual SGA threshold, and a e3,975-e5,545 increase
in annual earnings. These estimates are very close to the evidence presented in Moore
(2015) who studies the labor supply effects of the removal of drug and alcohol addictions
as qualifying conditions in the U.S. DI program. Panel D indicates that the removal of
DI benefits leads to a sizeable increase in registered unemployment, while Panel E shows
that by four years after program exit sick leave receipt starts to increase. Overall, the
similarity of the labor supply estimates indicates that the work capacity of DI recipients in
Austria is comparable to that of DI recipients in the U.S., lending support to the external
validity of our analysis on the earnings response to the SGA threshold.
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Table 4.7: Impact of DI Benefit Loss on Employment, Earnings and Transfers
Years after decision Two Three Four Five
A. Working days > 0
Coefficient on ALLOW 0.206⋆⋆⋆ 0.255⋆⋆⋆ 0.278⋆⋆⋆ 0.292⋆⋆⋆
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
R2 0.189 0.218 0.248 0.255
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.455 0.471 0.474 0.466
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.187 0.159 0.141 0.118
B. Earnings > SGA
Coefficient on ALLOW 0.196⋆⋆⋆ 0.234⋆⋆⋆ 0.256⋆⋆⋆ 0.276⋆⋆⋆
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
R2 0.197 0.224 0.247 0.273
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.346 0.369 0.374 0.369
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.099 0.083 0.066 0.044
C. Earnings
Coefficient on ALLOW 3,975⋆⋆⋆ 4,519⋆⋆⋆ 5,183⋆⋆⋆ 5,545⋆⋆⋆
(215) (220) (221) (221)
R2 0.200 0.216 0.232 0.250
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 6,698 7,090 7,457 7,520
Mean dependent Variable | denied 1,653 1,510 1,214 872
D. Unemployment
Coefficient on ALLOW 0.090⋆⋆⋆ 0.184⋆⋆⋆ 0.210⋆⋆⋆ 0.240⋆⋆⋆
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
R2 0.101 0.100 0.089 0.119
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.432 0.383 0.340 0.324
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.387 0.240 0.164 0.117
E. Sick leave
Coefficient on ALLOW -0.019⋆⋆ -0.000 0.040⋆⋆⋆ 0.029⋆⋆⋆
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
R2 0.004 0.015 0.022 0.024
Mean dependent Variable | allowed 0.092 0.091 0.106 0.078
Mean dependent Variable | denied 0.102 0.077 0.053 0.039
Observations 5,967 5,912 5,841 5,791
Notes: The sample consists of all individuals who left the DI program in the years 2005-2007, except for those who have
been transferred to the old-age pension program. Control variables include: experience past 15 years, unemployment past
15 years, sick leave past 15 years, tenure in years prior to decision, average wage, and dummies for gender, occupation,
region (37) and industry (251). Significance levels: ⋆⋆⋆ = 1%, ⋆⋆ = 5%, ⋆ = 10%.
158 Disability Notch
D Derivation of Equation (4.3)
This section illustrates the derivation of equation (4.3). The utility level at the SGA
threshold z∗ is given by
u(z∗) = (1− t)(s+ z∗)− n
∗ +∆n∗
1 + 1/e
(
z∗
n∗ +∆n∗
)1+1/e
,
where (n∗ +∆n∗) is the ability level of the DI beneficiary that is indifferent between
z∗ and zI . Maximizing equation (4.2) with respect to T (s, z) = −(1 − t)s + tz + [∆T +
∆tz]1(z > z∗) implies that zI = (n∗ +∆n∗)(1 − t −∆t)e. Using this expression, we can
write the utility at the interior point zI as follows
u(zI) = (1− t)s−∆T +∆tz∗ + 1
1 + e
(1− t−∆t)1+e(n∗ +∆n∗).
Setting u(zI) = u(z∗) and using the condition (n∗ + ∆n∗) = z∗+∆z∗
(1−t)e , we obtain an
expression that defines the elasticity e as an implicit function of :
(1− t)z∗ +∆T −∆tz∗ − n∗+∆n∗
1+1/e
(
z∗
n∗+∆n∗
)1+1/e
= 1
1+e
(1− t−∆t)1+e
(
z∗+∆z∗
(1−t)e
)
⇔
1
1+∆z∗/z∗
[
1 + ∆T/z
∗−∆t
1−t
]
− 1
1+1/e
(
1
1+∆z∗/z∗
)1+1/e
− 1
1+e
(
1− ∆t
1−t
)1+e
= 0
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